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Although scholars have long recognized the president’s pre-eminent status as an agenda-setter, 
there is surprisingly little evidence available to suggest that presidents can and do influence the 
public agenda. While a modest literature reveals presidential speeches as important determinants 
of the public agenda, the assumption that rhetoric matters, commonly made by students of the 
presidency, has been largely unaccompanied by the support of empirical evidence. As a result, 
the question of whether presidential rhetoric constitutes an important ingredient of agenda setting 
success remains very much open to debate.  
 Based on an extensive content analysis of State of the Union Addresses from 1946 to 
2003, this dissertation considers in three separate studies the influence of presidential rhetoric as 
a tool for setting the public agenda. The first considers the influence of several presidential 
rhetoric variables resulting from the content analysis on aggregate-level evaluations of the 
salience of 1,113 issues discussed by 11 presidents from 1946 to 2003. The second study 
estimates the influence of several moderators of the relationship between presidential rhetoric on 
the public agenda, based on the individual-level assessments of issue salience expressed by 
respondents following State of the Union Addresses given by Presidents Ronald Reagan, George 
H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. Finally, based on an experimental analysis in 
which 340 subjects were shown edited videos of a presidential speech, the third study examines
v 
the influence of the three specific forms of presidential rhetoric used by President George W. 
Bush in his discussion of the issue of the economy.  
 The findings demonstrate that (1) presidents respond to environmental conditions 
fashioning their State of the Union rhetoric, (2) presidents use their rhetoric to move issues onto 
the public agenda and, by claiming credit, presidents also move issues off the public agenda, (3) 
presidential rhetoric not only influences the public agenda directly, among those who watch the 
speech, but also indirectly by affecting media coverage after the speech, and (4) the influence of 
presidential rhetoric is more pronounced among those who support the president, who share 
similar political predispositions as the president, and who are politically sophisticated.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“The president’s is the only national voice in our affairs. Let him once win the admiration and 
confidence of the country and no other single force can withstand him. If he rightly interprets the 
national thought and boldly insists upon it, he is irresistible; the country never feels the zest for 
action so much as when its President is of such insight and calibre. Its instinct is for unified 
action and it craves a single leader.” 
Woodrow Wilson, 28th President of the United States (1908) 
 
 
 
 The ability to set the public agenda is widely regarded as one of the most important 
sources of presidential power (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cobb and Elder 1983; Downs 1972; 
Kingdon 1995). First, presidents may use their influence to keep controversial issues, or issues 
on which their position is unpopular, off the public agenda. Alternatively, presidents may be able 
to improve their public standing among the public by focusing on issues for which there is 
already considerable support for their position. In so doing, the president may be able to cultivate 
a degree of support among the public that could not be achieved by other presidents who do not 
engage in such agenda setting tactics. Second, Presidents who are successful in placing issues on 
the public agenda are frequently successful in placing those same issues on the congressional 
agenda (Kingdon 1995), and once presidents have convinced Congress to take up their policy 
proposals, the likelihood of success on subsequent roll call votes is significant (Canes-Wrone 
2001a, 2001b; Edwards and Barrett 2000). Third, presidents successful in heightening an issue’s 
salience among the public may be able to increase the weight of that issue in evaluations of their 
job performance (e.g. Edwards 1995; Krosnick and Kinder 1990). Presidents who are able to
2 
control the issues on which their performance evaluations are based may be able to exert a 
certain degree of influence, albeit indirect, over their popularity ratings. Finally, increasing an 
issue’s salience among the public is considered to be an effective call to action for critical groups 
of presidential supporters (Kernell 1997; Welch 2002). When a president calls attention to an 
issue, the response of much of the public is likely to be an increase in the level of salience for
 that issue. But for the most ardent among a president’s supporters, an appeal for support on a 
particular issue may be just the impetus needed to move these citizens from tacit support to 
political activism. 
 Scholars have long recognized the president’s pre-eminent status as an agenda-setter. 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Kingdon 1995; Neustadt 1990). According to Baumgartner and 
Jones (1993), “no other actor can focus attention as clearly, or change the motivations of such a 
great number of actors, as the president” (241). Kingdon (1995) similarly concluded that, “the 
president can single-handedly set the agendas, not only of people in the executive branch, but 
also of people in Congress and outside of government” (23). Although the traditional model of 
the president as the primary agenda setter in American politics remains the dominant perspective, 
there is surprisingly little evidence available to suggest that presidents can and do influence the 
public agenda. While a modest literature reveals presidential speeches as important determinants 
of the public agenda (e.g. Behr and Iyengar 1985; Cohen 1995, 1997; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; 
Miller and Wanta 1996; Wanta 1997), the assumption that rhetoric matters, commonly made by 
students of the presidency, has been largely unaccompanied by the support of empirical evidence 
(Edwards 1996). As a result, the question of whether presidential rhetoric constitutes an 
important ingredient of agenda setting success remains very much open to debate.  
3 
 Based on an extensive content analysis of State of the Union Addresses from 1946 to 
2003, this dissertation consists of three separate studies of the influence of presidential rhetoric 
as a tool for setting the public’s issue agenda. The first considers the influence of several 
presidential rhetoric variables resulting from the content analysis on aggregate-level evaluations 
of the salience of 1,113 issues discussed by 11 presidents from 1946 to 2003. The second study 
estimates the influence of several moderators of the relationship between presidential rhetoric on 
the public agenda, based on the individual-level assessments of issue salience expressed by 
respondents who watched State of the Union Addresses given by Presidents Ronald Reagan, 
George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. Finally, based on an experimental 
analysis in which 340 subjects were shown videos of the 2003 State of the Union Address, the 
third study examines the influence of the three forms of presidential rhetoric used by George W. 
Bush in his discussion of the issue of the economy. 
 In the following sections, this dissertation (1) considers the research on presidential 
speeches and the public opinion, (2) presents the results of a content analysis of presidential 
rhetoric in State of the Union Addresses, (3) details an issue priming perspective on presidential 
agenda setting, (4) describes the research design, methodology, and results of three separate 
studies of the influence of presidential rhetoric and the public agenda, (4) and discusses the 
implications of the findings 
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II. PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES AND PUBLIC OPINION 
 
 
 
A. PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES AND PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL 
 A considerable amount of research of research has investigated the influence of 
presidential speeches on public opinion, the lion’s share of which has focused on presidential 
approval. While a substantial number of these studies have found presidential speeches to be an 
effective strategy for maintaining public support (Ragsdale 1984; Ragsdale 1987; Brace and 
Hinckley 1992, 1993), a number of other studies are less sanguine about the influence of 
presidential speeches (MacKuen 1983; Ostrom and Simon 1989; Simon and Ostrom 1989; 
Welch 2002). The first systematic analysis of the influence of speeches on presidential approval 
was conducted by Ragsdale (1984). The results of her study of 159 major speeches given by 
Truman through Carter indicate that each presidential speech resulted in an average increase in 
presidential approval of 3%, and exceeded the effects of important events, military activity, and 
inflation. In a subsequent analysis, Ragsdale (1987) examined the group bases of public reactions 
to presidential speeches. Importantly, the results demonstrate that the effects of major speeches 
on presidential approval were not felt equally across all segments of the population. With the 
exception of Nixon, Presidents Johnson through Reagan used their speeches to boost their 
popularity ratings among all groups of partisans. In contrast, while Johnson, Ford Carter, and 
Reagan all benefited from increased popularity among middle and high income groups following
a speech, none of these presidents, with the unexpected exception of Reagan, received greater 
public support from those with low incomes. In more recent work addressing the influence
5 
of speeches on presidential approval, Brace and Hinckley (1992, 1993) have established that, 
among the forms of political drama available to presidents, major speeches represent the most 
effective strategy for increasing presidential approval - an average of about 6% - while foreign 
travel had little impact at all, and domestic trips actually resulted in a negative impact on 
approval.  
 In contrast to the aforementioned analyses, a number of other studies cast considerable 
doubt on the efficacy of presidential speeches as an all-purpose strategy to halt declines or 
replenish losses in approval (MacKuen 1983; Ostrom and Simon 1989; Simon and Ostrom 1989; 
Welch 2002). Quite different from the results reported by Ragsdale (1984, 1987) and Brace and 
Hinckley (1992, 1993), Ostrom and Simon (1989) found in their study of presidential approval 
during the Reagan administration that presidential speeches resulted in the smallest influence on 
approval of any of the forms of political drama analyzed. While approval enhancing events and 
unemployment had the greatest impact on approval - an average increase in approval of 8% and 
4%, respectively, the effects of foreign trips and speeches were much smaller, an average 
increase of 3% and 1%, respectively. Welch (2002) also examined the effect of presidential 
speeches on approval during the Reagan administration, but his data allowed him to distinguish 
between the reactions to Reagan’s speeches of those who watched the entire speech, those who 
watched part of the speech, and those who heard or read about the speech later. Of ten major 
speeches given by Reagan from 1981 to 1984, just one resulted in a significant positive effect on 
presidential approval, and even this limited effect was confined to those who just watched part of 
the speech. Interestingly, four addresses produced a negative effect on approval. Two of these 
addresses produced a negative effect among those who watched part of the speech, and two of 
the addresses produced a negative effect among those who read or heard about the speech later. 
6 
Finally, in part of larger analysis of the influence of presidential speeches and approval, Edwards 
(2003) also examined the influence of Reagan’s speeches on his popularity among the public. He 
found that the only time an increase in approval of 6% or more occurred after a Reagan speech, 
was when Reagan announced the commencement of an air strike against Libya on April 14, 
1981.  
 Together, the research of Ostrom and Simon (1989), Welch (2002), and Edwards (2003) 
provide compelling evidence contradicting the image of Reagan as a “Great Communicator,” 
who was able to use his charisma and political skills to overcome opposition to his presidency. In 
an analysis extending beyond the Reagan presidency to include Presidents Eisenhower through 
Reagan, Simon and Ostrom (1989) demonstrate that speeches did not consistently produce 
increases in approval and, in some cases, actually had a negative impact on presidential approval. 
The only instances in which a presidential speech led to an increase in approval was when the 
speech was accompanied by an approval enhancing event. Similarly, in his study of speeches and 
approval from Presidents Reagan through George W. Bush, Edwards (2003) demonstrates that, 
of the increases in approval that did occur during the time series examined, very few followed a 
presidential speech, most of those did follow speeches were within margin of error, and speeches 
in several cases were followed by losses in approval.  
 The conclusions reached in studies of the influence of speeches on presidential approval 
are decidedly mixed. How may their discrepant findings be reconciled? First, most of the 
research casting doubt on the effect of speeches is limited to the Reagan presidency. While these 
studies have been vital in readjusting our evaluations of the “Teflon” president, their findings are 
less useful in evaluations of the effectiveness of presidential speeches across presidential 
administrations.  
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 Second, at least some of the discrepancy in the findings may be attributable to the 
different types of speeches included in the various studies. The analyses which found presidential 
speeches to be influential determinants of approval levels were all confined to major, nationally 
televised speeches, including inaugural addresses, State of the Union Addresses, and other 
addresses to joint sessions of Congress that were delivered during prime-time and were covered 
live by all three television networks (Ragsdale 1984, 1987, Brace and Hinckley 1992, 1993). In 
contrast, Simon and Ostrom (1989) selected the speeches used in their analysis according to a 
different set of criteria. All speeches, messages, and announcements broadcast live by at least 
one network were included in their analysis, while both State of the Union Addresses and 
inaugural addresses were excluded. Finally, the list of speeches used by Edwards (2003) includes 
both major and minor speeches- although the list is clearly dominated by the latter. Thus, it is 
apparent that the work of Ragsdale and Brace and Hinckley is based on speeches that were, on 
average, of a higher profile and viewed by more people, and not surprisingly more effective than 
the speeches used by Simon and Ostrom and Edwards in their research. Thus, in order to 
significantly increase in their popularity ratings among the public, the literature collectively 
suggests that president must resort to major, nationally televised addresses delivered in prime-
time. Simple announcements or short messages delivered during the middle of the day and 
broadcast by just one or two of the major networks are insufficient. 
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B. PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES AND POLICY PREFERENCES 
 A considerable amount of effort has also been devoted to studying the effects of speeches 
on the public’s policy preferences. A number of studies have examined the effect of attributing 
presidential support for policies on public attitudes toward those policies. Using a split-ballot 
technique, Rosen (1973) found that fewer respondents would oppose a “family assistance plan,” 
a fictitious policy, if they were told that it was President Nixon’s plan than if they were not told it 
was Nixon’s, although the differences in support were relatively modest. Thomas and Sigelman 
(1985) examined preferences to the same hypothetical policy, and a number of others, using the 
split-ballot research design. They found that attribution of the policies to Reagan did increase 
support for those policies, but only among those who expressed a strong psychological 
identification with President Reagan. In contrast to these findings, the research of Sigelman and 
Sigelman (1981) found that respondents were actually less likely to support various policies if 
responsibility for those policies was attributed to President Carter, than if responsibility was not 
attributed to Carter. In a study conducted by Hurwtiz (1989), respondents were asked if they 
supported or opposed a number of policies. After giving their answers, they were told President 
Reagan held the opposite position and were then given the opportunity to change their opinion, if 
they so chose. His results reveal that 3 out of 10 respondents elected to change their opinions 
after hearing President Reagan’s positions differed from their own. Interestingly, of the policies 
presented to respondents, he found that individuals were nearly three times more likely to change 
their opinions on foreign policy issues, in comparison to domestic issues. This finding is in 
accord with the notion that the president is generally granted a greater degree of deference in 
matters of foreign affairs than in domestic policy. Hurwitz (1989) has demonstrated that 
“presidential followership” did not take place equally among all segments of the public. 
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Generally speaking, those most susceptible to presidential influence were unwilling or unable to 
bear the “cognitive costs” associated with arriving at an independent judgment about a given 
policy. Those with little political information, little interest in politics, and those for whom the 
issue was not salient, proved to be the most responsive to the president’s influence. Finally, 
Mondak (1993) has demonstrated that it is possible to produce different levels of support for the 
same policy by simply inserting “source cues” in questions posed to respondents. The 
respondents in his study were exposed to 74 pairs of policy preference questions. For each pair, 
one question included a source cue, and the other did not. For example, concerning the issue of 
defense, half of the respondents were asked, “Would you say that United States military is 
stronger than when Reagan took office, less strong, or the same?” while the other half were 
asked “Do you think the United States is stronger militarily than it was five years ago, or do you 
think it’s about the same?” The results indicate that attitudes toward the policies presented to 
respondents were to a statistically significant extent determined by the presence, or absence, of 
Reagan’s name as a source cue. When source cues were not provided, approval of Reagan 
exerted much less impact on policy preferences in comparison to the opinions expressed toward 
policies when source cues were provided. Mondak (1993) also found that, the longer the question 
and the less information contained in the question, the less respondents relied on source cues 
when they were provided. Finally, the analysis has also shown that when the source cues were 
particularly prominent (i.e. when the amount of cue information was high, and the substantive 
content of the question was low), they had a much greater impact on policy preferences than 
when source cues were not prominent. While these studies do not necessarily gauge the public 
response to presidential speeches, they do suggest that at least a portion of the president’s 
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influence on the public’s policy preferences may simply result from learning that a president 
supports, or opposes, a particular policy.  
 In a study that does consider the influence of speeches on policy preferences, Gilboa 
(1987) examined the effect of President Reagan’s televised speeches on public opinion toward 
the American military presence in Lebanon in 1983, and toward the TWA hostage crisis in 1985. 
Although Gilboa does not estimate the impact of speeches in a statistical analysis that controlled 
for alternative explanations of attitude change, his data do indicate more support for the military 
mission in Lebanon as measured by polls taken immediately after the speech in comparison to 
the level of support found immediately before the speech. In the midst of the TWA hostage 
crisis, Reagan gave a press conference in which he highlighted the dangers of a military 
operation to extricate the TWA hostages and warned against negotiating with terrorists. In polls 
taken immediately after the speech, public support for both of these policies declined in 
comparison to the support for these policies revealed by polls taken just prior to Reagan’s press 
conference.  
 Perhaps the best available evidence addressing the question of whether presidential 
speeches are influential determinants of policy preferences is offered by Page, Shapiro and 
Dempsey (1987), and Page and Shapiro (1992). Their analysis estimated the impact of 
presidential speeches and numerous other influences (e.g. economy, war, events, and the mass 
media) on a diverse range of policy preferences over a 50 year period. The results show that 
presidents’ speeches did influence public policy preferences, though the influence was confined 
to presidents with approval ratings above 50%. Their evidence further indicates that in order to 
have an impact on public opinion, it must be the president, and not other administration officials, 
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who delivers the speech. In fact, surrogates speaking on behalf of the president had a slightly 
negative effect on public policy preferences.  
 Meernik and Ault’s (2001) study estimated the impact of presidential speeches, foreign 
travel, the use of military force, media coverage, and a number of other factors on public 
attitudes toward the president’s handling of foreign policy. Among their findings, the authors 
demonstrate that positive news increased support, while negative news resulted in a decrease in 
support. The authors have also shown that, while foreign travel had no impact, both military 
force and nationally televised presidential speeches resulted in statistically significant increases 
in public support for the president’s handling of foreign policy. Finally, Edwards (2003) has 
shown that Presidents Reagan and Clinton were both unable to influence public support for 
government services, Reagan was unable to increase support for defense spending, and Clinton 
was unable to generate increased support for health care, except among African-Americans.   
 
C. PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES AND AGENDA SETTING 
1. The Congressional Agenda 
 While considerable attention has been given to the impact of presidential speeches on 
approval ratings and policy preferences, the empirical literature also suggests that speeches can 
be a particularly useful tool in presidential attempts to set the agendas of Congress, the mass 
media, and the public. Although research has examined the influence of presidential speeches on 
Congress, much of this work has focused on the effect of speeches on roll call votes, and very 
little has considered the influence such speeches have on the congressional agenda. One 
exception is a study conducted by Edwards and Wood (1999) which considers the attention given 
to the issues of crime, education, and health care in the 1980s and 1990s by Congress, as well as 
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the media and the president. The authors found that presidents were able to use their speeches, 
statements, and messages to influence the issues taken up in congressional hearings, although 
this influence was limited to foreign policy. In domestic affairs, speeches given by Bush and 
Clinton had strong statistically significant effects on congressional attention to the issues of 
education, Clinton’s speeches influenced the congressional agenda on the issue of health care, 
and Reagan’s speeches did not have a significant influence on the agenda of Congress. 
Interestingly, in no instance did their results indicate a reciprocal relationship: presidents did not 
respond to the congressional agenda in deciding which issues to address in their speeches.  
 In another study, Peake (2001) argues that the capacity of the president to influence the 
agendas of other actors in the political system has been underestimated in previous research 
(Wood and Peake 1998; Edwards and Wood 1999). Whereas Wood and Peake (1998) and 
Edwards and Wood (1999) have suggested that the president’s influence on the congressional 
agenda is relatively limited, particularly in the realm of foreign policy, Peak (2001) points out 
that these studies were limited to a consideration of highly salient foreign policy issues. By 
extending the analysis to include less salient issues, Peake’s analysis demonstrates that 
presidents substantially impacted congressional attention to foreign policy issues. 
2. The Media Agenda  
 Existing research also indicates that presidents can affect the issues covered by the mass 
media, although the influence of presidents seems to be more limited and the relationship more 
interactive than the relationship between presidents and the congressional agenda. Edwards and 
Wood (1999) found that presidents were able to influence media attention to the domestic issues 
of health care and education, but not on foreign policy issues. The authors also discovered that 
presidents reacted to media coverage of crime and education in deciding which issues to address 
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in their speeches. In their study of the involvement of presidents and media in foreign policy 
agenda setting, Wood and Peake (1998) found that presidents reacted to media coverage of 
foreign policy issues, but had no impact themselves on media attention to foreign affairs. While 
the results reported by Edwards and Wood (1999) and Wood and Peake (1998) cast doubt on the 
influence of presidents on the media’s agenda in the realm of foreign policy, Peake’s (2001) 
analysis offers a different perspective. As with his analysis of presidents and the congressional 
agenda, Peake (2001) has similarly demonstrated that the dearth of presidential influence on the 
media’s agenda uncovered in earlier studies may be attributed to their exclusion of less salient 
foreign policy issues. When the analysis is extended to both types of issues, Peake’s (2001) 
results have shown that presidents substantially influenced media coverage to foreign policy 
issues. 
3. The Public Agenda  
 The research of primary interest is that which examines the relationship between 
presidential speeches and the public agenda. The limited evidence available suggests that 
presidents can indeed influence which issues the public deems most important (Behr and Iyengar 
1985; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Cohen 1995, 1997). Behr and Iyengar (1985) found presidential 
speeches delivered between 1974 and 1980 to be influential determinants of public concern for 
the issues of inflation and energy, but not unemployment. For every presidential speech 
addressing energy and inflation, and additional 6% of citizens cited those issues as being the 
most important. In a similarly conducted analysis, Iyengar and Kinder (1987) found each 
presidential speech addressing the issue of energy resulted in an increase of public concern about 
that issue by 4%, and a speech addressing the economy resulted in an increase in concern about 
inflation by 8%.  
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 The most comprehensive analysis of presidential influence on the public agenda was 
conducted by Cohen (1995, 1997). His studies examined the effects of State of the Union 
Addresses on public evaluations of the most important problem facing America from 1953 to 
1989. Using Gallup’s Most Important Problem Series, Cohen investigated the influence on the 
public agenda of issue attention (the number of mentions relevant to a particular issue), and 
substantive speech (the number of positions taken by presidents that could be classified as liberal 
or conservative), on the salience of economic, foreign policy, and civil rights issues. Cohen’s 
(1995, 1997) analyses indicated attention to the issues had strong effects on public evaluations of 
issue salience immediately following the State of the Union Address for all three issue areas, as 
measured by the first poll taken after the president’s speech. Substantive speech, however, was 
revealed to have no impact for any of the three issue areas. Cohen also estimated the persistence 
of presidential effects on the public agenda as measured by the last poll taken before the next 
State of the Union Address. He found that presidential influence persisted at least until year’s 
end for foreign policy, but had disappeared for both civil rights and economic issues. Although 
recent research strongly suggests the “two presidencies” thesis (Wildavsky 1966) may not be a 
useful explanation for the president’s influence on congressional roll call votes (e.g. Fleisher et 
al. 2000), Cohen’s (1995, 1997) findings raise the strong possibility that a two presidencies 
effect may condition the president’s influence on the public agenda. Finally, Cohen (1995, 1997) 
found that popular presidents were no more successful than unpopular presidents in setting the 
public agenda. One interpretation for this finding is offered by Miroff (1982), who point out that 
the office of the presidency bestows on all its occupants a credibility that encourages the public 
to listen to what they have to say, popular or not. 
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4. Presidents as Agenda Setters 
 As the preceding review of the literature demonstrates, presidents can influence what 
issues the public considers to be the most important. However, there are significant constraints 
on the ability of presidents to act as effective agenda setters. First, presidential speeches are 
almost never composed exclusively of issues presidents would prefer to address. Deteriorating 
economic conditions (Behr and Iyengar 1985; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Cohen 1995), issues 
covered by the media (Behr and Iyengar 1985; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Wood and Peake 1998; 
Edwards and Wood 1999; Peake 2001), issues debated by Congress (Edwards and Wood 1999; 
Peake 2001), important events (Peake 2001), and issues already on the public agenda (Cohen 
1995; Hill 1998) can all affect what issues are emphasized by presidents in their speeches. Wood 
and Peake (1998) have thus concluded that presidents are inherently weak agenda setters due to 
the reactive nature of the office and the extent to which presidents are apt to take cues regarding 
the importance of issues from other actors in the political system. To be sure, presidents have 
always been, and likely will always be, responsive to outside influences in deciding which issues 
to discuss in their speeches. To ignore economic conditions, important events, and the issues that 
are already on the minds of Congress and the public, and being covered by the mass media, 
would be foolhardy. At the same time, presidents are not prisoners. While presidents must 
respond to some outside influences some of the time, extant research demonstrates that 
presidents also act as issue entrepreneurs, moving issues onto the agendas of other institutions 
and focusing attention on important presidential initiatives, essentially creating attention were 
none exists (Edwards 1999, 342). 
 Second, the effectiveness of presidential attempts to set the agenda may be severely 
hampered by the lack of public receptivity toward presidential speeches (Kernell 1997; Edwards 
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2000; Welch 2000; Welch 2002). It is widely conceded that presidential speeches are not likely 
to be a useful tool for changing the public’s policy preferences. The research on selective 
exposure in social psychology collectively suggests that individuals who are predisposed to 
disagree with the president are much less likely to even watch the president’s speech than those 
who are predisposed to agree with the president (Festinger 1957).1 However, even if they do 
watch the speech, the evidence indicates that those previously supportive of the president will 
react positively to the speech, while those previously unsupportive will react negatively (Glaros 
and Miroff 1983).  
 However, the dynamics of public receptivity are likely to play out somewhat differently 
with regard to agenda setting. To set the public agenda, presidents need only to convince the 
public that an issue should be addressed, not how it should be addressed. That presidents preach 
in their addresses to a congregation of the converted is not necessarily an impediment to agenda 
setting success. In fact, such citizens are the ones most likely to respond to presidential attempts 
to increase an issue’s salience among the public. Because those who watch televised presidential 
addresses tend to be more politically active than those who do not (Welch 2000), presidential 
speeches may be an effective strategy for spurring core groups of the president’s supporters into 
action, either by contacting their representatives, by joining an issue advocacy group, or by 
speaking with others about the issues they heard the president address (Welch 2002). When it 
comes to their efforts to set the public agenda, it is argued that presidents ultimately address in 
their speeches precisely that segment of the population they would prefer to address.
                                                 
1 However, a number of scholars now believe that selective exposure is not a dominant pattern among the public 
(Cotton 1985; Donohew and Palmgreen 1971; Festinger 1964; Freedman and Sears 1965; Sears and Freedman 1967; 
Wicklund and Brehm 1976). Research has shown, for example, that individuals might not avoid dissonant 
information if they anticipated it would be easy to refute because of the weakness of the information, because of the 
low credibility of its source, or because of the strength of their own position. (Festinger 1964) 
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5. Evaluating the Research on Presidential Agenda Setting 
 Although this small collection of research has advanced our understanding of presidential 
agenda setting, a number of significant gaps remain. First, analyses of presidential agenda setting 
have too often been limited to the consideration of a relatively limited number of salient issues 
(Behr and Iyengar 1985; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Edwards and Wood 1999; Wood and Peake 
1998; but see Cohen 1995). As Peake (2001) points out, the conclusions one draws concerning 
the president’s ability to set the agenda are likely to be substantially different when considering 
not only issues that have already received a great deal of attention, but also those that have not.  
 Second, most of the research on presidential agenda setting is limited to just a few 
administrations (Behr and Iyengar 1985; Edwards and Wood 1999; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; 
Miller and Wanta 1996; Peake 2001; Wanta 1997; Wood and Peake 1998). The question of 
whether the dynamics of agenda setting are unique to the individual occupants of the White 
House, or whether they are similar across presidencies, has not been sufficiently addressed.   
 Third, presidents may be able to influence the public agenda immediately after a speech 
is given, but how long does the influence of a president’s rhetoric last? With the exception of one 
study that measures the influence of presidential rhetoric after one year’s time (Cohen 1995), the 
question of whether presidents are able to sustain their influence on the public agenda with the 
rhetoric in their speeches has escaped scholarly attention.  
 Finally, and most importantly, while the literature demonstrates that presidents are able to 
use their speeches to influence the public agenda, little is known about what makes some 
speeches more effective than others. As the following content analysis makes clear, presidents 
rely on a diverse range of rhetorical appeals in their State of the Union Addresses- but does it 
matter what presidents say? The central purpose of the following studies is to determine what 
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influence this presidential rhetoric has, if any, on the issues that are identified by the public as 
the most important problems facing America 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
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III. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESSES, 1946-2003 
 
 
 
 Since Harry Truman delivered the first televised State of the Union Address in 1947, 
presidents have been able, once a year every year, to capture the undivided attention of a 
significant portion of the American public. Because of the opportunity this occasion affords, 
presidents have used the State of the Union Address as the central battleground for their foreign 
and domestic priorities (Kessel 1975; Light 1999). Unlike many other speeches the president 
gives throughout the year which tend to be relatively short and often focus on a single issue or 
set of issues, the State of the Union Address is usually much longer and typically covers a broad 
panoply of issues. More than any other speech or message, the State of the Union Address 
represents the quintessential statement of the president’s agenda. In an attempt to identify the 
rhetorical strategies used by presidents in their speeches, a content analysis of State of the Union 
Addresses delivered by presidents Harry Truman through George W. Bush from 1946 to 2003 
was performed.2 
 
 
A. PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC 
 Selection of the presidential rhetoric variables identified in the content analysis and used 
in as independent variables in all subsequent studies was based in part on the “going public” 
                                                 
2 Although this analysis is confined to presidential rhetoric in the State of the Union Address, other studies have 
examined the full range of presidential rhetoric (e.g. Edwards and Wood 1999) What this analysis loses in terms of 
being able draw from the universe of presidential speeches, it gains in making a detailed content analysis possible, 
the type of content analysis which would not be feasible in a study based on the full range of presidential rhetoric.  
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literature examining presidential influence on public opinion (issue attention, issue justifications,
public appeals, foreign policy, and post-address speeches), in part on the congressional literature 
(congressional appeals, agenda size, and credit claiming), and in part on the social psychological
 literature on persuasion (fear appeals, compare and contrast, issue order, and American values). 
Brief descriptions of the presidential rhetoric variables resulting from the content analysis, and 
the coding schemes used for each, are provided below. Selected examples of each form of 
presidential rhetoric are provided in Appendix A.3 
1. Issue Attention  
 The number of words used by the president to discuss the issue in question. The one 
positive finding that underscores the efficacy of presidential rhetoric concerns the influence of 
issue attention. Cohen (1995), Miller and Wanta (1996), and Wanta (1997) collectively found 
issue attention to be an important factor in public evaluations of issue salience. 
2. Issue Justification  
 The number of words used by the president to justify the importance of a given issue. 
While issue attention refers to a president’s discussion of an issue in its entirety, issue 
justification refers to the subset of that discussion in which the president makes an explicit 
attempt to justify the importance of that issue. Cohen (1995) has demonstrated that presidents are 
not able to increase the salience of an issue by taking a liberal or conservative position on that 
issue. But it is not known whether presidents are able to increase the importance of an issue 
among the public by simply arguing that it is important.  
                                                 
3 While this study represents a somewhat broader treatment of presidential rhetoric than previous research, it should 
be pointed out that any attempts to quantify presidential rhetoric inevitably oversimplify the concept. As a result, 
missing from this analysis is a consideration of how presidents fashion their rhetoric, how issues are presented and 
framed, and the rhetorical skill with which speeches are delivered, all critical components of presidential rhetoric.  
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3. Public Appeals 
 The number of words used by the president to make a direct appeal for public support on 
the issue in question. While the number of appeals presidents have made to the public in their 
speeches has steadily increased over the past several decades (Lewis 1997; Lim 2002), the 
effects of these appeals on the public agenda have not been systematically explored.  
4. Congressional Appeals 
 The number of words used by the president to appeal to Congress for action on the issue 
in question. While the nexus between appeals to Congress and the public agenda may not be 
immediately apparent, it is possible that citizens may deem such an appeal as a more genuine 
indicator of an issue’s importance than a public appeal. The average citizen’s thinking may be, 
“If president Bush thinks Congress ought to pass a law to fix this, it must be a problem,” whereas 
the same citizen may dismiss a direct appeal to the public as so much hot air.   
5. Fear Appeals 
 The number of words used by presidents in referring to negative consequences that are 
likely occur if their position on a given issue is not adopted. Research conducted by social 
psychologists demonstrates that fear appeals can be persuasive, if used properly. Because strong 
fear appeals tend to arouse people’s defenses, and weak appeals are likely to register no effects at 
all, moderate fear appeals have the greatest potential to persuade an audience (Mewborn and 
Roger 1979; Mongeau 1998; Natarajan 1979; Larson 2000). The study of fear arousing rhetoric 
also has a strong foundation in the political science literature. Presidential candidates, in who 
they are or what they do, have been shown to engage emotions (Abelson et al. 1982; Markus 
1988a; Markus and MacKuen 1993), as have members of Congress (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
1998), as well as policies (MacKuen et al. 2001). These threats may arise from the state of the 
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economy (Conover and Feldman 1986a), they may stem from threats to group identification or 
group interests (Nadeau, Neimi, and Amato 1995; Pantoja and Segura 2001), or even from the 
state of the nation in a general sense (Rahn 2000). This program of research has demonstrated 
that the use of fear arousing appeals can lead to increased voter mobilization, to greater interest 
in political affairs, and to a motivation to become more politically knowledgeable (Markus and 
MacKuen 1993; Markus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). Despite the considerable attention it has 
received in the psychology and political science literatures, it is not known whether the use of 
fear appeals by presidents constitutes an effective agenda setting strategy. 
6. Compare and Contrast 
 The number of words used by presidents to compare and contrast their policy for dealing 
with a given issue with the policies proposed by others. A considerable body of evidence has 
accumulated in the experimental literature that indicates two-sided messages are more persuasive 
than one-sided messages (Allen 1998; Larson 2000; O’Keefe 1990; Trenholm 1989). By drawing 
favorable comparisons between their policy proposals and those of others, presidents may be 
able to increase the salience of issues those policies are designed to address. 
7. Agenda Size 
 The number of issues discussed by the president in a given State of the Union Address. 
While evidence suggests that agenda size is inversely related to presidential success on roll call 
votes (Rivers and Rose 1985), it is not known whether large agendas inhibit a president’s ability 
to set the public agenda. Although Light (1999) gives an informative treatment of the importance 
of limiting agenda size, his expectations have not been subjected to empirical analysis. 
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8. Issue Order  
 The order in which each issue was discussed in the president’s State of the Union 
Address. It is expected that presidents will be more successful in placing issues featured 
prominently in their speeches on the public agenda than issues discussed toward the end of their 
speech. Given the public’s limited attention to politics (e.g. Delli Carpini and Keeter 1992), the 
public is likely to pay closer attention to the beginning of a president’s speech than to the end. 
9. American Values  
 The number of words used by presidents to associate a policy or issue with cherished 
American values.4 There is convincing evidence to suggest that political figures who are able to 
associate policies with particular American values are able to substantially increase public 
support for those policies. Relying on analyses based on experimental and survey data, Barker 
(2002) has shown that Rush Limbaugh was able to change citizens’ attitudes toward particular 
public policies through his political talk radio program by associating those policies with certain 
American values, such as individualism. 
10. Foreign Policy  
 A dummy variable indicating whether the issue in question involved matters of foreign 
policy or defense. While the “two presidencies” thesis has not fared well in recent research on 
presidential influence in Congress (e.g. Fleisher et al. 2000), research suggests that the public 
extends an unusually high degree of deference to the president in the realm of foreign policy 
(Cohen 1995; Hill 1998; Hurwtiz 1989; Mondak 1993). Public deference on foreign policy issues 
may stem from the public’s desire to make sure “politics stop at the water’s edge” (Tatalovich 
                                                 
4 The values selected for inclusion in this analysis include freedom, individualism, egalitarianism, tolerance, justice, and 
democracy. Selection of these values is based on a long and venerable tradition of research that examines the importance 
of values as determinants of public opinion (Conover and Feldman 1984; Feldman 1988; Kluckhohn 1951; Rokeach 1973; 
Sniderman et al. 1991; Tetlock 1986).  
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and Daynes 1979, 1984), or it may stem from the public’s perception that foreign policy issues 
hold less immediate relevance to their own lives and are more complex than domestic issues.  
11. Post-Address Speeches  
 The number of speeches given by the president during the week following the State of the 
Union Address that discuss issues mentioned in the address.5 By giving a speech immediately 
following their State of the Union Address, presidents may be able to reinforce the importance of 
particular issues among the public. In so doing, presidents may be able to reach segments of the 
public did not see their speech, and reinforce the salience of issues that represent their most 
important priorities.   
12. Credit Claiming without Evidence  
 The number of words used by the president in claiming credit for success in dealing with 
the issue in question. Whereas Mayhew (1974) considered credit claiming as a strategy used by 
members of Congress to improve their reelection prospects, it is certainly evident that presidents 
also engage in credit claiming. Presidents may be able to improve their chances of being 
reelected by reminding the public of the progress that was made during their tenure in dealing 
with various issues. Also, by highlighting progress made in addressing various issues, presidents 
may be able to use credit claiming to boost their approval levels. Finally, credit claiming may be 
a useful tool for moving issues off the public agenda. If the president is able to convince the 
public that progress has been made in dealing with an issue, then the percentage of citizens citing 
that issue as the most important problem should decline. Because presidents are constantly trying 
to convince the public that “their” issues are the most important issues, the ability to move “old” 
                                                 
5 Included in this study were speeches delivered live to a national television audience. Data were collected from Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States (various issues). One week was selected as the interval because it represents 
the longest possible time after the president’s speech during which no poll was conducted measuring the public agenda.   
25 
issues off the public agenda may be as valuable to a president as being able to move new issues 
onto the agenda. 
13. Credit Claiming with Evidence  
 The number of words used by presidents referring to quantitative evidence of success in 
dealing with the issue in question (numerical facts, figures, and statistics). Presidents may be 
able to enhance the influence of their credit claiming rhetoric by citing actual evidence of 
success in dealing with the issue in question. Existing research strongly supports the notion that 
evidence enhances persuasion. In a variety of research settings, messages that incorporate 
evidence have repeatedly been found more persuasive than messages that do not (Larson 2000; 
Perloff 1993; Petty and Cacioppo 1986). 
 
B. RESULTS 
 The results of the content analysis appear in Table 1. They demonstrate, first of all, that it 
was the early presidents who gave the greatest amount of attention to the issues in their State of 
the Union Addresses. The addresses delivered by Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, in 
particular, featured the highest average amount of attention per issue. After ebbing during the 
Reagan and Bush administrations, average levels of issue attention increased dramatically in the 
State of the Union Addresses delivered by Clinton, and has remained high in the first three 
addresses given by George W. Bush.  
 Second, although other presidents appealed to the public and Congress, Clinton surpassed 
all of his colleagues in his determination to stimulate public and congressional support for the 
policies proposed in his annual messages. While Clinton’s public appeals were used generously 
for issues both foreign and domestic, his appeals for congressional action were used almost 
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exclusively for domestic issues, and only in trumpeting the most important priorities of his 
presidency, such as crime control, health care reform, and welfare reform.  
 Third, the results also show that presidents Ford and Clinton were the most active in 
credit claiming without the use of evidence. Much of Clinton’s credit claiming rhetoric 
highlighted the improvement in economic conditions that occurred during his administration. In 
particular, Clinton attempted to claim credit for cutting the federal deficit, reducing the national 
debt, and promoting economic growth. Ford, in contrast, attempted to claim credit for addressing 
a range of different issues, including the economy, crime, drugs, and improving relations with 
China, the Soviet Union, and the Middle East. Although both Clinton and Ford relied on credit 
claiming without evidence, Clinton surpassed Ford, as well as the other nine presidents, in the 
amount of quantitative evidence he cited in claiming credit for dealing with the issues mentioned 
in his State of the Union Addresses.  
TABLE 1. Content Analysis of Presidential Rhetoric in State of the Union Addresses,  
1946-2003 
 
  
Presidential Rhetoric Variable 
   
  
  HST  
  
  DDE 
  
   JFK 
  
   LBJ 
  
  RMN 
  
  GRF 
  
  JEC 
  
RWR  
  
 GHWB  
  
WJC 
  
GWB 
Issue attention 237.0 233.6 245.6 146.6 184.7 204.0 153.6 147.9 121.9 200.7 232.5
Issue justification 34.2 35.7 47.8 18.1 23.2 28.4 19.0 18.7 18.1 27.8 22.2
Congressional appeals 6.5 6.0 2.4 3.9 6.1 4.6 1.5 1.5 4.9 11.2 9.0
Public appeals 0.7 1.2 0.8 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 5.7 1.0
Credit claiming without evidence 11.8 11.7 13.4 11.3 14.1 18.3 11.5 13.9 11.9 18.3 12.8
Credit claiming with evidence 4.1 3.0 5.9 5.5 4.2 5.5 4.7 5.8 4.1 9.0 5.7
Agenda size 19.8 19.4 17.7 22.3 18.0 14.0 15.6 17.5 19.3 26.8 15.6
Foreign policy 18.5 15.9 23.1 16.3 10.3 7.0 8.7 4.0 5.3 7.0 14.1
American values 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.3
Fear appeals 6.2 3.8 11.9 3.2 5.8 11.1 2.2 3.4 1.9 5.2 9.0
Compare and contrast     5.3 4.2 7.7 4.7 11.1 7.1 1.9 6.8 2.9 5.0 4.6
Post-address speeches 
     
0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 
 
0.2 
  
0.4
 
0.3
 
  
Note: Entries for “Issue attention” are the average number of words used by presidents in discussing the issues in their State of 
the Union Addresses. Entries for “Foreign policy” reflect the percentage of all issues discussed by presidents that involved 
matters of foreign policy and defense. Entries for “Agenda size” reflect the average number of issues discussed by presidents in 
their State of the Union Addresses. Entries for “Post-address speeches” reflect the average number of speeches given per issue 
mentioned in the State of the Union Address. All other entries are the average number of words per issue used by the president to 
make a given rhetorical appeal. Data collected from The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States.  
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 Fourth, a number of presidents placed particularly heavy emphasis on foreign policy. The 
presidents who emphasized foreign policy the most were Kennedy, Truman, Johnson, 
Eisenhower, and George W. Bush, respectively. Not surprisingly, significant international events 
occurred during each of the aforementioned presidential administrations. Kennedy’s presidency 
was dominated by the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Berlin Crisis, and the Vietnam War. Much of 
Truman’s presidency was devoted to prosecuting the war in Korea. Vietnam consumed, and 
ultimately ended, Johnson’s presidency. Concerns about U.S.-Soviet relations and Communism 
at home and abroad loomed large during the Eisenhower administration. More recently, the war 
against terrorism precipitated by the attack on the World Trade Center has occupied the full 
attention of George W. Bush’s administration.  
 Fifth, presidents have increasingly used the post-address speech as a strategic tool to 
reinforce the importance of certain issues mentioned in the State of the Union Address. 
Interestingly, the incremental increase in the use of post-address speeches closely parallels the 
growth of “going public” activities noted by Kernell (1996). Also, presidents selectively used 
their post-address speeches for their most important priorities. Reagan used the post-address 
speech in discussing the economy, tax cuts, and the national defense, George H.W. Bush spoke 
mostly about the Persian Gulf War, education, and family values in his speeches, Clinton gave 
speeches on the economy, health care, and gun control, and George W. Bush has focused on 
Iraq, international terrorism, and tax cuts in his post-address speeches.  
 Finally, the size of the president’s agenda varies considerably, from a maximum of 49 
issues discussed by Clinton in 2000, to a minimum of 10 issues mentioned by George H.W. Bush 
in 1990. Because of their preference for a more active federal government, Democratic 
presidents have, on average, discussed more issues in their speeches than have Republican 
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presidents. In fact, the three largest average agenda sizes are from Democratic presidents 
(Clinton: 27, Johnson: 22, Truman: 20). In contrast, three of the four smallest average agenda 
sizes are from speeches given by Republican presidents (Ford: 14, George W. Bush: 16, Reagan 
18). The six Republican presidents discussed an average of 17 issues, and the five Democratic 
presidents discussed an average of 21 issues. 
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IV. AN ISSUE PRIMING PERSPECTIVE ON PRESIDENTIAL AGENDA SETTING 
 
 
 
 While its application has largely been confined to the study of the media’s influence on 
public opinion, priming theory may also help to explain the dynamics of presidential agenda 
setting. When confronted with having to make a decision, people simply do not possess the 
cognitive capacity necessary to take all plausible considerations into account, to carefully weigh 
their import, and to integrate them into a final summary decision (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; 
Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Tourangeau and Rasinski 1988; Zaller and Feldman 1992). Faced 
with complexity and uncertainty, and lacking the wits to optimize, human beings must be willing 
to “satisfice” and find solutions that are “good enough” (Simon 1979, 3). Thus, people often rely 
on shortcuts, or cognitive heuristics (Khaneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Lupia 1994; Simon 
1955, 1978, 1979, 1986). One such heuristic is a reliance on whatever information is most 
accessible at that particular time (Bargh 1982, 1984, 1989; Fazio 1986; Higgins and Bargh 1987; 
Taylor 1982). 
 Applied to the context of agenda setting, presidents may be able to use their speeches to 
heighten the accessibility of certain issues they wish to place on the public agenda. Just as the 
media prime certain issues in the minds of citizens (e.g. Bartels 1993; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; 
Iyengar 1991; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar et al. 1982; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; 
Krosnick and Brannon 1993; Shah et al. 1999; Valentino Miller and Krosnick 1999), so too 
might presidents be able to prime issues with the rhetoric in their speeches (Edwards et al. 1995; 
Zaller 1992, 1994). As Zaller (1992) and Zaller and Feldman (1992) explain, individuals that
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have been asked a survey question do not normally canvass their minds for all considerations 
relevant to the decision before them. Rather, they are likely to respond based on whatever 
considerations are accessible at the “top of the head.” Thus, when presented with the question, 
“What is the most important problem facing America today?” respondents are likely to answer 
based on whatever issues have been primed, or are most accessible. 
 Of course, the president represents but one possible source of influence on the public 
agenda. Indeed, the literature collectively demonstrates that contextual factors (e.g. economic 
conditions, exogenous events, media coverage, etc.) often outweigh the importance of 
presidential speeches and other forms of “political drama” as determinants of public opinion 
(Brace and Hinckley 1992; Marra, Ostrom, and Simon 1990; Ostrom and Simon 1989; Simon 
and Ostrom 1989). This is not to suggest that presidents are powerless, however. To the contrary, 
previous research demonstrates that presidents can use their speeches in an entrepreneurial 
fashion to focus the attention of other actors in the political system, especially when the issue is 
important to them and constitutes a major presidential initiative (Edwards 1999, 342). The 
primary of objective of the following studies is to evaluate the extent to which presidents are able 
to “prime” issues in the minds of citizens in successful attempts to set the public agenda. 
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V. STUDY 1: PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND AGGREGATE-LEVEL 
EVALUATIONS OF ISSUE SALIENCE, 1946-2003 
 
 
 
A. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Data and Sample 
 This study considers the influence of presidential rhetoric on public evaluations of the 
importance of 1,113 issues discussed by 11 presidents in their State of the Union Addresses from 
1946 to 2003.6 The units of analysis are issues. For example, The 34 issues discussed by 
President Truman in his 1946 State of the Union Address represent the first 34 cases in the 
dataset. The 16 issues discussed by Truman in his 1947 address represent cases 35 through 49. 
And so on.7 The public agenda was estimated as a function of presidential rhetoric, media 
coverage, contextual influences, and a number of control variables. 
2. The Public Agenda 
 For each issue mentioned by the president in the State of the Union Address, the 
dependent variable was calculated as the percentage of respondents citing an issue as most 
                                                 
6 In 1973 Nixon broke with tradition and delivered a series of written policy messages to Congress in lieu of giving a 
State of the Union Address. Because there was no nationally broadcast presidential speech to a joint session of 
Congress that year, 1973 was excluded from all analyses. 
7 This description seems to suggest time series or even time-series cross-sectional data. However, the data do not 
meet the requirements of time-series analysis because each case, or issue, was not observed at a different point in 
time and at equally spaced intervals. The data are not time-series cross-sectional because the data do not consist of 
repeated measurements over time of the same set of units, in this case issues. While some issues are repeated from 
year to year, their numbers were not sufficient to warrant the use of time series analysis. Overall, an average of 17% 
of the issues discussed by the president in a given year were discussed by the president the following year. 
Nevertheless, because some issues were repeated from year to year, diagnostic tests recommended by Markus 
(1979) and Menard (1991) for the analysis of panel data were conducted to test for the presence of autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity. The results of these diagnostic tests revealed no significant autocorrelation or 
heteroskedasticity present in the measures of the public agenda.  
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important immediately after the address, minus the percentage citing the same issue as most 
important immediately before the address.8 For example, if 20% of respondents reported crime 
as the most important problem immediately before a State of the Union Address in which crime 
was mentioned, and 25% cited crime as most important after the address, then the value of the 
dependent variable for crime would be 5%. To gauge the persistence of presidential influence, 
this study also estimated the influence of presidential rhetoric on the change in issue salience 
from immediately before the president’s address to two months, four months, and six months 
after the president’s address. For example, the public agenda in the analysis conducted two 
months after the State of the Union Address is calculated as the percentage citing an issue as 
most important two months after the address, minus the percentage citing the same issue as most 
important immediately before the address. Measured in this way, the dependent variables in each 
of the four separate analyses represent the aggregate change in the salience of issues mentioned 
in the State of the Union Address, from before the address to after the address. 
3. Presidential Rhetoric  
 While the empirical record demonstrates presidents are able to use their speeches to 
influence the public agenda, little is known about what makes some speeches more effective than 
others. As the results of the content analysis demonstrate, presidents rely on a diverse range of 
rhetorical appeals in their speeches. However, the effects of many of these appeals have not been 
                                                 
8 Gallup’s Most Important Problem series provided the overwhelming majority of data points required for the 
construction of the dependent variables in this analysis. In some cases, however, Gallup did not ask the “most 
important problem” question at certain points in time when those data were needed to construct the dependent 
variable. In such cases, polling data from other survey organizations were used to supplement the Gallup data. 
Overall, fewer than 2% of the polls used were conducted by organizations other than Gallup. The survey 
organizations whose polls were used to supplement the Gallup data include ABC News/Washington Post, 
Cambridge National Reports, Harris, National Opinion Research Center (N.O.R.C.), and Yankelovich. While the 
data collection procedures employed here may introduce measurement error into the analysis, the results will likely 
understate the true effect of the independent variables on the public agenda and should not result in any systematic 
bias in estimation. After identifying the polls used in the analysis, the public agenda was coded separately and 
independently by the author and a research assistant. The independently coded data were used to conduct a 
reliability analysis which yielded an inter-coder reliability rating of α = .957.   
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systematically examined. The central objective of Study 1 consists of an evaluation of the 
influence of the 12 forms of presidential rhetoric variables resulting from the content analysis, 
described below in summarized form. 
a. Issue attention. The number of words used by the president to discuss an issue.9  
b. Issue justification. The number of words used by the president to justify the importance of a 
given issue. 
c. Public appeals. The number of words used by the president to make a direct appeal for public 
support on a given issue. 
d. Congressional appeals. The number of words used by the president in appealing to Congress 
for legislative action on a given issue.  
e. Fear appeals. The number of words used by presidents in referring to negative consequences 
likely to occur if their position on a given issue is not adopted.  
f. Compare and contrast. The number of words used by presidents to compare and contrast their 
policy for dealing with a given issue with the policies proposed by others.  
g. Agenda size. The number of issues discussed by the president in a State of the Union Address. 
For the purpose of this study, an issue is defined as any subject identified by the president as a 
matter to be addressed by the federal government. 
h. Issue order. The order in which each issue was discussed in the State of the Union Address. 
 
                                                 
9 Because the length of the State of the Union Address varies over time, “the number of words” used to make a 
given appeal may be an inappropriate coding strategy. One alternative is to recode the nine relevant variables from 
“the number of words” to “the proportion of the speech” used to make a given appeal. To investigate the advisability 
of this option, two sets of models were estimated that differed in just one respect: the first included the nine rhetoric 
variables coded as “the number of words,” while the second included the nine rhetoric variables measured as “the 
proportion of the speech.” Notably, the substantive results of the first set of models did not differ from the second. 
For this reason, and also to preserve “word” as the unit of measurement, the original coding scheme was maintained.    
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i. American values. The number of words used by the president to associate an issue with 
specific American values.10 
j. Foreign policy. A dummy variable indicating whether the issue involves matters of foreign 
policy or defense.  
k. Post-address speeches. The number of speeches given by the president during the week after 
the State of the Union Address that discuss each issue mentioned in the address.11 
l. Credit claiming without evidence. The number of words used by the president in claiming 
credit for success in addressing an issue.  
m. Credit claiming with evidence. The number of words used by the president in referring to 
quantitative evidence of success in addressing an issue (numerical facts, figures, and statistics).  
4. Media Coverage 
 While millions of Americans refrain from watching the State of the Union Address every 
year, they may read a newspaper article or watch a news program after the speech that covered 
an issue mentioned by the president. Thus, presidents may be able to use their rhetoric as an 
indirect source of influence on the public agenda by affecting what issues the media cover in the 
days, weeks, and months after the speech. Media coverage was defined as the total number of 
stories addressing each issue mentioned in the State of the Union that appeared on the front page 
of the New York Times12 after the speech and before the poll measuring the public agenda.  
                                                 
10 The values used in this analysis include freedom, individualism, egalitarianism, tolerance, justice, and democracy 
and is based on a venerable program of research on the importance of values as determinants of public opinion (e.g. 
Kluckhohn 1951; Rokeach 1973; Conover and Feldman 1984; Feldman 1988; Sniderman et al. 1991; Tetlock 1986).  
11 Included in this study are speeches delivered to a live television audience. Data were collected from The Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States. One week was selected as the interval because it represents the longest 
possible time after the president’s speech during which no poll was conducted measuring the public agenda.   
12 The proliferation and diversification of print, broadcast, and online media call into question, at least to some 
extent, the continued use of The New York Times as a proxy measure of media coverage. However, The New York 
Times provides what is arguably still the most representative account of the country’s national and international 
news, especially when compared to the front pages of most other national newspapers which tend to focus more 
heavily on local concerns, such as The Washington Post and The Los Angeles Times.      
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5. Contextual Factors 
The influence of environmental conditions on the public agenda has been well 
documented in previous research on presidential agenda setting. In order to differentiate the 
change in issue salience explained by environmental conditions from the change explained by 
presidential rhetoric and other variables, this study controls for several contextual factors. First, 
the prior public agenda reflects the average percentage of respondents who believed each issue 
mentioned by the president was the most important, measured during the month prior to the 
speech. Second, prior media coverage represents the total number of stories addressing each 
issue mentioned by the president that appeared on the front page of The New York Times during 
the month prior to the speech. Third, important events indicate the total number of events 
relevant to each issue mentioned by the president that occurred during the month prior to the 
speech.13 Fourth, economic conditions were measured as an interaction between the misery 
index,14 and a dummy variable categorizing issues mentioned in the speech as economic or non-
economic. The resulting variable estimates the effect of economic conditions on the salience of 
economic issues. Fifth, military conflict was measured as an interaction between a dummy 
variable indicating whether the U.S. was involved in military conflict at the time of the speech,15 
and a dummy variable differentiating foreign policy and defense issues from other issues. The 
resulting variable estimates the influence of military conflict on the salience of foreign and 
defense issues. Finally, presidential scandals refer to congressional investigations of the 
                                                 
13 Based on criteria in Brace and Hinckley (1992), an event was included if it appeared in two of the following: 
World Almanac and Book of Facts, The Almanac of American History (Schlesinger 1983), and The Encyclopedia of 
American Facts and Dates (Carruth, various issues). 
14 The misery index combines the average percentage change in the Consumer Price Index with the average rate of 
unemployment, both measured during the month prior to the State of the Union Address. 
15 The list of military conflicts used in the analysis is from Ragsdale’s (1996) Vital Statistics on the Presidency. 
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president, active at the time of the State of the Union, generating at least 20 front page stories in 
The New York Times.16 
6. Presidential Resources 
 The influence of presidents on other actors in the political system is frequently assumed 
to depend on the extent to which they possess certain resources. This study considers the 
influence of three such resources. Popularity was operationalized as the average approval rating 
measured during the month prior to the president’s speech. While a president’s success in setting 
the public agenda is expected to increase along with their popularity ratings, the one study with 
evidence bearing on this question suggests popular presidents are no more influential than 
unpopular ones (Cohen 1995). Honeymoon was measured as a dummy variable differentiating 
the first year of the president’s term from all other years. While there is evidence of a 
honeymoon phenomenon in the president’s relationship with Congress (Rivers and Rose 1985), 
and in the public’s evaluations of the president’s performance (e.g. Kernell 1998), it is not know 
whether presidents are more successful in setting the public agenda early in their terms. Finally, 
the president’s margin of electoral victory was calculated as the difference between the popular 
vote received by the president and the next closest candidate. Presidents elected by large margins 
may find the public agenda more responsive than presidents elected by small margins. 
7. Control Variables 
 The models also include three control variables. First, in an effort to identify the most 
effective agenda setters, dummy variables were assigned to each of the individual presidents, 
except for Truman. With Truman as the excluded president, each dummy variable estimates the 
average change in issue salience during a given administration compared to the average change 
in salience during the Truman administration. Second, this study also controls for survey lag; the 
                                                 
16 The criteria used to identify the presidential scandals included in this analysis are based on Mayhew (1996). 
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number of days between the president’s speech and the poll measuring the public agenda. 
Although this study considers the influence of presidential rhetoric on the public agenda 
immediately after, and two, four, and six months after the speech, not all of the polls used in this 
study were conducted at precisely these intervals. Third, to control for any differences in the 
public agenda resulting from the data collection procedures used by different survey 
organizations, a dummy variable was included for each survey organization whose polls were 
used, except Gallup. With Gallup as the excluded organization, the dummy variable for Harris, 
for example, reflects the average change in issue salience when a Harris survey was used, 
compared to when a Gallup survey was used. 
 
 
B. METHODOLOGY 
 The measures of presidential rhetoric, media coverage, contextual influences, and 
presidential resources were evaluated in a recursive structural equation model (SEM) using 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation.17 The model is summarized graphically in Figure 1, and each 
of the equations comprising the model is provided in written form in Appendix B. The overall 
model not only evaluates the influence of presidential rhetoric on the public agenda, directly and 
indirectly through media coverage, but it also estimates the influence that contextual factors have 
on the rhetoric used by presidents in their State of the Union Addresses. SEM was selected as the 
preferred method for several reasons. First, it affords the ability to specify the type of 
relationship among independent variables in the model. Second, SEM allows the researcher to 
decompose the relationships between variables into direct, indirect, and total effects. Third, in 
                                                 
17 MLE has been the preferred estimation technique in structural equation modeling, and has been shown to provide 
robust estimates under less-than-ideal conditions, particularly when sample sizes are small and the distribution of 
error terms does not conform to assumptions regarding normality (Hoyle 1995). All models were estimated using the 
statistical package AMOS version 4.01, developed by James Arbuckle. 
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FIGURE 1. Contextual Factors, Presidential Rhetoric, Media Coverage, Presidential 
Resources, Individual Presidents, and the Public Agenda, 1946-2003  
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addition to tests of significance for individual variables, SEM also conducts goodness-of-fit tests, 
providing a measure of the degree to which the theoretical model fits the data. Finally, the 
flexibility of SEM permits the estimation of models which violate certain traditional assumptions 
(e.g. models with non-normal data, heterogeneous error variances, and correlated errors).  
 The use of a recursive specification was made possible by the temporal ordering of 
variables included in the system of equations. More specifically, in modeling the temporal 
dynamics of presidential agenda setting, there is strong reason to expect the public agenda 
(measured at T4) to be responsive to (1) media coverage after the State of the Union Address 
(T3), (2) presidential rhetoric in the State of the Union (T2), (3) and contextual influences prior to 
the State of the Union (measured at T1). In addition to being unnecessary, the specification of a  
nonrecursive model in this case would have presented a nearly impossible challenge given the 
difficulty of obtaining instrumental variables that are theoretically related to the public agenda, 
but unrelated to contextual factors, presidential rhetoric, and media coverage.   
 To estimate the influence of contextual influences on presidential rhetoric, each context 
variable was specified as a possible direct cause of every rhetoric variable, resulting in 13 
separate equations. In modeling media coverage after the State of the Union, each context 
variable and each rhetoric variable was included as a potential direct cause of media coverage 
following the State of the Union. Each context variable was also included as a possible indirect 
cause of media coverage through every rhetoric variable. For example, prior media coverage was 
specified as a possible indirect cause of media coverage after the State of the Union, as mediated 
by issue attention, as mediated by issue justification, and so on, resulting in one additional 
equation. Finally, the model estimates the direct effects of presidential rhetoric, media coverage, 
contextual influences, and presidential resources on the public agenda. Also estimated were the 
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indirect effects of (1) each context variable as mediated by every rhetoric variable and media 
coverage, (2) and each rhetoric variable as mediated by media coverage after the State of the 
Union, resulting in one more equation and a total of 15 equations. 
 As specified, the model satisfies several critical assumptions required in the analysis of 
structural equation models. First, the use of a recursive system of equations demands a strong 
theoretical rationale for the direction of causal flow between variables. The justification for a 
recursive specification in the present model, as previously noted, is borne out of the temporal 
sequence of variables in the model. While media coverage prior to the State of the Union may 
affect the rhetoric used by presidents in their speeches, media coverage after the State of the 
Union cannot. Second, structural equation models are assumed to be “overidentified” such that 
the number of knowns (observed variable variances and covariances) is greater than the number 
of unknowns (parameters to be estimated). The greater the ratio of knowns to unknowns, the 
greater the number of degrees of freedom. Thus, the number of degrees of freedom serves as a 
general measure of the overidentification of a given model. The model tested here is 
overidentified with 381 available degrees of freedom. Third, structural equation models require 
relatively large samples, especially if the model is estimated using Maximum Likelihood. 
Stevens (1996) recommends a minimum of 15 cases per measured variable, Bentler and Chou 
(1987) suggest at least five cases per estimated parameter, and Loehlin (1992) advocates a 
minimum of 200 cases for most structural equation models. The present model features 
approximately 30 cases per variable, more than 10 cases per parameter, and a total of 1,113 
cases. Finally, structural equation models assume complete data, or the appropriate handling of 
missing data. Because listwise and pairwise deletion of cases and mean substitution represent ad 
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hoc solutions to the missing data problem, missing values were replaced with predicted values 
using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method of data imputation.18 
 
C. RESULTS 
1. Presidential Rhetoric 
 Table 2 reports the results from the section of the overall model that estimates the direct 
effects of contextual factors on presidential rhetoric.19 The results suggest that presidents give 
substantial weight to real-world conditions in their State of the Union rhetoric. First, when public 
concern about an issue is already high before the State of the Union Address, presidents are more 
likely to mention that issue, to justify its importance, and to mention the issue at the beginning of 
the address rather than the end. Preexisting concern about an issue also led presidents to claim 
credit for success in addressing that issue, perhaps in an attempt to convince the public that, as 
bad as the situation may be, some progress has been made. This finding is in accord with the 
research of Jacobs and Shapiro (2003) who argue that, while politicians are not responsive to 
public opinion when it comes to making major policy decisions, they do pay close attention to 
public opinion (through the use of polls and focus groups) in crafting their actions and statements 
designed to elicit public support. Research on public opinion is used to pinpoint the most alluring 
words, symbols, and arguments in attempt to move public opinion to support their desired 
policies. Thus, presidents employ “crafted talk” to create the appearance of responsiveness to  
public opinion, even as they set about the task of moving public opinion closer to their own 
                                                 
18 The Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method of data imputation uses all of the information from all 
of the variables in the model to replace missing values with predictions based on observed characteristics. While this 
method of missing data replacement is far from perfect and may introduce error into the analysis, (FIML) is 
generally considered to be superior to listwise and pairwise deletion and mean substitution of missing values. 
19 Because it is impossible to display the results of the entire structural equation model in a single table, the results 
are presented in Tables 2 through 5 according to the section of the model to which they refer. 
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TABLE 2. The Influence of Contextual Factors on Presidential Rhetoric in the State of the 
Union Address, 1946-2003 
 
    
Independent Variable Issue Attention  
Issue 
Justification  
American 
Values  
Congressional 
Appeals  
Public 
Appeals 
  
Contextual Factors               
Prior public agenda  2.716*** (.749)   0.579*** (.178)  0.004 (.003)  0.037 (.049)   0.013 (.033)
Prior media coverage  3.061*** (.650)   5.587*** (1.54)  0.064 (.036)  0.180 (.423)  -0.270 (.290)
Economic conditions  1.418 (1.51)   0.042 (.357)  0.028*** (.007)  0.263** (.098)  -0.040 (.067)
Military conflict  3.850* (1.84)    0.260 (.400)  0.520*** (.120)  4.660*** (1.69)   1.478 (1.15)
Important events  4.640*** (1.37)    1.560 (.900) -0.440 (.270)  3.500 (3.73)  -1.300 (2.50)
Presidential scandals -2.450 (1.41)    4.790 (3.34)  0.040 (.070)  0.310 (.910)  -0.720 (.630)
  
N  1,113      1,113   1,113   1,113    1,113  
Squared multiple corr. 
  
 0.047    0.041   0.041   0.024    0.006  
Independent Variable Agenda Size  Issue Order  Foreign Policy  Fear Appeals  Compare andContrast 
    
Contextual Factors               
Prior public agenda   0.000 (.001)  -0.090*** (.027)   0.001 (.001)  0.072 (.075)  0.037 (.081)
Prior media coverage   0.004 (.004)  -0.707** (.233)   0.006 (.009)  1.760** (.660)  0.953 (.706)
Economic conditions -0.010** (.003)  -0.269*** (.054)   0.030** (.001)  0.403** (.151)  0.334* (.161)
Military conflict -0.152*** (.030)   0.330 (.630)   0.380***(.020)  2.870 (1.75)  0.300 (.560)
Important events     0.060 (.100)   0.160 (.200)   0.070 (.070)  1.030 (.580)  4.300 (6.23)
Presidential scandals -1.940* (.820)   1.059* (.506)   0.020 (.020)  1.920 (1.41)  2.430 (1.53)
  
N  1,113 (.117)   1,113    1,113   1,113   1,113  
Squared multiple corr. 
  
 0.048    0.088   0.288   0.020   0.010  
Independent Variable 
  
Credit Claiming 
w/out Evidence 
 Credit Claiming
w/ Evidence 
   Post-Address 
Speeches  
  
 
    
Contextual Factors         
Prior public agenda  1.132*** (.117)   0.496*** (.057)   0.002 (.002)  
Prior media coverage  1.129 (1.01)   0.183 (.498)   0.010 (.011)  
Economic conditions  0.034 (.018)   0.005 (.003)   0.002 (.003)  
Military conflict -3.990 (2.73)  -2.670* (1.33)   0.005 (.003)  
Important events  0.620 (.960)   4.050 (4.43)  0.360***(.100)  
Presidential scandals -2.260 (2.20)  -1.280 (1.09)   0.010 (.020)  
  
N    1,113    1,113   1,113   
Squared multiple corr. 
  
   0.094    0.094    0.018   
 
  
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are the presidential rhetoric 
variables. CFI= (immediately after) .957; (2 months after) .961; (4 months after) .956; (6 months after) .972. *p <.05; **p <.01; 
***p <.001. Two-tailed. 
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desired preferences. So, in the context of the present study, presidents may react to public 
opinion deciding what issues to cover in their annual messages, but at the same time the rhetoric 
used to discuss those issues is designed to move the public’s preferences on those issues closer to 
the president’s position. 
 Second, media coverage of an issue before the State of the Union led presidents to 
mention that issue, to justify its importance, to warn the public of possible consequences if their 
position on the issue was not adopted, and to discuss the issue at the beginning of the address. 
 Third, during times of economic distress, presidents are more likely to appeal to Congress 
for action on economic issues, to warn of the consequences if their program for addressing 
economic issues was not adopted, to compare their policies for addressing the economy with 
policies proposed by others, and to associate their policies with American values. Moreover, in 
times of economic decline presidents are more likely to address economic issues at the beginning 
of their speech, to limit the size of their agendas, and to increase their attention to foreign policy 
issues, ostensibly in an attempt to shift the public’s focus away from economic concerns.  
 Fourth, when the country is involved in military conflict presidents are more likely to 
mention foreign policy issues, to appeal to Congress on these issues, to associate these issues 
with American values, to limit the size of their agendas, and less likely to claim credit for 
success in addressing foreign policy issues.  
 Fifth, important events encouraged presidents to mention issues related to those events in 
the State of the Union Address and in speeches delivered during the week following the address. 
 Finally, when presidents were implicated in scandals at the time of the State of the Union 
Address, they were more likely to limit the number of issues covered in the address, and to 
relegate discussion of issues related to the scandal to the end of the address. 
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2. Media Coverage 
 Although millions of Americans do not watch the State of the Union Address, they may 
be influenced by the president’s rhetoric indirectly by reading a newspaper article or watching 
television news programs that covered issues mentioned in the address. For this indirect path of 
influence to be satisfied, presidents must be able to affect media coverage with the rhetoric in 
their speeches. Table 3 illustrates the section of the overall model that estimates the direct effects 
of contextual factors and presidential rhetoric on media coverage after the president’s speech. 
Media coverage after the speech was in fact heavily determined by both sources of influence. 
Prior media coverage, prior public concern, and important events during the month before the 
speech significantly affected the issues covered by the media immediately after and two, four, 
and six months after the speech. Also, the involvement of the United States in military conflict 
led the media to increase their coverage of foreign policy issues immediately after the speech.  
 In addition to the importance of contextual factors, presidents were able to increase media 
coverage of issues by simply devoting more attention to those issues, by associating those issues 
with American values, by focusing on foreign policy, and by giving speeches during the week 
after the State of the Union addressing those issues. Interestingly, presidents were also able to 
use their rhetoric to decrease media coverage of issues by citing evidence of progress made in 
addressing those issues. While each of the aforementioned variables influenced media coverage 
across the entire six month period after the speech, several other variables had more limited  
effects. Presidents were able to generate coverage of issues up to four months after the address 
by justifying the importance of those issues, up to two months after the address by referring to 
possible consequences if their plan for addressing those issues were not adopted, and 
immediately after the address by comparing their policies for with policies proposed by others.
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TABLE 3. The Influence of Contextual Factors and Presidential Rhetoric on Media 
Coverage Following the State of the Union Address, 1946-2003 
 
Independent Variable Immediately After  
2 Months 
After  
4 Months 
After  
6 Months 
After 
  
Contextual Factors            
Prior public agenda  0.048*** (.005)   0.101*** (.009)   0.190*** (.015)   0.271*** (.021)
Prior media coverage  0.336*** (.042)   0.698*** (.077)   1.340*** (.125)   1.882*** (.178)
Economic conditions  0.007* (.003)   0.009 (.018)   0.042 (.029)   0.047 (.042)
Military conflict  0.100 (.130)   0.184 (.236)   0.393 (.385)   0.836 (.546)
Important events  2.248*** (.366)   2.951*** (.665)   4.634*** (1.09)   4.027*** (1.54)
Presidential scandals  0.012 (.089)   0.092 (.162)  -0.292 (.264)   0.403 (.374)            
 Presidential Rhetoric            
Issue attention  0.003*** (.001)   0.003*** (.001)   0.005*** (0.01)   0.007*** (.001)
Issue justification  0.007*** (.001)   0.007*** (.002)   0.009*** (.003)   0.009 (.006)
Public appeals  0.009 (.018)   0.010 (.008)   0.020 (.013)   0.009 (.023)
Congressional appeals  0.039 (.013)   0.004 (.006)   0.005 (.009)   0.036 (.016)
Fear appeals  0.004* (.002)   0.003* (.001)   0.003 (.006)   0.001 (.011)
Compare and contrast  0.005** (.002)   0.003 (.003)   0.007 (.006)   0.005 (.011)
American values  0.102* (.042)   0.172* (.076)   0.336** (.124)   0.435* (.176)
Agenda size -0.138 (.116)   0.026 (.212)  -0.093 (.346)  -0.043 (.490)
Issue order -0.001 (.005)   0.004 (.025)  -0.002 (.006)   0.000 (.023)
Foreign policy  0.993*** (.140)   1.530*** (.217)   2.411*** (.443)   3.491*** (.615)
Credit claiming without evidence -0.004 (.004)  -0.014 (.016)  -0.003 (.016)  -0.002 (.015)
Credit claiming with evidence -0.009** (.002)  -0.041** (.015)  -0.024** (.008)  -0.029** (.008)
Post-address speeches  0.610*** (.115)   1.993*** (.523)   1.946*** (.520)   1.561*** (.484)            
N  1,113   1,113    1,113   1,113  
Square multiple correl.  0.361   0.350    0.381   0.389  
Comparative Fit Index 
  
 0.957   0.961    0.956   0.972  
  
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is Media Coverage 
immediately after, 2 months after, 4 months after, and 6 months after the State of the Union Address. *p<.05; **p<.01; 
***p<.001. Two-tailed. 
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3. The Public Agenda 
 Table 4 displays the results from the portion of the overall model that estimates the 
influence of contextual factors, presidential rhetoric, and media coverage on the public agenda.  
The results clearly establish the value of presidential rhetoric as an instrument for priming issues 
in the minds of the public. Presidents increased public concern about certain issues simply by 
devoting more attention to those issues. The maximum number of words used by any president to 
discuss an issue was 1907. When presidents employed the full range of issue attention, they were 
able to increase the salience of issues by an average of between 6%, from just before to 
immediately after the speech, and 11%, from just before the speech to two, four, and six months 
after the speech.20 Although presidents rarely approached 1907 words in their discussion of an 
issue, this finding nevertheless underscores the latent power of presidential rhetoric available to 
presidents who focus their attention on their administration’s most important priorities. Second, 
when presidents relied on substantive justifications of the importance of issues to the fullest 
extent observed (389 words), they were able to increase the salience of issues by 4% across the 
six month period after the speech. Third, and somewhat surprisingly, presidential appeals to 
Congress, but not the public, were emphasized in evaluations of issue salience. Presidents who  
appealed to Congress to the maximum extent observed (120 words) were able to increase the 
salience of issues by an average of between 4%, from just before to two, four, and six months 
after the speech, and 5%, from just before to immediately after the speech. Presidents were also 
able to increase the salience of issues by focusing on foreign policy, by limiting the number of  
 
                                                 
20 Substantive effects were calculated by multiplying the unstandardized coefficient for a rhetorical appeal by the 
maximum number of words used to issue that appeal. For issue attention immediately after the speech, the 
coefficient of .003 was multiplied by the maximum observed value for issue attention (1907 words), yielding a 
product of 10%.   
47 
TABLE 4. The Influence of Contextual Factors, Presidential Rhetoric, Media Coverage, 
Presidential Resources, and Individual Presidents on the Public Agenda, 1946-2003 
 
Independent Variable Immediately After  
2 Months 
After  
4 Months 
After  
6 Months 
After 
   
Contextual Factors            
Prior public agenda  0.057*** (.021)   0.066*** (.020)   0.169*** (.024)   0.090*** (.003)
Prior media coverage  0.589* (.177)   0.456* (.197)   0.493* (.199)   0.312* (.149)
Economic conditions  0.143*** (.040)   0.066* (.031)   0.099* (.045)   0.080* (.034)
Military conflict  0.540* (.360)   0.511 (.584)   0.828 (.583)   0.334 (.664)
Important events  1.260 (1.56)   2.327 (1.66)   2.241 (1.65)   2.604 (1.88)
Presidential scandals  1.830* (.778)   1.601* (.761)   1.380 (1.40)   1.113 (1.45)            
Presidential Rhetoric            
Issue attention  0.003* (.001)   0.005*** (.002)   0.005*** (.001)   0.006*** (.001)
Issue justification  0.010*** (.002)   0.011** (.005)   0.010** (.003)   0.007 (.004)
Public appeals  0.009 (.018)   0.001 (.002)   0.015 (.020)   0.009 (.023)
Congressional appeals  0.039** (.013)   0.030* (.014)   0.036* (.014)   0.364* (.161)
Fear appeals  0.002 (.009)   0.017 (.010)   0.013 (.010)   0.001 (.010)
Compare and contrast -0.006 (.008)   0.003 (.008)   0.013 (.008)   0.004 (.010)
American values  0.148 (.170)   0.041 (.189)   0.318 (.189)   0.054 (.215)
Agenda size -1.440** (.481)  -1.540** (.530)  -1.913*** (.524)  -1.111*** (.595)
Issue order -0.051* (.022)   0.004 (.025)   0.005 (.025)   0.021 (.028)
Foreign policy -1.830** (.582)   1.400* (.674)   2.124*** (.667)   0.874 (.758)
Credit claiming without evidence -0.020** (.072)  -0.034*** (.008)  -0.026** (.008)  -0.024** (.009)
Credit claiming with evidence -0.044*** (.014)  -0.014 (.016)  -0.003 (.016)  -0.022 (.018)
Post-address speeches  2.630*** (.473)   2.306*** (.523)   2.071*** (.520)   1.564** (.481)            
Media Coverage  0.742*** (.122)   0.353*** (.074)   0.101* (.045)   0.119** (.036)
Presidential Resources            
Popularity  0.001 (.001)   0.001 (.003)   0.002 (.003)   0.001 (.001)
Electoral margin  0.036 (.034)   0.054 (.038)   0.021 (.039)   0.045 (.044)
Honeymoon  0.895* (.381)   0.487 (.413)   0.084 (.402)   0.302 (.494)            
Individual Presidents            
Eisenhower  0.551 (.921)  -1.506 (.801)  -0.055 (.161)  -0.944 (1.15)
Kennedy  0.523 (.969)   0.881 (.499)   2.106 (1.30)   1.043 (1.43)
Johnson  0.758 (.904)   0.185 (.165)   1.784 (1.24)   1.251 (1.21)
Nixon  1.504 (.961)  -0.854 (1.27)  -1.142 (.777)  -0.574 (1.07)
Ford  1.747 (1.00)   1.546 (1.75)  -0.974 (.941)   0.063 (1.25)
Carter  2.270* (0.91)   1.139 (.689)   0.646 (1.05)   1.847 (1.12)
Reagan  2.742*** (.830)   1.982 (1.05)   2.271 (1.52)   1.616 (1.26)
Bush I  2.886* (1.15)   1.391 (.714)   1.292 (.728)   1.354 (.996)
Clinton  2.861** (.950)   1.464 (.891)   1.757 (.904)   0.101 (.910)
Bush II  3.563*** (1.11)   2.377 (1.72)   2.101 (1.30)   0.823 (1.32)            
N  1,113    1,113    1,113    1,113  
Comparative Fit Index  0.957    0.961    0.956    0.972  
Squared multiple correl. 
  
 0.747    0.742    0.638    0.609  
  
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the Public Agenda 
immediately after, 2 months after, 4 months after, and 6 months after the State of the Union Address. *p<.05; **p<.01; 
***p<.001. Two-tailed.   
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issues discussed, by covering important issues at the beginning of the speech, and by reinforcing 
the importance of issues in speeches given during the week after the State of the Union.  
 The results also portray presidents as particularly effective in convincing the public that 
certain issues are no longer a cause for concern. When presidents relied on credit claiming to the 
fullest extent observed (331 words), they were able to reduce concern about selected issues by an 
average of between 7%, from just before to immediately after the speech, and 11%, from just 
before to two months after the speech. Presidents were able to boost the effectiveness of their 
credit claiming efforts by citing evidence of progress in dealing with an issue. When presidents 
invoked credit claiming to the fullest extent (229 words), they were able to reduce the salience of 
issues by 10% from just before to immediately after the president’s speech. The limited duration 
of this effect suggests that the evidence accompanying credit claiming is subtle and difficult for 
the public to recall beyond the period of time immediately after the speech. It should be pointed 
out that the effects of presidential rhetoric in this study are somewhat larger than those found in 
previous research that examines the entire range of presidential rhetoric (e.g. Edwards and Wood 
1999; Wood and Peake 1998). Perhaps the stronger effects uncovered here can be explained by 
the fact that more citizens tend to watch the State of the Union than other speeches. From this 
perspective, the results underscore the value of the State of the Union Address as a tool for 
influencing the public agenda, at least in comparison to other speeches that attract smaller 
audiences. Finally, while substantial evidence suggests presidents use military force as a strategy 
to divert the public’s attention away from unpopular issues (e.g. Brace and Hinckley 1992), the 
results here suggest presidents need not resort to such extreme measures. Presidents are able to 
use their rhetoric to shift public attention away from unpopular or controversial issues. 
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 Finally, presidents were more effective in setting the public agenda early in their terms, at 
least immediately after their speech. The results also reveal that presidents since Ford were more 
effective agenda setters than Truman immediately after their speech. What the results do not 
reveal is why. Have presidents learned from their predecessors about which rhetorical strategies 
work and which do not, or has the public simply become more attuned to presidential rhetoric 
over time, or both? While interesting, these questions lie beyond the scope of this study. 
 In addition to the influence of presidential rhetoric, the public agenda was also affected 
by the public agenda before the speech, by economic conditions at the time of the speech, and by 
media coverage before and after the speech. Also, the involvement of the country in military 
conflict resulted in increases in the salience of foreign policy and defense issues. Finally, the 
implication of presidents in scandals heightened the salience of issues related those scandals.  
4. Context Versus Rhetoric 
 Comparisons of the influence resulting from contextual factors and presidential rhetoric 
are shown in Table 5. Discussion to this point has focused on the direct effects of presidential 
rhetoric and contextual factors. In order to evaluate the relative importance of presidential 
rhetoric and contextual factors as determinants of the public agenda, this section considers the 
direct, indirect, and total effects of these variables. First, as the results in Table 5 demonstrate,  
the influence of contextual factors is generally greater than that of presidential rhetoric, although 
not substantially so. In fact, contextual factors and presidential rhetoric both remain important 
determinants of the public agenda during the entire six month period following the State of the 
Union Address. Second, the direct effects of presidential rhetoric and contextual factors were 
strongest immediately after the State of the Union, when the president’s speech and 
environmental conditions were still fresh in the minds of the public. Third, as the amount of time
50 
 
 
since the speech increased, the indirect effects of presidential rhetoric (through media coverage) 
and contextual factors (through presidential rhetoric and media coverage) became more 
pronounced. While much of the influence of presidential rhetoric immediately after the speech is 
felt directly among those who watched the speech, the influence of presidential rhetoric two, 
four, and six months after the speech is predominantly indirect, resulting from an influence on 
the issues covered by the media after the speech. Previous research has not investigated the 
media’s role in presidential attempts to set the public agenda. As a result, the literature misses 
much of the influence of presidential rhetoric uncovered here, a fact that also helps to explain the 
somewhat larger effects of presidential rhetoric found in this study, compared to the more 
modest effects found in other studies (e.g. Edwards and Wood 1999; Wood and Peake 1998). 
 
D. EVALUATING PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC 
 The results of all the models bearing on the influence of presidential rhetoric are 
summarized in Table 6. In particular, they emphasize the persuasive power of issue attention, 
issue justification, foreign policy, post-address speeches, and credit claiming as agenda setting 
strategies on both media coverage and the public agenda. Also, while credit claiming with 
TABLE 5. The Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Contextual Factors and Presidential 
Rhetoric on the Public Agenda, 1946-2003 
 
 Immediately After 
2 Months 
After 
4 Months 
After 
6 Months 
After 
Independent Variable Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
Contextual factors 0.19 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.12 0.17 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.14 
Presidential rhetoric 0.21 0.02 0.23 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.09 
  
Note: Entries are standardized coefficients. The coefficients for contextual factors represent the combined effects of all six 
contextual factors on the public agenda - directly and indirectly through presidential rhetoric and media coverage. The 
coefficients for presidential rhetoric represent the combined effects of all 13 presidential rhetoric variables on the public  
agenda - directly and indirectly through media coverage. 
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evidence influenced media coverage, credit claiming without evidence influenced the public 
agenda. Interestingly, presidents were able to limit the size of their agendas and appeal to 
Congress for legislative action as a way to set the public agenda, but not the media agenda. Not 
unexpectedly, the agenda size variable suggests that public appears to have a more limited 
attention span for politics than do the mass media, whose job requires them to cover political 
events such as the State of the Union Address. Conversely, presidents used fear appeals and 
appeals to American values to influence media coverage, but not aggregate-level assessments of  
the public agenda. Whether fear appeals are capable of influencing evaluations of issue salience 
at the individual level is one of several questions addressed below in Study 2. 
 In order to place the results of Study 1 in context, it is important to note that much of the 
previous research on presidential agenda setting focuses on a limited number of salient issues, is 
restricted to just a few administrations, and does not model the duration of the president’s 
influence on either the public or the media agenda. Most importantly, the literature offers 
presidents little advice as to what specific rhetorical strategies are most likely to enhance the 
president’s influence. This study identifies and estimates the influence of several forms of 
presidential rhetoric on the salience of 1,113 issues, salient and nonsalient, across 11 presidential 
administrations, across the 6 month period following the State of the Union Address. 
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TABLE 6. Summary Table for Study 1: The Influence of Presidential Rhetoric on  Media 
Coverage and the Public Agenda, 1946-2003 
 
 
 
Media Coverage 
 
Public Agenda 
Independent Variable 
  
   
Immediately 
After 
  
  
2 Months 
After 
  
  
4 Months 
After 
  
  
6 Months 
After 
  
 
Immediately
After 
 
  
2 Months 
After 
  
  
4 Months 
After 
  
  
6 Months 
After 
           
Presidential Rhetoric         
Issue attention ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Issue justification ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Credit claiming w/out evi. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Credit claiming w/evi. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Public appeals ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Congressional appeals ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Fear appeals ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
American values ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Compare and contrast ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Foreign policy ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Agenda size ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Issue order ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Post-address speeches ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
           
Note: This table summarizes the results from the models in Study 1 that estimate the influence of presidential rhetoric on 
Media Coverage and the Public Agenda. Checkmarks denote statistically significant variables, Xs denote nonsignificant 
variables. 
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VI. STUDY 2: PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL 
EVALUATIONS OF ISSUE SALIENCE 
 
 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Study 2 considers the impact individual attitudes have on the relationship between 
presidential rhetoric and the public agenda. While Study 1 offers insight into the aggregate-level 
response to presidential rhetoric, such an analysis is likely to miss much of the variation in 
individual reactions to presidential speeches. These differences may cancel out, or simply be 
undetectable, in studies that rely exclusively on data collected at the aggregate level. As a result, 
Study 1 is incapable of determining whether all respondents are equally susceptible to the 
influence of a president’s rhetoric. The available evidence indicates that certain attitudes, such as 
presidential approval and partisan identification, can play a critical role in determining whether 
presidential speeches succeed in influencing the public’s policy preferences (e.g. Meernik and 
Ault 2001; Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987; Page and Shapiro 1992). But it is much less clear 
whether such attitudes influence the dynamics of presidential agenda setting. Relying on 
individual-level survey data collected immediately after four State of the Union Addresses 
delivered by four different presidents, Study 2 estimates the relationship between presidential 
rhetoric and the public agenda as a function of exposure to the president’s speech, presidential 
support, political predispositions, and demographic characteristics.
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B. HYPOTHESES 
 The results of Study 1 show that aggregate-level perceptions of issue importance are 
significantly influenced by the rhetoric used by presidents in their State of the Union Address. 
However, not all respondents are likely to be equally influenced by presidential rhetoric. 
Estimated below is the influence of several moderators of the relationship between presidential 
rhetoric and the public agenda. Respondents who watched the president’s speech, who supported 
the president, whose political predispositions were consonant with the president’s, and who 
belonged to demographic groups in the coalition of the president’s party, are all expected to be 
more responsive to presidential rhetoric than respondents who did not share these characteristics.  
1. Exposure to the President’s Speech  
 Before exploring the importance of presidential support, political predispositions, and 
demographic characteristics, it is appropriate to first consider, in an acid-test of presidential 
rhetoric, whether those who saw the president’s speech were more influenced by the president’s 
rhetoric than those who did not. Respondents’ opinions concerning the importance of issues are 
no doubt informed by numerous sources- including the news media, important events, and 
economic conditions, to name just a few. But if presidential rhetoric matters, then the evaluations 
of issue salience expressed by respondents who actually watched the president’s speech should 
be more influenced by the president’s rhetoric than the evaluations of issue salience expressed by 
respondents who did not watch the president’s speech. Formally stated,  
 H1: The influence of presidential rhetoric on the public agenda is expected to be greater 
 among respondents who watched the president’s speech than among respondents who did 
 not watch the president’s speech, ceteris paribus. 
 
 Whereas Hypothesis 1 asks if presidential rhetoric is in fact more important for those who 
did see the president’s speech than for those who did not, Hypotheses 2 through 7 are designed to 
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determine which respondents among those who did watch the speech are likely to be most 
receptive to a president’s rhetoric. Thus, tests of these hypotheses were conducted using a sample 
consisting only of those respondents who saw the president’s speech. 
2. Presidential Support  
 A great deal of research speaks to the crucial role played by presidential evaluations in 
determining whether presidents are able to influence the public. The available evidence indicates 
presidents are more effective in using their speeches to influence the public’s policy preferences 
when approval of their performance exceeds 50% (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987; Page and 
Shapiro 1992), and when respondents express a strong psychological identification with the 
president (e.g. Thomas and Sigelman 1985). It is less clear whether such attitudes influence a 
president’s ability to set the agenda. Considered here are two different measures of presidential 
support: presidential vote choice, and presidential approval. Those who voted for the president in 
the last election and expressed approval of the president’s performance are expected to be more 
receptive to a president’s rhetoric than respondents who did not vote for the president and 
expressed disapproval of the president’s performance. Formally stated,  
 H2: The influence of presidential rhetoric on the public agenda is expected to be greater 
 among respondents who voted for the president than among respondents who did not vote 
 for the president, ceteris paribus. 
 
 H3: The influence of presidential rhetoric on the public agenda is expected to be greater 
 among respondents who expressed approval of the president’s performance than among 
 respondents who expressed disapproval of the president’s performance, ceteris paribus. 
 
3. Political Predispositions 
 Beginning with The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960), a venerable tradition of 
research has underscored the importance of political predispositions as explanatory variables in 
the analysis of political behavior. Party identification and ideological orientation have  
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consistently been revealed as important determinants in a variety of political decision making 
contexts- including voting decisions, support for public policies, and evaluations of the 
president’s performance. Whether these political predispositions impact a president’s ability to 
set the agenda, however, remains open to question. It is expected that liberals and Democrats will 
be more willing to consider the rhetoric of Democratic presidents, and conservatives and 
Republicans more willing to rely on the rhetoric of Republican presidents. Formally stated, 
 H5: The influence of presidential rhetoric on the public agenda is expected to be greater 
 among respondents with same party identification as the president than among 
 respondents with the opposite party identification of the president, ceteris paribus. 
 
 H4: The influence of presidential rhetoric on the public agenda is expected to be greater 
 among respondents with the same ideological orientation as the president than among 
 respondents with the opposite ideological orientation of the president, ceteris paribus. 
 
4. Demographic Characteristics 
 The allegiances of demographic groups to the Democratic Party have their roots in the 
New Deal coalition forged by Franklin Roosevelt and the efforts of his administration to combat 
the Great Depression. The passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, which provided 
unemployment insurance and assistance to the needy, went a long way toward ensuring the 
support of the poor. Urban residents were brought into the Democratic fold in part by recovery 
programs which provided large cities with new schools, hospitals, water and sewer systems, and 
bridges and roads. The loyalty of organized labor was secured by the Wagner Act of 1935, which 
guaranteed to labor the right to collectively bargain on equal terms with management, and the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which established minimum wages and child labor laws 
(Davis 1986). Although Roosevelt was able to win the support of some African-Americans with 
the relief provided by New Deal reforms, the emergence of African-Americans as strong 
supporters of the Democratic Party was not fully realized until the 1960s. Hitherto, the 
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Republican Party – the party of Lincoln, the Civil War, and Reconstruction – had been 
associated with racial equality. But the commitment of Presidents Kennedy and, especially, 
Johnson to the civil rights movement, coupled with the Republican nomination of racial 
conservative Barry Goldwater in 1964, persuaded many African-Americans to switch their 
support from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party (Carmines and Stimson 1989). Taken 
together, these demographic groups – the poor, urban residents, members of labor unions, and 
African-Americans – constitute the Democratic coalition. Just as these groups have been 
steadfast supporters of Democratic candidates and policies, it is hypothesized that respondents 
from these demographic groups are also likely to give substantial weight to the rhetoric of 
Democratic presidents in deciding which issues they believe to be most important. Formally 
stated, 
 H6: The influence of a Democratic president’s rhetoric on the public agenda is expected
 to be greatest among respondents who belonged to all 4 groups in the Democratic 
 coalition, and weakest among respondents who belonged to no groups in the Democratic 
 coalition, ceteris paribus. 
 
 The Republican Party has long been recognized as the party of the business and 
professional classes. The substance behind this image can be traced all the way back to the social 
and economic disparities that underlay the battles between the wealthy, aristocratic Federalists 
and the less privileged Democratic-Republicans. These differences became even more 
pronounced in the conflicts between the Jacksonian Democrats and the Whigs a few decades 
later, and surfaced yet again in the 1896 presidential election between William McKinley and the 
anti-establishment candidate, William Jennings Bryan (Hershey and Beck 2003). Evidence of 
these differences can be found today, as those with high incomes are more likely to identify with 
the Republican Party than those with low incomes. Furthermore, because the Republican Party 
led the Union cause in the Civil War and favored rights for former slaves, most white 
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southerners opposed the GOP. But as the Democratic Party embraced a burgeoning civil rights 
movement and the Republican Party favored increasingly conservative positions on racial issues, 
white southerners abandoned the Democratic Party in favor of the Republican Party. Finally, 
despite the diversity of sects and orientations Protestantism embraces, the theological 
individualism of more conservative Protestantism predisposes Protestants to embrace 
Republicanism (Beck and Sorauf 1992). In recent years, however, it has been the political 
conservatism of Protestant fundamentalists, anchored to issues such as abortion and school 
prayer, which has stimulated Protestant enthusiasm for the GOP (Hershey and Beck 2003). Thus, 
the wealthy, whites, southerners, and Protestants form the Republican coalition. While these 
groups have extended generous support to Republican candidates and policies, it is hypothesized 
that respondents from these demographic groups are also likely to place considerable importance 
on the rhetoric of Republican presidents in their decisions of what issues they believe are the 
most important. Formally stated, 
 H7: The influence of a Republican president’s rhetoric on the public agenda is expected
 to be greatest among respondents who belonged to all 4 groups in the Republican 
 coalition, and weakest among respondents who belong to no groups in the Republican 
 coalition, ceteris paribus. 
 
 
 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Data and Sample 
 Study 2 is based on a pooled dataset composed of individual-level data from four 
different public opinion surveys, each conducted immediately following a president’s State of 
the Union Address. The first survey was conducted after Ronald Reagan’s 1982 address, the  
used in this study. Each of the surveys selected was conducted immediately following the State 
of the Union Address, each includes a question that asks respondents which issue they believe 
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represents the most important problem facing America, and each of the surveys contains items 
necessary for testing the proposed hypotheses.  
 The units of analysis are issues. The first 12 cases represent the first respondent’s 
evaluation of the salience of the 12 issues discussed by Reagan in his 1982 speech. The next 12 
cases represent the second respondent’s evaluation of the salience of the same 12 issues. And so 
on. The 1982 survey consists of a total of 754 respondents, resulting in a subtotal of 9,048 cases. 
The 1992 survey features 1,512 respondents’ evaluations of the 24 issues discussed by George 
H.W. Bush, resulting in an additional 36,288 cases. The 1994 survey features 1,013 respondents’ 
evaluations of the 16 issues mentioned by Clinton, increasing the number of cases by 16,208. 
The 2001 survey includes 1,449 respondents’ evaluations of the 14 issues mentioned by George 
W. Bush, resulting in 20,286 more cases, and a total of 81,830 cases. Because of the relatively 
large sample involved, all tests of statistical significance were conducted at the .01 level. 
2. The Public Agenda  
 The public agenda serves as the dependent variable in all subsequent analyses and 
consists of individual responses to the question, “What is the most important problem facing 
America today?” If a respondent identified an issue mentioned by the president as the most 
important facing America, a value of “one” was recorded for the dependent variable 
corresponding to that issue. For all other issues mentioned by the president that were not 
identified as the most important, a value of “zero” was recorded for the dependent variable 
corresponding to those issues. The dependent variable thus represents each respondent’s 
perception of the importance of every issue mentioned in the president’s speech.  
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3. Presidential Rhetoric  
 Of primary interest is the influence of presidential rhetoric on the public agenda- both 
directly, and as moderated by exposure to the president’s speech, presidential support, political 
predispositions, and demographic characteristics. The presidential rhetoric variables included in 
this study are the same as those examined in Study 1, with one exception.21 The influence of a 
moderator on the relationship between presidential rhetoric and the public agenda was estimated 
by creating interaction terms between that moderator and each presidential rhetoric variable, 
resulting in a total of 12 interaction terms. The uninteracted presidential rhetoric variables 
estimate the direct influence of a given form of presidential rhetoric on the public agenda. 
Descriptive statistics for the presidential rhetoric variables and each of the moderators described 
below are included in Table C1 in Appendix C. 
4. Exposure to the President’s Speech  
 Exposure to the president’s speech was measured using a single item that asked 
respondents whether watched the State of the Union Address. Respondents who reported 
watching the speech were assigned a “one,” while those who did not see the speech were 
assigned a “zero.” Of those surveyed, 47% of respondents watched Reagan’s 1982 address, 60% 
reported seeing George H.W. Bush’s 1992 address, 54% indicated they saw Clinton’s 1994 
address, and 52% said they watched George W. Bush’s 2001 address. 
5. Presidential Support  
 Two measures of presidential support were included in the study. The first, presidential 
vote choice, was coded as “one” for respondents who said they voted for the president in the last 
                                                 
21 Post-address speeches were not included in the models estimated in Study 2 because each of the four surveys was 
conducted immediately after the State of the Union Address, before any post-address speeches were given. 
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election, and a “zero” for those who did not vote for the president.22 The second, presidential 
approval was coded as “one” for those who approved of the president’s performance and a 
“zero” for those who disapproved of the president’s performance.  
6. Political Predispositions 
 Measures of party identify identification and ideological orientation were used to 
determine respondents’ political predispositions. Respondents who reported the same party 
identification as the president were coded as a “one,” respondents reporting an identification with 
the opposite party of the president were assigned a “zero,” and Independents were coded as 
missing data. For example, in the survey conducted after Clinton’s 1994 address, Democrats 
(strong Democrat, Democrat, leaning Democrat) were assigned a “one,” and Republicans (strong 
Republican, Republican, leaning Republican) were coded as “zero.”    
 Similarly, respondents who reported the same ideological orientation as the president 
were coded as “one,” those reporting the opposite ideological orientation from the president were 
assigned a “zero,” and moderates were coded as missing data. As an illustration, in the survey 
conducted after Reagan’s 1982 speech, conservatives (very conservative, conservative, 
somewhat conservative) were coded as “one,” and liberals (very liberal, liberal, somewhat 
liberal) were assigned a “zero.”23  
 
 
                                                 
22 Respondents who were too young to have voted in the last presidential election were coded as missing data from 
the model that examines the effect of exposure to the president’s speech. The percentages of respondents excluded 
were: 5% in the 1982 survey, 8% in the 1992; 7% in 1994; and 8% in 2001.  
23 Ideally, the partisan and ideology measures would have been coded as continuous measures. However, the data 
for this question in the 1982 and 1994 surveys were limited to just 3 response categories: Republican/conservative, 
Independent/moderate, Democrat/liberal. As a result, the continuous ideology and party measures from the other 2 
surveys (1992, 2001) were collapsed to ensure these measures were coded consistently across all 4 surveys.   
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7. Demographic Characteristics 
 The demographic groups included in the Democratic coalition include the poor,24 urban 
residents,25 members of labor unions,26 and African-Americans.27 The demographic groups in the 
Republic coalition consist of the wealthy,28 whites,29 southerners,30 and Protestants.31 The 
Democratic and Republican coalition variables were created by summing the individual group 
measures, resulting in five-point scales that record the total number of groups to which a 
respondent belongs. For example, poor African-American urban residents employed by labor 
unions were assigned a “four,” while respondents belonging to none of these groups were 
assigned a “zero.” 
8. Contextual Factors 
 To control for the influence of contextual factors on the public agenda, this study 
includes variables for the prior public agenda, prior media coverage, events, and economic 
conditions. As in Study 1, the prior public agenda was measured as the percentage of 
respondents who believed each issue mentioned in the State of the Union Address was the most 
important facing America measured during the month prior to the address. Prior media coverage 
was defined as the number of stories addressing each issue mentioned in the State of the Union 
Address that appeared on the front page of the New York Times during the month preceding the 
president’s address. The important events variable was measured as the total number of events 
that occurred relevant to each issue mentioned in the State of the Union Address during the 
                                                 
24 Poor: (1=respondents with household income in the bottom 20% of all respondents; 0=all other respondents) 
25 Urban residents: (1=urban residents; 0= all other respondents) 
26 Labor union members: (1=union members; 0=non-union members) 
27 African-Americans: (1=African-Americans; 0=all other races) 
28 Wealthy: (1=respondents with household income in top 20% of all respondents; 0=all other respondents ) 
29 Whites: (1=whites; 0=all other races ) 
30 Southerners (1= residents of the South; 0=residents of other regions) 
31 Protestants: (1=respondents of Protestant denomination; 0=all other denominations) 
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month prior to the president’s speech.32 The economic conditions measure was operationalized, 
as in Study 1, as an interaction between a misery index combining inflation and unemployment 
and an economic dummy variable that specifies each issue mentioned by the president as either 
economic or non-economic. The resulting interaction term was intended to estimate the influence 
of economic conditions on the salience of economic issues. Worsening economic conditions are 
expected to result in the heightened salience of economic issues.  
9. Individual Presidents 
 Finally, to account for any differences in the influence of rhetoric across individual 
presidents included in this study, three dummy variables were included, one for each president 
except Reagan. Each dummy variable estimates the average change in the salience of issues 
mention in a given speech, compared to average change in the salience of issues mentioned by 
Reagan in his 1982 speech. For example, the dummy variable for George H.W. Bush represents 
the average change in the salience of issues mentioned in his 1992 speech, compared to the 
average change in the salience of issues mentioned by Reagan in his 1982 speech. 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
1. Exposure to the President’s Speech (Hypothesis 1) 
 One way to evaluate the merits of Hypothesis 1 is to simply compare the influence of 
presidential rhetoric among those who saw the president’s speech with the influence of 
presidential rhetoric among those that did not see the speech. The fatal flaw in this method is 
found in the problem of selection bias. As research reveals (e.g. Edwards 2003; Welch 2000; 
2002), those who watch the State of the Union Address are often predisposed to agree with the 
                                                 
32 The criteria used for the selection of important events are the same as those used in Study 1. 
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president. As a result, respondents who choose to watch presidential speeches may be more 
receptive to a president’s rhetoric than respondents who choose not watch such speeches. 
Fortunately, statistical techniques are available to overcome this problem. One of the most 
popular approaches to dealing with selection bias is the Heckman (1976, 1979) two-step 
procedure.  
 The first step of the Heckman procedure involves estimating a “Selection Model,” a 
multiple logistic regression analysis of the decision to watch the president’s speech. The 
explanatory variables required for this model include factors that are related to the decision to 
watch the president’s speech, but unrelated to the public agenda. The explanatory variables 
selected include a measure of partisan intensity,33 a measure of ideological intensity,34 a four-
point scale of political involvement,35 a measure of the respondent’s level of education,36 and an 
age37 variable. Politically involved respondents with intense partisan and ideological views are 
expected to be more likely to watch the president’s speech than respondents who do not share 
these characteristics. Also, highly educated respondents are considered to be more motivated to 
seek out the sort of political information discussed by presidents in the State of the Union 
Address (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1992; Popkin 1991; Welch 2000). Finally, given their 
comparatively low levels of engagement in the political process, respondents aged 18 to 21 are 
expected to be less likely to watch the State of the Union Address than respondents above the 
age of 21. However, it is not the effects of these variables that are of primary interest, since these 
                                                 
33 Partisan intensity: (1=strong Democrats/Republicans; 0=all other respondents). 
34 Ideological intensity: (1=strong liberals/conservatives; 0=all other respondents). 
35 Political involvement: The four-point scale was constructed by combining responses to three items. The first 
asked respondents whether or not they are registered to vote (1=registered; 0=not registered). Responses indicating 
registration was not a requirement were coded as missing data. The second item asked respondents whether or not 
they voted in the last presidential election (1=voted; 0=did not vote). The third item asked respondents whether or 
not they were interested in politics (1=somewhat or very interested; 0=not very or not at all interested). 
36 Education: (4=advanced degree; 3=bachelor’s degree; 2=high school graduate; 1=less than high school). 
37 Age: (1=respondents 18-21 years old; 0=respondents over 21 years old). 
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variables are readily available to include as control variables in the second step of the Heckman 
procedure. Rather, it is the effects of the unmeasured characteristics of respondents on the 
decision to watch the speech that are of most importance. Although this information is not 
included in the coefficients for the explanatory variables, it is available in the residuals 
calculated by the logistic regression model. After all, the variation in the dependent variable that 
remains after accounting for the effects of known factors can only be caused by unknown factors. 
To complete the first step, the residuals are used to calculate a selection bias control factor, 
lambda, defined as the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). This summary measure includes the effects of 
all unmeasured characteristics of respondents that are related to the decision to watch the speech.  
 The second step of the procedure involves the estimation of a “Regression Model” using 
multiple logistic regression analysis. This is the model used to test Hypothesis 1, and includes 
lambda, the selection bias control factor. Because this control factor captures the effects on the 
public agenda of unmeasured characteristics related to the decision to watch the president’s 
speech, the other independent variables in the model are freed from these effects, and the logistic 
regression analysis produces unbiased coefficients for them. A more detailed description of the 
Heckman two-step procedure employed in this study is provided in Appendix D.  
 In order to test the moderating influence of exposure to the president’s speech, as 
specified in Hypothesis 1, several interaction terms were included in the Regression Model 
(Jaccard 2001). The interaction terms are between the moderator, exposure to the president’s 
speech, and each presidential rhetoric variable, resulting in a total of 12 interaction terms. For 
example, a statistically significant interaction between exposure to the president’s speech and 
issue attention indicates that those who saw the president’s speech were more influenced by the 
length of the president’s discussion of an issue than respondents who did not see the speech. 
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2. Presidential Support, Political Predispositions, and Demographic Characteristics 
(Hypotheses 2 through 7) 
 
 Whereas Hypothesis 1 predicts presidential rhetoric will matter more among those who 
saw the speech than among those who did not, Hypotheses 2 through 7 suggest those who did see 
the speech are more likely to be influenced by presidential rhetoric if they voted for the 
president, approved of the president’s performance, shared the same partisan and ideological 
predispositions with the president, and if they belonged to demographic groups in the coalition of 
the president’s party. As such, testing of these hypotheses was conducted with a sample that 
includes only respondents who saw the president’s speech. As with Hypothesis 1, Hypotheses 2 
through 7 were tested by creating interaction terms between the moderator in question and each 
presidential rhetoric variable. For example, a statistically significant interaction between 
presidential vote choice and congressional appeals indicates those who voted for the president 
gave more weight to the president’s appeals to Congress in their assessments of issue salience 
than respondents who did not vote for the president. The models testing Hypotheses 2 through 7 
were all estimated using multiple logistic regression analysis. 
 
E. RESULTS 
1. Exposure to the President’s Speech 
 The results of the Heckman two-step procedure appear in Tables 7 and 8. They reveal 
each of the explanatory variables in the Selection Model to be strong, statistically significant 
predictors of the decision to watch the State of the Union Address. Educated respondents above 
the age of 21 with intense partisan and ideological views who were highly involved in politics 
were substantially more likely to watch the president’s speech than respondents who did not 
share these characteristics. The odds ratios in Table 7 demonstrate the influence of a one-unit 
67 
increase in the value of an independent variable on the odds that a respondent watched the State 
of the Union Address. The results indicate that respondents with intense partisan views were an 
average of 10% more likely to watch the president’s speech, and respondents with intense 
ideological views were an average of 12% more likely to watch the speech. Also, for each one-
unit increase on the 4-point scale of political involvement, respondents were an average of 16% 
more likely to watch the State of the Union Address. Thus, respondents with a maximum score 
on the 4-point scale of political involvement were an average of 64% more likely to watch the 
president’s speech than respondents with the minimum score on this scale. Moreover, for each 
one-unit increase on the four-point scale of education, respondents were an average of 19% more 
likely to watch the speech. Stated differently, respondents with advanced degrees, the maximum 
score, were an average of 76% more likely to watch the president’s speech than respondents who 
had not graduated from high school, the minimum score. In further evidence of the 
disengagement of young people from the political process, respondents between the ages of 18 
and 21 were an average of 51% less likely to watch the State of the Union Address than 
respondents over 21 years old. Finally, the bivariate correlations between each of these 
 
TABLE 7. Selection Model: The Decision to 
Watch the President’s Speech 
 
Independent Variable 
  
Logit 
  
 Se  Exp(b) 
      
Partisan intensity     .055    .017  1.1044* 
Ideological intensity     .052    .013  1.1216** 
Political involvement     .149    .010  1.1614** 
Education     .174    .008  1.1902** 
Age    -.702    .045  0.5071** 
       
Pseudo R2     .210     
N 77,963     
        
Note: Selection Model estimated using logistic regression 
analysis. The dependent variable is “Decision to Watch the 
President’s Speech.” *p<.01; **p<.001.  Two-tailed. 
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explanatory variables and the public agenda proved statistically nonsignificant, satisfying the 
critical assumption that the explanatory variables in the Selection Model are unrelated to the 
public agenda (see Table E1 in Appendix E for the bivariate correlations). The Regression Model 
was then estimated with the interaction terms, along with their component variables, and the 
selection bias control factor, lambda, computed in the Selection Model.  
 Table 8 displays the results of the Regression Model. The statistically nonsignificant 
influence of lambda in the Regression Model confirms that the selection bias inherent in 
respondents’ decisions to watch the State of the Union Address was effectively addressed. The 
odds ratios in Table 8 illustrate the effect of a one-unit increase in the value of the independent 
variable on the odds that a respondent identified an issue mentioned by the president as the most 
important problem facing America. The odds ratio for the uninteracted moderator variable, 
exposure to the president’s speech, demonstrates that respondents who watched the president’s 
speech were approximately 4.6 times more likely to identify an issue mentioned in the speech as 
the most important problem than respondents who did not watch the speech. 
 We turn next to the individual (uninteracted) presidential rhetoric variables in the model. 
Because the unit of measurement for most of the presidential rhetoric variables is a single word, 
a more meaningful method for interpreting the substantive significance of these variables is to 
calculate the effect of a given rhetoric variable when the president relied on it to the maximum 
extent observed in the dataset. The odds ratios associated with the uninteracted presidential 
rhetoric variables represent the conditional effects of these variables on the odds that a 
respondent identified an issue mentioned by the president as most important, when the value of 
the moderator is equal to zero (Jaccard 2001). To interpret the substantive significance of an 
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TABLE 8. Regression Model: Exposure to the President’s Speech 
and the Relationship Between Presidential Rhetoric and the Public 
Agenda 
 
Independent Variable 
  
Logit 
   
  
Rse   
  
Exp(b)  
   
Presidential Rhetoric      
Issue attention     .001 .000  1.0001 
Issue justification     .003 .001  1.0021** 
Credit claiming without evidence    -.003 .002  0.9986 
Credit claiming w/ evidence    -.026 .004  0.9941** 
Public appeals     .016 .004  1.0114** 
Congressional appeals     .006 .002  1.0014 
Fear appeals     .013 .004  1.0134* 
American values     .041 .031  1.0001 
Compare and contrast     .000 .002  0.9998 
Foreign policy     .245 .228  1.0001 
Agenda size     .017 .011  1.0068 
Issue order     .014 .010  1.0043 
Exposure to President’s Speech   1.516 .354  4.5561**       
Interactions     
Speech x Issue attention     .002 .001  1.0002* 
Speech x Issue justification     .002 .000  1.0021** 
Speech x Credit claiming without evidence    -.010 .004  0.9987* 
Speech x Credit claiming with evidence    -.004 .001  0.9956* 
Speech x Public appeals    -.004 .003  1.0125** 
Speech x Congressional appeals     .014 .004  1.0045** 
Speech x Fear appeals     .012 .003  1.0123** 
Speech x American values     .069 .034  1.0010 
Speech x Compare and contrast     .004 .002  1.0004 
Speech x Foreign policy     .965 .305  2.6241** 
Speech x Agenda size    -.012 .012  0.9978 
Speech x Issue order    -.059 .011  0.9910** 
     
Individual Presidents     
Bush I .017  .432  1.0000 
Clinton .451  .401  1.0012 
Bush II .597  .397  1.0316 
     
Contextual Factors     
Prior public agenda     .100 .003  1.1179** 
Prior media coverage     .061 .051  0.9949 
Economic conditions     .473 .105  1.6047** 
Important Events     .739 .248  1.5624* 
     
Lambda    -.322 .217  0.9977 
Pseudo R2     .253    
N 75,455    
      
  
Note: Regression Model estimated using logistic regression analysis with White’s robust 
standard errors. The dependent variable is the Public Agenda. The explanatory variables in the 
Selection Model were included as controls in the Regression Model. These results are not 
shown but are available upon request from the author. *p <.01; **p <.001. Two-tailed. 
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uninteracted rhetoric variable, the odds ratio for that appeal was multiplied by the maximum 
number of words used by the president to issue that appeal.  
 Considered first is the influence of public appeals. The odds ratio for the uninteracted 
public appeals variable (1.0114) indicates that, for each additional word used by the president to 
appeal for public support on an issue, respondents who did not watch the speech were an average 
of 1.1% more likely to identify that issue as most important. Multiplying the odds ratio by the 
full range of the public appeals variable (67 words) reveals that respondents who did not watch 
the speech were an average of 74% more likely to identify an issue as the most important 
problem when the president appealed for public support on that issue to the maximum extent 
observed in the dataset. Presidents also used fear appeals to heighten the salience of issues 
mentioned in their speeches. When presidents directed the public’s attention to possible 
consequences that might occur if their position on an issue was not adopted (38 words), 
respondents were an average of 49% more likely to consider that issue to be the most important 
facing America. Finally, when presidents relied on substantive justifications of the importance of 
an issue (372 words), respondents who did not watch the president’s speech were an average of 
74% more likely to identify that issue as most important. 
  The interaction terms in the Regression Model suggest that several forms of presidential 
rhetoric figured more prominently in the evaluations of issue salience expressed by those who 
watched the speech than by those who did not watch the speech. In fact, when presidential 
rhetoric was influential, it was usually influential only among respondents who watched the 
president’s speech. Issue attention, credit claiming without evidence, congressional appeals, 
foreign policy, and issue order were all emphasized in the evaluations of issue salience expressed 
only by those who watched the speech. The interaction terms in this, and all subsequent, models 
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are interpreted as the average change in the influence of a rhetoric variable on the public agenda, 
given a one-unit increase in the moderator variable- which, in this case, is exposure to the 
president’s speech (Jaccard 2001). Discussed below are congressional appeals, issue attention, 
and credit claiming with evidence. The moderating effect of exposure to the president’s speech 
on the influence of each of these forms of presidential rhetoric is also demonstrated graphically 
in Figures 2 through 4. 
 Take congressional appeals, for example. The uninteracted effect of this rhetorical 
variable suggests that, when presidents appealed to Congress for legislative action on an issue 
(105 words), respondents who did not watch the speech were an average of 11% more likely to 
select that issue as the nation’s most important problem. The interaction term for this rhetorical 
appeal reveals that the influence of congressional appeals was an average of 53% greater among 
respondents who watched the speech than among respondents who did not watch the speech. 
Thus, when presidents appealed to Congress on an issue to the maximum extent observed,  
respondents who watched the speech were an average of 64% more likely to identify that issue as 
the most important.38  
 Exposure to the president’s speech also proved to be an important moderator of the 
influence of issue attention on the public agenda. The uninteracted effect of issue attention 
reveals that, when presidents discussed an issue to the fullest extent (1703 words), respondents  
 
                                                 
38 The uninteracted effect of congressional appeals represents the influence of this variable among those who did not 
watch the president’s speech. The interaction term for congressional appeals indicates how much greater the 
influence of congressional appeals was among respondents who did watch the president’s speech, than among 
respondents who did not. Thus, the total influence of congressional appeals on the public agenda among respondents 
who watched the speech was calculated by combining the uninteracted effect for congressional appeals  (11%) with 
the effect of the interaction between congressional appeals and exposure to the president’s speech (53%), yielding a 
product of 64%.  
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FIGURE 2. The Moderating Effect of Exposure to the President’s Speech on the 
Relationship Between Congressional Appeals and the Public Agenda 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. The Moderating Effect of Exposure to the President’s Speech on the 
Relationship Between Issue Attention and the Public Agenda 
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FIGURE 4. The Moderating Effect of Exposure to the President’s Speech on the 
Relationship Between Credit Claiming with Evidence and the Public Agenda 
 
 
who did not watch the president’s speech were an average of 17% more likely to identify that 
issue as the most important problem facing America. The interaction term indicates that the 
influence of issue attention on the public agenda was an average of 34% greater among 
respondents who watched the president’s speech than among respondents who did not. Thus, 
when presidents maximized their discussion of an issue, respondents who watched the 
president’s speech were an average of 51% more likely to identify that issue as the most 
important problem facing America. 
 Also, when presidents cited quantitative evidence of success achieved in dealing with an 
issue (100 words), the uninteracted effect of credit claiming with evidence suggests that 
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the president’s speech than among respondents who did not watch the speech. Thus, when 
presidents invoked credit claiming with evidence to the fullest extent, respondents who watched 
the speech were an average of 100% less likely to identify that issue as the most important 
problem.  
 These findings stand in contrast to considerable research that finds the greatest impact of 
another form of presidential communication, presidential debates, is among those who did not 
watch the debates (Jamieson and Waldman 2001). Although speculative, the discrepancy can 
probably be explained by the role played by media coverage. First, many of the people who do 
not watch presidential debates may be exposed to some for of media coverage of the debates, 
perhaps by accident, in which the main points and arguments of the candidates are presented in 
summarized fashion. This media coverage often features the commentary of political pundits 
who offer their opinion as to how well the candidates performed and who, in their estimation, 
won or lost the debate. On the other hand, those who do not watch State of the Union Addresses 
are not as likely to be exposed to extensive media coverage of those addresses. For one, the level 
of media coverage attracted by presidential debates, held during the general election phase of a 
presidential campaign, is typically far greater than that received by a State of the Union Address. 
For another, the respondents in this study who did not watch the president’s speech did not have 
an opportunity to seek out media coverage of the speech: all four surveys in this study were 
conducted on the day of the State of the Union Address, or the following day.   
 Finally, the results show that the public agenda in the Regression Model was responsive 
to a number of other factors in addition to presidential rhetoric. Worsening economic conditions 
encouraged respondents to identify economic issues mentioned by the president as most 
important, important events relevant to issues mentioned in the speech led respondents to choose 
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those issues as the most important, and the public agenda measured prior to the speech proved to 
be a strong predictor of the public agenda measured after the speech.   
2. Presidential Support 
  As the evidence marshaled above indicates, presidential rhetoric is substantially more 
influential among respondents who watched the president’s speech than among respondents who 
did not watch the speech. It remains to consider who among the respondents that did watch the 
president’s speech were the most receptive to the president’s rhetoric. Consequently, the 
moderating influences of presidential support, political predispositions, and demographic 
characteristics were estimated using a sample composed of only those respondents who watched 
the president’s speech. 
 The results from the Presidential Support models appear in Tables 9 and 10. First, 
concerning the presidential vote choice model shown in Table 9, the coefficient for the 
uninteracted vote choice variable indicates that respondents who voted for the president were 
more than twice as likely to identify an issue mentioned by the president as most important than 
respondents who did not vote for the president. Moreover, the interaction terms show that 
respondents who voted for the president were, in numerous cases, more receptive to presidential 
rhetoric in their assessments of issue salience than respondents who did not vote for the  
president. More specifically, respondents who voted for the president were more receptive than 
respondents who did not to the president’s use of issue attention, issue justifications, credit 
claiming with evidence, congressional appeals, fear appeals, American values, and agenda size. 
Addressed further is the moderating influence of vote choice on issue attention, issue 
justifications, and credit claiming with evidence. The moderating effect of presidential vote 
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choice on the influence of these presidential rhetoric variables is represented graphically in 
Figures 5 through 7.   
 By devoting more time to their discussion of an issue, presidents were able to increase 
public concern about that issue. When presidents maximized their discussion of an issue (1703 
words), respondents who did not watch the speech were an average of 17% more likely to 
believe that issue represented the most important problem facing the country. But the effect of 
issue attention on the public agenda was an average of 34% greater among respondents who 
voted for the president than among respondents who did not. As a result, respondents were an 
average of 51% more likely to identify an issue as the most important problem when presidents 
used 1703 words to discuss that issue.  
 When presidents relied on substantive justifications of the importance of certain issues 
(372 words), respondents who did not watch the speech were an average of 15% more likely to 
identify those issues as most important. Also, the interaction term demonstrates that the effect of 
issue attention on the public agenda was an average of 26% greater among those who voted for 
the president than among those who did not. Thus, respondents who voted for the president were 
an average of 41% more likely to identify an issue as the most important problem when the 
president attempted to justify the importance of that issue to the maximum extent observed. 
 Finally, by directing the public’s attention to evidence of progress made in dealing with 
certain issues, presidents were able to substantially reduce public concern about those issues.  
When presidents relied on credit claiming with evidence in their discussion of an issue (100 
words), respondents who did not vote for the president were an average of 30% less likely to 
identify that issue as most important. The influence of credit claiming with evidence was an  
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TABLE 9. Presidential Vote Choice and the Relationship Between 
Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda 
 
Independent Variable     Logit    
  
Se   
  
Exp(b)  
   
Presidential Rhetoric      
Issue attention     .002 .000  1.0001** 
Issue justification     .008 .001  1.0004** 
Credit claiming without evidence     .003 .002  0.9990 
Credit claiming w/ evidence    -.034 .005  0.9967** 
Public appeals     .039 .003  1.0033** 
Congressional appeals     .006 .002  1.0001 
Fear appeals    -.001 .007  1.0000 
American values     .063 .042  0.9997 
Compare and contrast     .006 .001  1.0013** 
Foreign policy     .629 .267  1.0001 
Agenda size    -.002 .010  0.9998 
Issue order    -.027 .010  0.9832* 
    
Presidential Vote Choice     .740 .209  2.0959** 
      
Interactions     
Vote choice x Issue attention     .001 .000  1.0002** 
Vote choice x Issue justification     .006 .002  1.0007** 
Vote choice x Credit claiming without evidence     .000 .003  1.0004 
Vote choice x Credit claiming w/ evidence    -.003 .001  0.9966* 
Vote choice x Public appeals     .011 .009  1.0010 
Vote choice x Congressional appeals     .016 .002  1.0021** 
Vote choice x Fear appeals     .017 .004  1.0167** 
Vote choice x American values     .148 .042  1.0159** 
Vote choice x Compare and contrast     .002 .001  1.0002 
Vote choice x Foreign policy     .738 .446  2.0001 
Vote choice x Agenda size    -.030 .012  0.9704* 
Vote choice x Issue order     .002 .011  0.9997 
      
Individual Presidents      
Bush I     .022 .030  1.0022 
Clinton     .258 .127  1.0294 
Bush II     .198 .106  1.0219 
     
Contextual Factors     
Prior public agenda     .105 .004  1.1101** 
Prior media coverage     .141 .062  1.1421 
Economic conditions     .615 .143  1.8544** 
Important Events     .906 .385  1.6636** 
     
Pseudo R2 .254    
N 38,681    
         
Note:  Presidential Vote Choice model estimated using logistic regression analysis. The 
dependent variable is the Public Agenda. *p <.01; **p <.001. Two-tailed. 
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FIGURE 5. The Moderating Effect of Presidential Vote Choice on the Relationship 
Between Issue Attention and the Public Agenda 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6. The Moderating Effect of Presidential Vote Choice on the Relationship 
Between Issue Justification and the Public Agenda 
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FIGURE 7. The Moderating Effect of Presidential Vote Choice on the Relationship 
Between Credit Claiming with Evidence and the Public Agenda 
 
 
average of 40% greater among respondents who voted for the president than among respondents 
who did not. Thus, when presidents relied on credit claiming to the maximum extent observed, 
respondents who voted for the president were an average of 70% less likely to consider that issue 
to be the most important problem facing the nation.  
 Intriguingly, the statistical significance of many of the individual (uninteracted) rhetoric 
variables suggests that, while presidential rhetoric is influential among respondents who watched 
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vote for the president were an average of 34% more likely to identify that issue as the nation’s 
most important. Finally, attesting to the importance of issue order, presidents increased the 
salience of issues by discussing those issues at the beginning of their speeches. Assuming the 
president discussed a total of 24 issues in their speech, the maximum observed number of issues, 
respondents were an average of 64% less likely to identify an issue mentioned by the president as 
most important if the president relegated their discussion of that issue to the end of the speech, 
than if the president discussed that issue at the beginning of the speech. 
 Like those who voted for the president, respondents who approved of the president’s 
performance were considerably more likely to select issues mentioned by the president as the 
most important problems facing the nation. According to the results in Table 10, the uninteracted 
presidential approval variable demonstrates that respondents who approved of the president’s 
performance were more than twice as likely to identify an issue mentioned by the president as 
the most important problem than respondents who disapproved of the president’s performance. 
Furthermore, presidential approval acts as a robust moderator of the relationship between several 
forms of presidential rhetoric and the public agenda. Issue attention, issue justifications, credit 
claiming with evidence, congressional appeals, fear appeals, compare and contrast, agenda size, 
and issue order were all emphasized more heavily in the evaluations of issue salience expressed 
by respondents who approved of the president than by respondents who disapproved of the 
president. The following considers in more detail the influence of approval on issue 
justifications, agenda size, and compare and contrast. Figures 8 through 10 illustrate these effects 
in graphical form. 
 When presidents justified the importance of issues in their speeches (372 words), 
respondents who disapproved of the president were an average of 37% more likely to identify 
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those issues as the nation’s most important problems. The interaction term indicates that the 
influence of issue justifications was an average of 52% greater among respondents who 
approved of the president than among respondents who disapproved of the president. Therefore, 
respondents who approved of the president’s performance were an average of 89% more likely to 
identify an issue as most important when the president attempted to justify the importance of that 
issue to the maximum extent observed in the dataset. 
 Also, in evidence of the importance of agenda size, when presidents discussed the 
maximum observed number of issues in their speeches (24), respondents who disapproved of the 
president’s performance were an average of 38% less likely to identify those issues as most 
important. In addition, the influence of agenda size was an average of 29% greater among 
respondents who approved of the president than among respondents who disapproved. 
Accordingly, when presidents discussed the maximum number of issues in their speeches, 
respondents who approved of the president’s performance were an average of 67% less likely to 
identify those issues as the most important problems facing the country. 
 By comparing and contrasting their policies with others presidents were able increase the 
salience of those issues. More precisely, when presidents relied on comparison and contrasts in 
discussing an issue (264 words), respondents who disapproved of the president were an average 
of 29% more likely to recognize that issue as the most important problem. Moreover, the 
influence of comparison and contrasts was an average of 42% greater among respondents who 
approved of the president than among respondents who disapproved of the president. Thus, 
respondents who approved of the president were an average of 71% more likely to identify an 
issue as most important when the president compared and contrasted their policy for addressing 
that issue with the policies proposed by others to the fullest extent observed. 
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TABLE 10. Presidential Approval and the Relationship Between 
Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda 
 
Independent Variable      Logit    
  
Se   
  
Exp(b)  
   
Presidential Rhetoric      
Issue attention   .003 .000  1.0002** 
Issue justification   .011 .001  1.0011** 
Credit claiming without evidence  -.003 .002  0.9967 
Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.019 .005  0.9989** 
Public appeals   .004 .004  1.0000 
Congressional appeals   .006 .003  1.0032** 
Fear appeals  -.013 .008  0.9968 
American values   .075 .062  1.0001 
Compare and contrast   .005 .001  1.0011** 
Foreign policy   .627 .455  1.5340 
Agenda size  -.049 .010  0.9840* 
Issue order  -.049 .031  0.9917 
    
Presidential Approval   .825 235  2.2819** 
      
Interactions     
Approval x Issue attention   .002 .000  1.0002** 
Approval x Issue justification   .009 .001  1.0014** 
Approval x Credit claiming without evidence   .002 .002  1.0000 
Approval x Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.021 .007  0.9976* 
Approval x Public appeals   .021 .009  1.0021 
Approval x Congressional appeals   .012 .003  1.0062** 
Approval x Fear appeals   .027 .004  1.0268** 
Approval x American values   .095 .071  1.0002 
Approval x Compare and contrast   .005 .001  1.0016** 
Approval x Foreign policy   .564 .373  1.7574 
Approval x Agenda size  -.066 .012  0.9366** 
Approval x Issue order  -.038 .010  0.9629 
      
Individual Presidents      
Bush I .022  .049  1.0221 
Clinton .320  .125  1.0596 
Bush II .964  .383  1.0613* 
     
Contextual Factors     
Prior public agenda   .104 .003  1.1641** 
Prior media coverage   .161 .055  1.1154* 
Economic conditions   .520 .123  1.6228** 
Important Events   .722 .265  1.5111* 
     
Pseudo R2   .243    
N 50,953    
         
Note: Presidential Approval model estimated using logistic regression analysis. The dependent 
variable is the Public Agenda. *p <.01; **p <.001. Two-tailed. 
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FIGURE 8. The Moderating Effect of Presidential Approval on the Relationship Between 
Issue Justification and the Public Agenda 
 
 
 
FIGURE 9. The Moderating Effect of Presidential Approval on the Relationship Between 
Agenda Size and the Public Agenda 
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FIGURE 10. The Moderating Effect of Presidential Approval on the Relationship Between 
Compare and Contrast and the Public Agenda 
 
 
 The statistical significance of several individual (uninteracted) rhetoric variables further 
demonstrates that even respondents who watched the president’s speech, but disapproved of the 
president’s performance, were influenced by presidential rhetoric. First, when presidents 
expanded their discussion of an issue to the maximum extent observed (1703 words), 
respondents who disapproved were an average of 34% more likely to identify that issue as most 
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who disapproved were an average of 34% more likely to believe that issue represented the 
nation’s most important problem. Finally, when presidents cited evidence in claiming credit for 
progress made in dealing with an issue (100 words), respondents who disapproved of the 
president were an average of 21% less likely to cite that issue as the most important problem.  
Finally, the results of both Presidential Support models reveal important events, economic 
conditions, and the prior public agenda to be important determinants of the public agenda.  
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3. Political Predispositions 
 The results of the Political Predispositions models are shown in Tables 11 and 12. 
Respondents who shared the same partisan predisposition as the president were expected to be 
more influenced by that president’s rhetoric than respondents with the opposite partisan 
predisposition. The results summarized in Table 11 provide strong evidence in support of this 
expectation. Democrats were more likely than Republicans to identify the issues mentioned by 
Clinton in his speech as important, and Republicans were more likely than Democrats to identify 
the issues mentioned by Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush in their speeches as 
most important. The coefficient of the uninteracted partisan predisposition variable shows that 
respondents with the same party identification as the president were about 1.51 times, or 51%, 
more likely to identify an issue mentioned by that president as most important than respondents 
with the opposite party identification.  
 The interaction terms further show that presidential rhetoric weighed more heavily in the 
evaluations of issue salience made by respondents who belonged to the same party as the  
president. More specifically, the following discussion considers the moderating effect of partisan 
identification on the influence of issue attention, fear appeals, and American values, each of 
which is shown graphically in Figures 11 through 13. When presidents used 1703 words to 
discuss an issue, respondents of the opposite party were an average of 17% more likely to select 
that issue as most important. But the influence of issue attention was an average of 34% greater 
among respondents from the same party than among respondents from the opposite party. 
Consequently, when presidents employed the full range of issue attention in their discussion of 
an issue, respondents of the same party as the president were an average of 51% more likely to 
identify that issue as the nation’s most important problem. 
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 By referring to the possible consequences likely to occur is their position on an issue was 
not adopted (38 words), respondents of the opposing party were an average of just 4% more 
likely to identify that issue as most important. However, the influence of fear appeals on the odds 
that respondents identified an issue as most important was an average of 53% greater among 
respondents of the same party as the president than among respondents of the opposing party. As 
a result, when presidents used fear appeals to the maximum extent observed, respondents of the 
same party as the president were an average of 57% more likely to identify that issue as most 
important. 
 In associating particular issues with cherished American values, presidents encouraged 
respondents to view those issues as more important. Respondents from the opposite party of the 
president were an average of 45% more likely to identify an issue as most important when 
presidents attempted to associate that issue with American values (38 words). Additionally, the 
influence of American values was an average of 65% greater among respondents from the same 
party than among respondents from the opposite party. Thus, when presidents associated issues 
in their speeches with American values to the maximum extent, respondents from the president’s 
party were an average of 110% more likely to consider that issue to be the most important 
problem. 
 While presidential rhetoric was a more important determinant of the public agenda 
among respondents who shared the same party identification as the president, the results also 
demonstrate that presidents also used their rhetoric to influence the public agenda among 
respondents who identified with the opposing party. In particular, issue attention, issue 
justifications, credit claiming, American values, compare and contrast, and issue order were all 
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TABLE 11. Partisan Predispositions and the Relationship Between 
Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda 
 
Independent Variable      Logit    
  
Se   
  
Exp(b)  
   
Presidential Rhetoric      
Issue attention   .003 .000  1.0001** 
Issue justification   .011 .002  1.0009** 
Credit claiming without evidence  -.012 .003  0.9987** 
Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.008 .008  0.9997 
Public appeals   .046 .005  1.0046 
Congressional appeals   .006 .003  1.0012 
Fear appeals   .004 .009  1.0010 
American values   .111 .039  1.0120* 
Compare and contrast   .007 .002  1.0016** 
Foreign policy   .534 .294  1.1860 
Agenda size  -.004 .012  0.9999 
Issue order  -.064 .011  0.9380** 
    
Partisan Predispositions   .414 .103  1.5125** 
      
Interactions     
Partisan pred. x Issue attention   .003 .001  1.0002** 
Partisan pred. x Issue justification   .001 .000  1.0110** 
Partisan pred. x Credit claiming  -.012 .004  0.9983* 
Partisan pred. x Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.006 .001  0.9948** 
Partisan pred. x Public appeals   .002 .004  1.0002 
Partisan pred. x Congressional appeals   .005 .001  1.0071** 
Partisan pred. x Fear appeals   .008 .002  1.0078** 
Partisan pred. x American values   .063 .014  1.0166** 
Partisan pred. x Compare and contrast   .001 .001  1.0001 
Partisan pred. x Foreign policy   .180 .136  1.1973 
Partisan pred. x Agenda size  -.004 .005  0.9996 
Partisan pred. x Issue order  -.018 .005  0.9829** 
     
Individual Presidents     
Bush I .242 .115  1.0274 
Clinton .435 .169  1.0245 
Bush II .641 .312  1.0356 
     
Contextual Factors     
Prior public agenda   .103 .003  1.1231** 
Prior media coverage   .175 .052  1.1762* 
Economic conditions   .584 .118  1.7904** 
Important Events   .761 .264  1.5317* 
     
Pseudo R2   .241    
N 54,080    
         
Note: Partisan Predispositions model estimated using logistic regression analysis. The 
dependent variable is the Public Agenda. *p <.01; **p <.001. Two-tailed. 
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FIGURE 11. The Moderating Effect of Party Identification on the Relationship Between 
Issue Attention and the Public Agenda 
 
 
 
FIGURE 12. The Moderating Effect of Party Identification on the Relationship Between 
Fear Appeals and the Public Agenda 
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FIGURE 13. The Moderating Effect of Party Identification on the Relationship Between 
American Values and the Public Agenda 
 
 
important factors in the evaluations of issue salience expressed by respondents from the opposite 
party of the president.  
 For example, when presidents compared their policies for dealing with an issue with the 
policies advocated by others (264 words), respondents from the opposite party were an average 
of 42% more likely to believe that issue represented the nation’s most important problem. Also, 
respondents were an average of 33% more likely to identify an issue as most important when 
presidents resorted to substantive justifications of the importance of that issue (372 words). 
Finally, when the president claimed credit for progress made in dealing with an issue (205 
words), respondents of the opposing party were an average of 27% less likely to believe that 
issue was most important. 
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 The results in Table 12 demonstrate the moderating influence of ideological orientation 
on the relationship between presidential rhetoric and the public agenda. Liberals were more 
likely to identify the issues mentioned by Clinton as most important, whereas 
conservatives were more likely to identify the issues mentioned by Reagan, George H.W. Bush, 
and George W. Bush as most important. More precisely, the coefficient of the uninteracted 
variable, ideological orientations, indicates that respondents with the same ideological 
orientation as the president were about 1.52 times, or 52%, more likely to identify an issue 
mentioned by that president as most important than respondents with the opposite ideological 
orientation.  
 The interaction terms reveal that presidential rhetoric was a more important determinant 
of the evaluations of issue salience expressed by respondents with the same ideological 
orientation as the president. Interpreted below is the moderating effect of ideological orientations 
on the influence of American values, issue justifications, and credit claiming with evidence. The 
moderating effect of ideology on the influence of each of these presidential rhetoric variables is 
portrayed graphically in Figures 14 through 16. When presidents associated issues with 
American values (32 words), respondents who shared the same ideological orientation as the 
president were an average of just 4% more likely to identify those issues as most important. 
However, the influence of American values was an average of 53% greater among respondents 
who shared the same ideological orientation as the president than among respondents who did 
not. Therefore, by associating an issue with American values to the fullest extent, respondents 
with the same ideological orientation as the president were an average of 57% more likely to 
identify that issue as most important. 
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TABLE 12. Ideological Orientation and the Relationship Between 
Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda 
 
Independent Variable      Logit    
  
Se   
  
Exp(b)  
   
Presidential Rhetoric      
Issue attention   .000 .000  1.0000 
Issue justification   .003 .001  1.0002 
Credit claiming without evidence  -.012 .003  0.9979** 
Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.056 .007  0.9971** 
Public appeals   .049 .005  1.0050** 
Congressional appeals   .012 .004  1.0020* 
Fear appeals   .007 .011  1.0001 
American values   .012 .078  1.0011 
Compare and contrast   .008 .002  1.014** 
Foreign policy   .361 .377  1.1693 
Agenda size  -.044 .014  1.0065* 
Issue order  -.041 .012  1.0068* 
    
Ideological Orientation   .457 .116  1.5244** 
      
Interactions     
Ideological orientat. X Issue attention   .000 .000  1.0000 
Ideological orientat. X Issue justification   .001 .000  1.0006* 
Ideological orientat. X Credit claiming w/out evidence  -.007 .001  0.9988** 
Ideological orientat. X Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.015 .003  0.9945** 
Ideological orientat. X Public appeals   .006 .034  1.0000 
Ideological orientat. X Congressional appeals   .008 .002  1.0037** 
Ideological orientat. X Fear appeals   .004 .005  1.0004 
Ideological orientat. X American values   .012 .003  1.014** 
Ideological orientat. X Compare and contrast   .002 .001  1.0001 
Ideological orientat. X Foreign policy   .363 .236  1.4378 
Ideological orientat. X Agenda size  -.019 .006  0.9814* 
Ideological orientat. X Issue order  -.035 .006  0.9655** 
     
Individual Presidents     
Bush I -.017 .052  0.9983 
Clinton .573 .299  1.0267 
Bush II .519 .887  1.0003 
     
Contextual Factors     
Prior public agenda   .102 .003  1.1164** 
Prior media coverage   .133 .053  1.1219 
Economic conditions   .593 .116  1.8100** 
Important Events   .685 .257  1.5019* 
     
Pseudo R2 .256    
N 
  
54,216
     
Note: Partisan Predispositions model estimated using logistic regression analysis. The 
dependent variable is the Public Agenda. *p <.01; **p <.001. Two-tailed. 
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FIGURE 14. The Moderating Effect of Ideological Orientation on the Relationship 
Between American Values and the Public Agenda 
 
 
 
FIGURE 15. The Moderating Effect of Ideological Orientation on the Relationship 
Between Issue Justification and the Public Agenda 
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FIGURE 16. The Moderating Effect of Ideological Orientation on the Relationship 
Between Credit Claiming with Evidence and the Public Agenda 
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more effective among respondents who shared the same ideological orientation as the president. 
Respondents who differed from the president in their ideological views were an average of 30% 
less likely to identify an issue as most important if presidents cited evidence of success in dealing 
with that issue. Furthermore, the influence of credit claiming with evidence was an average of 
58% greater among respondents with the same ideological orientation as the president than 
among respondents with the opposite ideological orientation. Taken together, when presidents 
cited evidence in their attempts to claim credit for addressing an issue to the maximum extent 
possible, respondents of the same ideological orientation as the president were an average of 
88% less likely to identify that issue as most important.  
 The significance of several of the uninteracted effects attests to the influence of 
presidential rhetoric, even among respondents whose ideological views differed from the 
president’s. When presidents appealed to Congress on an issue (105 words), respondents with the 
opposite ideological orientation as the president were an average of 21% more likely to consider 
that issue to be most important. Moreover, when presidents discussed an issue at the end of a 
speech in which they mentioned 24 issues, respondents with the opposite ideological orientation 
as the president were an average of 16% less likely to identify those issues as most important. 
Finally, when presidents compared their policy for addressing an issue with policies suggested 
by others to the maximum extent, respondents with the opposite ideological orientation as the 
president were an average of 39% more likely to identify that issue as the most important 
problem facing America. 
 In addition to the importance of presidential rhetoric, a number of other factors proved to 
be influential determinants of the public agenda. Economic conditions, important events, and the 
95 
prior public agenda were influential in the Partisan Identification and Ideological Orientation 
Models, whereas prior media coverage was significant in just the Partisan Identification Model. 
4. Demographic Characteristics 
 The final set of hypotheses concerns the role played by respondents’ demographic 
characteristics in the presidential agenda setting process. Respondents who belonged to 
demographic groups in the Democratic coalition were expected to be more responsive to the 
rhetoric of Democratic presidents, and respondents who belonged to groups in the Republican 
coalition were expected to be more responsive to the rhetoric of Republican presidents. The 
influence of membership in the Democratic coalition was tested using survey data collected after 
Clinton’s 1994 address. The influence of membership in the Republican coalition was 
determined using survey data collected after the speeches given by Reagan in 1982, George 
H.W. Bush in 1992, and George W. Bush in 2001. Because it is entirely possible that what is 
really being measured by demographic characteristics is partisan identification or ideological 
orientation, control variables for both were included in the model.39  
 The results in Table 13 show that poor, African-American, urban residents employed by 
labor unions were more likely to identify an issue mentioned in President Clinton’s 1994 State of 
the Union Address as most important than respondents who did not share these characteristics.  
Figures 17 through 19 are used to represent the moderating effect of membership in the 
Demographic coalition in graphical form. The uninteracted Democratic coalition variable 
indicates that for each additional group in the Democratic coalition to which a respondent 
belonged, that respondent was an average of 19% more likely to identify an issue mentioned by 
Clinton as the most important problem facing America. Or, in other words, respondents who
                                                 
39 The measures of partisan and ideological predispositions are the same as those included in the models designed to 
test Hypotheses 4 and 5. For purposes of presentation, these results are not shown but are available upon request 
from the author. 
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TABLE 13. Democratic Coalition and the Relationship Between 
Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda 
 
Independent Variable      Logit    
  
Se   
  
Exp(b)  
   
Presidential Rhetoric      
Issue attention   .024 .004  1.0002** 
Issue justification   .169 .026  1.0007** 
Credit claiming without evidence  -.092 .051  0.9995 
Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.159 .031  0.9959** 
Public appeals   .873 .126  1.0094** 
Congressional appeals   .089 .030  1.0039* 
Fear appeals  -.002 .004  0.9998 
American values   .001 .002  1.0001 
Compare and contrast   .401 .059  1.0009** 
Foreign policy   .007 .011  1.0000 
Agenda size    _____ _____      _____ 
Issue order  -.057 .108  0.9997 
    
Democratic Coalition   .282 .030  1.1901** 
      
Interactions     
Dem. Coalition x Issue attention   .003 .001  1.0001** 
Dem. Coalition x Issue justification   .005 .001  1.0005** 
Dem. Coalition x Credit claiming without evidence  -.013 .004  0.9991* 
Dem. Coalition x Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.042 .012  0.9988** 
Dem. Coalition x Public appeals   .009 .013  1.0000 
Dem. Coalition x Congressional appeals   .042 .013  1.0021* 
Dem. Coalition x Fear appeals   .001 .003  1.0000 
Dem. Coalition x American values   .001 .002  1.0000 
Dem. Coalition x Compare and contrast   .010 .006  1.0000 
Dem. Coalition x Foreign policy   .007 .009  1.1000 
Dem. Coalition x Agenda size    _____ _____      _____ 
Dem. Coalition x Issue order  -.066 .020  0.9914* 
     
Individual Presidents     
Bush I .016 .013  1.0169 
Clinton .073 .049  1.0276 
Bush II .086 .036  1.0395 
     
Contextual Factors     
Prior public agenda   .124 .031  1.1327** 
Prior media coverage   .040 .015  1.0466* 
Economic conditions   .964 .150  3.2044** 
Important Events   .016 .013  1.0251 
     
Pseudo R2   .421    
N 10,377    
         
Note:  Democratic Coalition model estimated using logistic regression analysis. The dependent 
variable is the Public Agenda. *p <.01; **p <.001. Two-tailed. 
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belonged to all four demographic groups in the Democratic coalition were an average of 76% 
more likely to identify an issue mentioned by Clinton as the most important problem than 
respondents who belonged to no such groups.  
 Respondents’ demographic characteristics also proved to be an influential moderator of 
the relationship between presidential rhetoric and the public agenda. The interaction terms 
measure the average change in the relationship between a given rhetorical appeal and the public 
agenda, given a one-unit increase in the moderator variable- which, in this case, is Democratic 
coalition. Issue attention, issue justifications, credit claiming with and without evidence, 
congressional appeals, and issue order were all more influential among respondents who 
belonged to the Democratic coalition than among respondents who did not. As a subset of these 
variables, the following takes up for discussion the moderating effect of the Democratic coalition 
variable on the influence of issue attention, issue justifications, and credit claiming with 
evidence. The effect of membership in the Democratic coalition on the influence of these 
presidential rhetoric variables is shown graphically in Figures 17 through 19. 
 The uninteracted effect of issue attention suggests that when presidents used 1703 words 
to discuss an issue, respondents who belonged to no groups in the Democratic coalition were, on 
average, 35% more likely to identify that issue as the most important problem. Additionally, the 
interaction term suggests that the influence of issue attention on the public agenda was an 
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FIGURE 17. The Moderating Effect of Democratic Coalition on the Relationship Between 
Issue Attention and the Public Agenda 
 
 
 
FIGURE 18. The Moderating Effect of Democratic Coalition on the Relationship Between 
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FIGURE 19. The Moderating Effect of Democratic Coalition on the Relationship Between 
Credit Claiming with Evidence and the Public Agenda 
 
 
average of 17% greater for each additional group in the Democratic coalition to which a 
respondent belonged. Thus, when Clinton discussed an issue to the fullest extent observed, 
respondents who belonged to one group were an average of 52% more likely to identify that 
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issue, respondents who belonged to all four groups in the Demographic coalition were an 
average of 86% more likely to identify that issue as the most important problem. 
 Finally, respondents who belonged to no groups in the Democratic coalition were an 
average of 43% less likely to identify that issue as most important when Clinton cited evidence 
of success in dealing with that issue to the maximum possible extent (205 words). The 
interaction term shows that that the influence of credit claiming with evidence was an average of 
13% greater for each additional group in the Democratic coalition to which a respondent 
belonged. Thus, when Clinton justified the importance of an issue, respondents who belonged to 
all four groups in the Demographic coalition were an average of 95% more likely to identify that 
issue as the most important problem. 
 The effects of the uninteracted rhetoric variables show that Clinton’s rhetoric influenced 
the evaluations of issue salience expressed, not only by respondents who belonged to the 
Democratic coalition, but also by respondents who did not. First, when Clinton appealed for 
public support on an issue (67 words), respondents who belonged to no groups in the Democratic 
coalition were an average of 63% more likely to believe that issue represented the nation’s most 
important problem. Second, respondents who belonged to no groups in the Democratic coalition 
were an average of 24% more likely to identify an issue when Clinton compared his policies for 
addressing that issue with the policies proposed by others (267 words). Finally, Clinton also set 
the public agenda by appealing to Congress. When Clinton called on Congress for legislative on 
an issue (105 words), respondents who belonged to groups in the Democratic coalition were an 
average of 41% more likely to identify that issue as the nation’s most important.  
 On the other end of the political spectrum, respondents who belonged to groups in the 
Republican coalition were more receptive to the rhetoric of Republican presidents than 
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respondents who did not belong to these groups. Wealthy, white, southern Protestants were more 
likely to identify issues mentioned by Republican presidents as the most important problems 
facing America than respondents who did not share these characteristics. As the results in Table 
14 reveal, membership in the Republican coalition functions as an important moderator of the 
influence of several rhetorical appeals on the public agenda. In particular, the following 
discussion considers the moderating effect of the Republican coalition variable on the influence 
of American values, congressional appeals, and fear appeals. The moderating effect of 
membership in the Republican coalition is also shown represented graphically in Figures 20 
through 22. 
 The uninteracted effect of American values illustrates that respondents who belonged to 
no groups in the Republican coalition were an average of 48% more likely to identify an issue as 
most important when Republican presidents associated that issue with American values to the 
maximum extent (32 words). However, the interaction term shows that the influence of 
American values was an average of 8% greater for each additional group in the Republican 
coalition to which a respondent belonged. Thus, when Republican presidents associated issues 
with American values to the fullest extent possible, respondents who belonged to all four groups 
in the Republican coalition were an average of 80% more likely to identify that issue as the most 
important problem.  
 Congressional appeals issued by Republican presidents were also more influential among 
respondents who belonged to the Republican coalition. The uninteracted effect of congressional 
appeals suggests respondents who did not belong to any groups in the Republican coalition were 
an average of 41% more likely to identify an issue as most important when presidents appealed 
to Congress for action on that issue to the maximum extent (105 words). Also, the interaction 
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TABLE 14. Republican Coalition and the Relationship Between 
Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda 
 
Independent Variable      Logit    
  
Se   
  
Exp(b)  
   
Presidential Rhetoric      
Issue attention   .004 .001  1.0001* 
Issue justification   .005 .000  1.0012** 
Credit claiming without evidence  -.002 .013  0.9999 
Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.023 .004  0.9971* 
Public appeals   .008 .012  1.0014 
Congressional appeals   .026 .005  1.0039** 
Fear appeals   .026 .009  1.0029* 
American values   .143 .043  1.0151* 
Compare and contrast   .010 .002  1.0011** 
Foreign policy   1.08 .420  1.6041 
Agenda size  -.044 .019  1.0046 
Issue order  -.062 .011  0.9849** 
    
Republican Coalition   .809 .157  2.2453** 
      
Interactions     
Rep. Coalition  x Issue attention   .000 .000  1.0000 
Rep. Coalition x Issue justification   .002 .000  1.0018** 
Rep. Coalition x Credit claiming without evidence  -.007 .002  0.9983* 
Rep. Coalition  x Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.020 .006  0.9980* 
Rep. Coalition  x Public appeals   .014 .006  1.0004 
Rep. Coalition  x Congressional appeals   .010 .003  1.0011** 
Rep. Coalition  x Fear appeals   .021 .004  1.0022** 
Rep. Coalition  x American values   .109 .017  1.0026** 
Rep. Coalition  x Compare and contrast   .000 .001  1.0000 
Rep. Coalition  x Foreign policy   .494 .217  1.2611 
Rep. Coalition  x Agenda size  -.016 .007  0.9984 
Rep. Coalition  x Issue order  -.011 .006  0.9989 
     
Individual Presidents     
Bush I .169 .128  1.0215 
Clinton .371 .198  1.0340 
Bush II -.041 .033  0.9964 
     
Contextual Factors     
Prior public agenda   .132 .005    1.147** 
Prior media coverage   .016 .062    1.016 
Economic conditions   .105 .001    3.111** 
Important Events   .920 .261    2.512** 
     
Pseudo R2   .279    
N 44,443    
         
Note: Republican Coalition model estimated using logistic regression analysis. The dependent 
variable is the Public Agenda. *p <.01; **p <.001. Two-tailed.   
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FIGURE 20. The Moderating Effect of Republican Coalition on the Relationship Between 
Credit Claiming with Evidence and the Public Agenda 
 
 
  
FIGURE 21. The Moderating Effect of Republican Coalition on the Relationship Between 
Congressional Appeals and the Public Agenda 
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FIGURE 22. The Moderating Effect of Republican Coalition on the Relationship Between 
Fear Appeals and the Public Agenda 
 
 
term indicates that the influence of congressional appeals was an average of 12% greater for 
each additional group in the Republican coalition to which a respondent belonged. 
Consequently, respondents who belonged to all four groups in the Republican coalition were an 
average of 89% more likely to identify an issue as the nation’s most important problem when 
Republican presidents appealed for congressional action on that issue. 
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the fear appeals issued by Republican presidents than respondents who did not belong to the 
Republican coalition. The uninteracted effect of this variable demonstrates that, when presidents 
invoked the use of fear appeals in their discussion of an issue to the maximum extent observed 
(38 words), respondents who did not belong to the Republican coalition were an average of 11% 
more likely to consider that issue to be the nation’s most important problem. The interaction term 
for this variable shows that the influence of fear appeals was an average of 8% greater for each 
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additional group in the Republican coalition to which a respondent belonged. As a result, when 
presidents relied on fear appeals in their discussion of an issue, respondents who belonged to all 
four groups in the Republican coalition were an average of 43% more likely to identify that issue 
as the most important problem facing America. 
 The uninteracted effects of the rhetoric variables demonstrate that the influence of the 
rhetoric used by Republican presidents was not confined to respondents who belonged to groups 
in the Republican coalition. For example, when Republican presidents relied on substantive 
justifications of the importance of issues in their speeches (372 words), respondents who 
belonged to no groups in the Republican coalition were, on average, 45% more likely to believe 
that issue represented the country’s most pressing problem. Moreover, respondents who 
belonged to no groups in the Republican coalition were, on average, 29% more likely to identify 
an issue as most important when Republican presidents compared their policies for addressing 
that issue with the policies recommended by others (264 words). Also, when Republican 
presidents cited evidence of progress made in addressing an issue (105), respondents who 
belonged to no groups in the Republican coalition were, on average, 30% less likely to select that 
issue as the nation’s most important problem. 
 Finally, the evaluations of issue salience made by respondents in both the Democratic and 
Republican Coalition models were heavily influenced by several factors in addition to 
presidential rhetoric. The prior public agenda was significant in the Democratic and Republican 
coalition models, economic conditions and prior media coverage was significant in the 
Democratic Coalition Model, important events was significant in the Republican Coalition 
Model, and partisan and ideological orientation were significant in neither of the models. 
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5. Individual Presidents 
 A study based on 4 State of the Union Addresses delivered by four different presidents 
hardly provides an appropriate platform from which to draw broad, sweeping generalizations 
concerning the ability of the President of the United States to influence public opinion. At the 
same time, however, the data used in this study do shed light on the ability of our four most 
recent presidents to craft rhetorical appeals capable of influencing individual-level perceptions of 
the public agenda.   
 Reagan, dubbed by political commentators as “The Great Communicator,” was widely 
renowned for his charismatic delivery of presidential speeches. And although he never mastered 
the art of presidential oratory to the extent Reagan did, Clinton was also considered by most to 
be an effective speech giver. In contrast, neither George W. Bush nor his father considered the 
nationally televised presidential speech a preferred forum for addressing the public; both seemed 
more comfortable communicating with the public in more intimate settings with fewer people. 
The reputed disparities in the rhetorical skills possessed by the four presidents suggest Reagan 
and Clinton would be more effective agenda setters than their contemporaries, George H.W. 
Bush and George W. Bush. However, this is not what the data show. In fact, the results reveal no 
consistent differences in the influence of the four presidents on the public agenda. In only one of 
the seven models was there a statistically significant difference between the four presidents. In 
the Presidential Approval Model, George W. Bush was able to increase the salience of issues in 
mentioned in his 2001 speech by a modest average of 6% greater than Reagan was able to 
increase the salience of issues mentioned in his 1982 speech. Thus, despite their apparent 
rhetorical weaknesses, the Bushes were no less effective agenda setters than their supposedly 
more rhetorically gifted counterparts, Reagan and Clinton.  
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 While this finding contradicts the conventional wisdom concerning the importance of 
presidents’ personal qualities and their ability to persuade the public, it is in accord with previous 
research that demonstrates highly charismatic presidents were no more effective in leading the  
public than presidents who were not charismatic (Edwards 2003; Ranney 1985; Sussman 1984). 
The results of this study also portray the viewers of State of the Union Addresses as relatively 
sophisticated consumers of presidential rhetoric capable of distinguishing presidential style from 
substance. While each of the four presidents was able to convince the public that the issues 
mentioned in their speeches were important, some were more convinced that others. Presidents 
were significantly more effective in their attempts to influence the evaluations of issue salience 
expressed by individuals who supported the president, by those who shared the same political 
predispositions as the president, and by those who belonged to demographic groups in the 
coalition of the president’s party. In the end, the influence of presidents on the public agenda 
depends, not so much on their charisma, personality, or “stage presence,” but to a far greater 
extent on their ability to fashion rhetorical appeals capable of convincing the public that the 
issues mentioned in their speeches represent the most important problems facing America. 
 
F. EVALUATING PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC 
 Table 15 provides a comprehensive summary of the results. It reveals the influence of 
each of the presidential rhetoric variables on the public agenda in each of the models estimated in 
Study 2. The results suggest a number of important findings. First, it apparent from the empirical 
results that Study 2 provides for a more efficient estimate of the influence of presidential rhetoric 
than Study 1. Unlike the data used in Study 1, the data in this study distinguish between 
respondents who watched the speech and those who did not watch the speech. The advantage of  
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TABLE 15. Summary Table for Study 2: Presidential Rhetoric and Individual-Level 
Assessments of Issue Salience 
 
  
  
Presidential Support 
  
  
Political Predispositions  
  
Partisan Coalitions 
Independent Variable 
  
  
Exposure  
to Speech 
Model 
  
  
Presidential
Vote Choice 
Model 
  
  
Presidential 
Approval 
Model 
  
 
Partisan 
Identification 
Model 
 
 
Ideological 
Orientation 
Model 
 
 
  
Democratic 
Coalition 
Model 
  
    
Republican 
Coalition 
Model 
  
         
Presidential Rhetoric         
Issue attention ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Issue justification ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Credit claiming w/out evi. ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Credit claiming w/evi. ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Public appeals ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Congressional appeals ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Fear appeals ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
American values ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Compare and contrast ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Foreign policy ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Agenda size ? ? ? ? ?  _____ ? 
Issue order ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
         
Moderator Variables         
Exposure to speech ? _____ _____ _____ _____  _____ _____ 
Presidential vote choice _____ ? _____ _____ _____  _____ _____ 
Presidential approval _____ _____ ? _____ _____  _____ _____ 
Partisan identification _____ _____ _____ ? _____  _____ _____ 
Ideological orientation _____ _____ _____ _____ ?  _____ _____ 
Democratic coalition _____ _____ _____ _____ _____  ? _____ 
Republican coalition _____ _____ _____ _____ _____  _____ ? 
         
Interactions         
Issue attention ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Issue justification ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Credit claiming ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Credit claiming w/ evi. ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Public appeals ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Congressional appeals ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Fear appeals ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
American values ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Compare and contrast ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Foreign policy ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Agenda size ? ? ? ? ?  _____ ? 
Issue order ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
         
  
Note: This table summarizes the results from the models in Study 2 that estimate the influence of presidential rhetoric on the 
Public Agenda. Each presidential rhetoric variable under the “Interactions” heading represents the influence of a rhetoric variable 
when interacted with a particular moderator. Checkmarks denote statistically significant variables, Xs denote nonsignificant 
variables. Hyphens denote variables not in the model. 
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being to able to make such a distinction is confirmed by the results of the Regression Model. 
They suggest that, when presidential rhetoric is influential, it is usually influential only among 
respondents who actually watched the president’s speech. In fact, the uninteracted effect of 
exposure to the president’s speech demonstrates that those who watched the speech were over 
4.5 times more likely to identify an issue in that speech as the most important problem facing 
America- the strongest effect in any of the seven models estimated. While respondents do in fact 
learn about the president’s speech indirectly through media coverage, as Study 1 demonstrates, 
the results in this study show that a significant portion of this influence is felt directly, among 
respondents who actually watched the president’s speech.  
 Second, many of the presidential rhetoric variables significant in Study 1 were discovered 
in Study 2 as important determinants of the public agenda. Issue attention, issue justifications, 
congressional appeals, and both forms of credit claiming proved to be consistent, strong 
determinants of the public agenda in both Study 1 and 2. Two notable exceptions to this pattern 
of consistency are the influence of foreign policy and public appeals. While Study 1 and previous 
research (e.g. Cohen 1995) suggests presidents are effective in placing foreign policy issues on 
the public agenda than domestic issues, the results of Study 2 reveal no such advantage.  
One additional discrepancy in the findings of Study 1 and 2 is found in the differential influence 
of public appeals. In none of the models estimated in Study 1 was the influence of public appeals 
on the public agenda statistically significant, whereas the influence proved important in several 
of the models performed in Study 2. Although any explanation would be speculative, these 
discrepancies are most likely an artifact of the individual presidents and the particular speeches 
included in Study 2.  
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 Third, the results of the Democratic and Republican Coalition Models suggest an 
interesting pattern- namely the significance of public appeals in the former, and American values 
in the latter. The importance of public appeals is consonant with the conventional wisdom 
regarding the general populist tendencies of the Democratic Party, especially in comparison to 
the more elitist propensities of the Republican Party. The importance of American values is 
consistent with previous research (Barker 2002) that demonstrates the influence of value-based 
rhetoric used by elite Republican leaders as determinants of public opinion toward policy issues. 
 Fourth, the present study also suggests normative implications for the study of elite-mass 
relations. In one sense, the significance of public appeals and fear appeals in several of the 
models represent a cause for concern, particularly for those worried about the ability of citizens 
to rise above the rhetorical presidency’s (Tulis 1987) baser tendencies. In Study 1, fear appeals 
proved influential only in media coverage following the president’s speech, not public 
evaluations of issue importance. However, the results of Study 2 suggest that the public does 
take into account the president’s use of fear appeals when it comes to deciding what issues they 
believe to be most important. On the other hand, the fact that respondents were willing to 
consider the evidence cited by presidents in their attempts to claim credit, as well as the 
substantive justification for an issue’s importance, suggests a citizenry that is capable of rising 
above presidents’ attempts to exploit public fears and their often crass appeals for public support 
on the issues and policies mentioned in their speeches.  
 Finally, the primary findings of this study concern the importance of several moderators 
of the relationship between presidential rhetoric and the public agenda. Indeed, the influence of 
presidential rhetoric is in fact greater among those who supported the president, shared the same 
political predispositions as the president, and belonged to the coalition of the president’s party. 
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An important corollary to this central finding is the impressive influence of presidential rhetoric 
among those who did not share these characteristics. As the results collectively demonstrate, 
while presidential rhetoric was more influential among those predisposed to agree with the 
president, presidents were also able to use their rhetoric to influence the evaluations of issue 
salience expressed by respondents who did not support the president, share the same partisan and 
ideological predispositions, or belong to demographic groups in the coalition of the president’s 
party. Simply put, presidents are able to use the rhetoric in their State of the Union Address to 
influence the public agenda, not just among respondents predisposed to agree with the president, 
but also among respondents who are not so predisposed. 
 Why should this be the case? That is, why should presidents be able to affect the 
evaluations of issue salience made even by respondents who are most likely to disagree with 
them on most political matters? The influence of presidential rhetoric among those predisposed 
to disagree with the president is explained in large measure by the difference between agenda 
setting and other political decision making contexts. The research on presidential influence 
clearly indicates that presidents are, generally speaking, unable to use their speeches to effect 
meaningful changes in the policy preferences of their audience. Not only are individuals 
predisposed to disagree with the president less likely to even watch the speech, but even if they 
do they are unlikely to surrender their beliefs and admit defeat to a president with whom they 
disagree with on most political issues anyway. 
 The dynamics of the agenda setting process are likely to play out somewhat differently, 
however. For the president to be successful in setting the public agenda requires only that an 
individual agree that an issue should be addressed, not how that issue should be addressed. It is 
probably much easier for respondents predisposed to disagree with the president to concede that 
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an issue mentioned in the State of the Union Address is important, than it is for those 
respondents to admit their position on that issue is incorrect, and the president’s correct. After 
Clinton’s 1994 State of the Union Address, there was a sharp increase in the number of 
Americans who believed the issue of health care represented the nation’s most important 
problem, even among Republicans and other groups predisposed to disagree with President 
Clinton’s views on health care. As we soon found out, conservatives, Republicans, and 
individuals from a number of other groups did indeed have very different ideas about the size 
and shape health care reform should ultimately take, a fact that ultimately led to the defeat of 
President Clinton’s ambitious health care reform proposal. Thus, while President Clinton was 
able to convince a broad cross-section of Americans that the issue of health care should be 
addressed by government, he was ultimately unable to convince us how it should be addressed.  
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VII. STUDY 3: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 On January 7, 2003, just one day before the State of the Union Address, George W. Bush 
gave a speech to the Economic Club of Chicago in Chicago, Illinois. While this speech addressed 
a number of issues – including the prospects for war against Iraq, international terrorism, and 
corporate responsibility – its principal focus was the economy. The objective of the experimental 
analysis conducted in Study 3 is to determine whether Bush was able to use the rhetoric in this 
particular speech to influence subjects’ perceptions of the importance of the economy. More 
precisely, Study 3 estimates the influence of President Bush’s use of issue justification, 
congressional appeals, and credit claiming with evidence on subjects’ perceptions of the 
importance of the economy.  
 The issue of the economy was chosen as the subject of this analysis several reasons. 
Unlike many other issues on which public opinion is relatively stable, opinions concerning the 
importance of the economy are in a constant state of fluctuation. Perceptions of the economy 
frequently change as new information relevant to the performance of the economy is received. 
Important sources of such information include the news media (Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 
1998; Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000; Hetherington 1996; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 
1996; Mondak, Mutz, and Huckfeldt 1999; Mutz 1992, 1994; Nadeau et al. 1999; Sniderman 
Brody and Tetlock 1991; Weatherford 1983), interpersonal communication (Kinder, Rosenstone, 
and Hansen 1983; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987, 1995), retrospective evaluations of economic
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performance (Conover, Feldman, and Knight 1986; Fiorina 1981; Lewis Beck 1985), as well as 
citizens’ personal financial situations (Chong, Citrin, and Conley 2001; Downs 1957; Kramer
1971). The purpose of Study 3 is to determine whether presidential rhetoric may be counted 
among these sources of influence as an important determinant of economic perceptions.  
 Selection of issue justifications, congressional appeals, and credit claiming with evidence 
was based on several factors. First, these three persuasive appeals were consistently identified in 
the analyses conducted in Studies 1 and 2 as among the most effective rhetorical appeals used by 
presidents in their State of the Union Addresses. Study 3 seeks to uncover additional 
corroborative evidence of their influence. If President Bush was able to influence perceptions of 
the importance of the economy in his January 7 speech, Studies 1 and 2 suggest that this 
influence may well result from his justification the issue’s importance, his appeals to Congress 
for legislative on the issue, and his attempts to claim credit for success already achieved in 
addressing the economy. Moreover, the further evaluation of these three forms of presidential 
rhetoric holds implications for the future study of presidential influence. First, while Cohen 
(1995) demonstrates that ideological justifications of an issue’s important is not an effective 
tactic of persuasion, Studies 1 and 2 indicate that presidents need not resort to ideological 
defenses of an issue’s importance. Rather, presidents may be able to heighten an issue’s 
importance among the public by simply arguing it is important. Clarifying the nature and extent 
of the influence of substantive appeals remains an important task in the study of presidential 
persuasion. Second, the consistently robust influence of congressional appeals coupled with the 
relatively weak influence of public appeals suggests a public that favors congressional appeals as 
its chosen cue for issue importance. Study 3 offers additional evidence bearing on the public’s 
reliance on congressional appeals as an indicator of issue importance. Finally, Study 3 provides 
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yet another proving ground for the effectiveness of credit claiming as a tactic of political 
persuasion.  
 While Mayhew (1974) considered credit claiming as a strategy used by members of 
Congress to enhance their reelection prospects, the results of Studies 1 and 2 suggest this strategy 
may have wider application to the study of elite behavior and its influence. Study 3 seeks further 
evidence to help answer the question of whether credit claiming, previously confined to the study 
of congressional elections, also provides insight into president’s relationship with the public. 
 To complement the survey-based analyses in Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 conducts an 
experimental analysis of presidential rhetoric. The experimental method offers additional 
leverage in the attempt to evaluate the president’s influence on the public agenda. For one, an 
experimental analysis, combined with Studies 1 and 2, provides a “triangulation across multiple 
methods” useful in alleviating doubts that particular findings are method-bound (Kinder Palfrey 
1993; Webb et al. 1966). As Webb states, “When a hypothesis can survive the confrontation of a 
series of complementary methods of testing, it contains a degree of validity unattainable by one 
tested within the more constricted framework of a single method (1966, 174).” Also, made 
possible by the random assignment of subjects to experimental and control groups, Study 3 
enables a more direct test of the causal mechanisms than Studies 1 and 2. Further, the use of 
random assignment also eliminates the problem of selection bias discussed in Study 2. By 
randomly assigning those predisposed to agree as well as those predisposed to disagree with the 
president to watch the president’s speech, Study 3 avoids the problem of selection bias. Finally, 
unexplored to this point is the role of political sophistication. Unlike Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 
incorporates items necessary for investigating the manner and extent to which subjects’ political 
sophistication affects the ability of presidents to set the public agenda.  
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 The January 7, 2003 speech was selected as the source of the presidential rhetoric 
examined in this study for three primary reasons. First, this particular speech was broadcast live 
to a national television audience by CNN, MSNBC, and FOX News. Unlike many presidential 
speeches that are targeted toward particular segments of the population, this speech was clearly 
intended for a mass audience and discussed many of the same issues and relied on many of the 
same arguments incorporated in the State of the Union Address just a day later. Second, this 
speech was chosen in part because the rhetoric contained therein was not “time-bound” and 
arguably still relevant to the environmental conditions present at the time the experiment was 
conducted. Finally, the January 7 speech was the only presidential speech delivered in the year 
2003 in which President Bush invoked multiple rhetorical appeals in his discussion of the 
economy. 
 
B. PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS: AN 
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
 
 Study 3 is based on the participation of 340 undergraduate students enrolled in 
undergraduate psychology and political science courses at the University of Pittsburgh during the 
two-week period from October 7 to October 21, 2003. To examine the influence of George W. 
Bush’s rhetoric on perceptions of the importance of the economy, subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of five conditions; a pure control group, a control group, an issue justification 
condition, a congressional appeal condition, and a credit claiming with evidence condition. All 
subjects completed a questionnaire, identical in all five conditions, designed to measure a range 
of political attitudes and predispositions.      
Subjects in the pure control group completed the survey, but watched no video. Subjects 
in the remaining 4 conditions watched different versions of a video in which President Bush is 
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shown discussing the issue of the economy. Complete descriptions of the content of all 4 videos 
are provided in Appendix F. Each of these four videos is comprised of two segments. The first 
segment, which is the same in all four conditions, shows President Bush citing evidence of 
economic decline, including an increase in the unemployment rate, a decline in the number of 
manufacturing jobs, and a decline in the stock market. The second segment varies according to 
the condition. The second segment of the issue justification video shows Bush attempting to 
justify the importance of the economy by citing evidence of economic hardship experienced by 
citizens, including increasing personal debt, living paycheck-to-paycheck, and the inability to 
save for their children’s education and their own retirement. The second segment of the 
congressional appeal condition shows President Bush appealing to Congress for legislation to 
deal with the economy, such as the extension of unemployment benefits to those recently out of 
work. In the second segment of the credit claiming with evidence condition, President Bush calls 
attention to his negotiations with congressional leaders which resulted in the passage of a tax bill 
which, in his words, represents the largest tax cut in a generation that will provide real and 
immediate relief to middle-income Americans. The second segment of the control video shows 
President Bush discussing the federal government’s role in managing the economy. Unlike the 
second segments of the issue justification, congressional appeal, and credit claiming videos, the 
second segment of the control video is not expected to result in a significant change in subjects’ 
perceptions of the importance of the economy. President Bush does not argue the issue is 
important or should be addressed by Congress, nor does he suggest that action has already been 
taken to address the economy. This segment was included to ensure that the overall length of the 
control video was approximately equal to the length of the issue justification, congressional 
appeal, and credit claiming with evidence videos.         
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 To create the videos to which subjects were exposed, a videotape of President Bush’s 
January 7 speech to the Economic Club of Chicago was obtained in VCR format from Federal 
Document Clearing House, Inc.40 Using digital editing software,41 this video was converted into 
digital video format and edited for content on a personal computer. Once the editing process was 
completed, the four videos were saved on CD-ROMs as digital avi files. In the research 
laboratory, subjects were told that they were participating in a research study examining the 
communication skills and speechmaking abilities of President George W. Bush. Each subject 
participating in the study was seated at his or her own computer. Subjects in the pure control 
group completed the questionnaire, but watched no video. Subjects randomly assigned to a 
condition that required watching a video were provided with a set of headphones attached to 
their computer to ensure that the audio from their computer would not disturb other subjects 
participating in the study. Before watching the video, subjects were instructed to begin filling out 
their questionnaire. Eventually, subjects reached a page in their questionnaire that directed them 
to stop answering questions and begin watching the video on their computer. At this point, 
subjects were instructed in their questionnaire to put on their headphones and press “play” on the 
Windows Media Player already opened and visible on their computer screen. Once the subject 
pressed the “play” button, Windows Media Player initiated playback of the video of President 
Bush’s speech stored on the CD-ROM placed in the CD-ROM drive of that subject’s computer. 
Before President Bush appeared on the screen, an introductory message accompanied by music 
                                                 
40 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc. is an electronic publisher of transcripts, videotapes, and audio cassettes of 
business and political news from the world’s leading news services, including CNN, CNNfn, Fox News, NPR, 
CNBC/Dow Jones Business Video, and the Nightly Business Report. 
41 The video of President Bush’s speech was converted from analog video, from a VCR tape, to digital video using 
the digital video editing suite Pinnacle Studio version 8.0. Pinnacle Studio provides hardware for capturing video 
from camcorders, VCRs, and DVD players into digital video on a personal computer. It provides the software 
necessary for the editing of video captured in these formats, and it converts videos into a variety of media formats, 
including AVI files, MPEG-1 files, MPEG-2 files, VCD, SVCD, VCR, DVD, camcorders, and streaming internet 
files.  
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instructed subjects to use this time to adjust the volume on their headsets. This was implemented 
as a precautionary measure to make sure that, when President Bush did begin to speak, subjects 
would be able to pay close attention to what he was saying, and not be preoccupied by adjusting 
the volume on their headset. At the very end of the video, a message appeared on the screen 
instructing subjects to return to their questionnaires to complete the remaining questions. The 
portion of the questionnaire subjects completed prior to watching the video contained items used 
to measure the independent variables included in the analysis. The part of the questionnaire 
subjects were asked to fill out after the watching the video contained questions designed to 
measure the dependent variable and other variables that might plausibly be affected by exposure 
to the video of the president’s speech. Each individual session lasted approximately 30 minutes, 
and an approximately equal number of subjects were assigned to each of the five conditions.  
 
C. HYPOTHESES 
1. Presidential Rhetoric 
Of primary interest is the influence of the rhetorical appeals used by President Bush in his 
January 7 speech on subjects perceptions of the importance of the economy. If President Bush 
was successful in his attempts to use congressional appeals to increase concern about the 
economy, then the perceived importance of the economy among subjects in the congressional 
appeal condition should be greater than the perceived importance of the economy among 
subjects in the control group. That is, subjects who watched a video in which Bush cited 
symptoms of economic decline followed by an appeal to Congress to take action to address the 
economy are expected to believe the economy is more important than subjects who watched a 
video in which President Bush cited evidence of economic decline followed by a discussion of 
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the role of the federal government in managing the economy. Conversely, if President Bush was 
able to use credit claiming to reduce concern about the economy, then the perceived importance 
of the economy among subjects in the credit claiming with evidence condition should be less 
than the importance of the economy perceived by subjects in the control group. Subjects exposed 
to the video in which President Bush cited evidence of economic decline, but claimed credit for 
success achieved in addressing some of its symptoms, should consider the economy to be less 
important than subjects who were shown a video in which President Bush cited evidence of 
economic decline and then discussed the role of the government in managing the economy. 
Formally stated, 
H1: Subjects in the issue justification and congressional appeal conditions are expected 
to believe the economy is more important than subjects in the control group, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
H2: Subjects in the credit claiming with evidence condition are expected to believe the 
economy is less important than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. 
 
2. Presidential Support 
 While exposure to President Bush’s speech is expected to result in heightened concern 
about the economy, not all subjects are likely to be equally influenced by the president’s rhetoric. 
To the contrary, the results of Study 2 highlight the importance of political attitudes and 
predispositions as moderators of the relationship between presidential rhetoric and perceptions of 
the public agenda. The present study estimates the influence of three classes of moderators- 
presidential support, political predispositions, and political sophistication.   
 Findings from the literature on presidential elections demonstrate that evaluations of the 
candidates’ personal traits often function as important determinants of voting preferences in both 
general elections (e.g. Stokes 1966, Markus 1988b, Kinder 1983, 1986, Wattenberg 1991, Miller 
and Shanks 1996, Germond and Witcover 1981, Moore 1995) as well as nominating elections 
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(Barker and Lawrence 2002; Norrander 1986; Popkin 1991; Stone and Rapoport 1994; Stone, 
Rapoport, and Atkeson 1995). Also, Edwards (1985) has shown that the public’ evaluations of 
the leadership traits exhibited by Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Nixon were significantly related to 
the public’s approval of these presidents. Whether evaluations of presidents’ personal traits 
affect their ability to set the public agenda has not been explored. From the perspective of this 
study, subjects who expressed favorable evaluations of President Bush’s personal characteristics 
are likely to place greater emphasis on his rhetoric in evaluating the importance of the economy 
than subjects who expressed unfavorable evaluations of Bush’s personal characteristics. Subjects 
with favorable evaluations may simply be more willing to consider presidential rhetoric in 
deciding how important they believe the issue of the economy to be. Subjects with unfavorable 
evaluations may simply tune out the president’s words and evaluate the economy’s importance 
based on other sources of information to which they have been exposed. Formally speaking, 
 H3: The influence of presidential rhetoric on the perceived importance of the economy is 
 expected to be greater among subjects who expressed favorable evaluations of President 
 Bush’s personal characteristics than among subjects who expressed unfavorable 
 evaluations of President Bush’s personal characteristics, ceteris paribus. 
 
 As the review of the literature has previously underscored, presidents with higher 
approval ratings are, generally speaking, more effective in using their speeches to influence the 
public’s policy preferences than presidents who do not enjoy high approval ratings (Ragsdale 
1984; Ragsdale 1987; Brace and Hinckley 1992, 1993). Of more direct relevance are the results 
of Study 2, which collectively demonstrate that individuals who approved of the president were 
more likely than individuals who disapproved of the president to consider presidential rhetoric in 
their evaluations of issue importance. In the case of the present study, the influence of President 
Bush’s issue justification, congressional appeal, and credit claiming with evidence is expected to 
be greater among subjects who expressed strong approval of the president’s performance in 
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office than among subjects who strongly disapproved of the president’s performance. In formal 
terms,  
H4: The influence of presidential rhetoric on the perceived importance of the economy is 
expected to be greater among subjects who expressed strong approval of the president’s 
performance than among subjects who expressed strong disapproval of the president’s 
performance, ceteris paribus. 
 
3. Political Predispositions  
While political predispositions are considered to be the among the most important 
determinants in numerous studies encompassing a diverse range of decision making contexts, 
their importance in the presidential agenda setting process has not been established. If the 
partisan and ideological predispositions of the president’s audience matter, then subjects who 
share similar political predispositions with President Bush should place greater emphasis on his 
rhetoric in evaluating the importance of the economy than subjects with the opposite political 
predispositions. Simply put, strong Republican and strong conservative subjects are likely be 
more willing to listen to what President Bush has to say about the economy than strong 
Democratic and liberal subjects. Formally, 
H5: The influence of presidential rhetoric on the perceived importance of the economy is 
expected to be greater among strong Republican subjects than among strong Democratic 
subjects, ceteris paribus. 
  
H6: The influence of presidential rhetoric on the perceived importance of the economy is 
expected to be greater among strong conservative subjects than among strong liberal 
subjects, ceteris paribus.  
  
4. Political Sophistication  
The remaining hypotheses address the role of political sophistication in the agenda setting 
process. Generally speaking, the politically sophisticated are more likely to tune into watch 
presidential speeches than their less sophisticated counterparts (Welch 1997, 2000; Edwards 
2003; Leighley 1991; Tan 1980). However, in an experimental study such as this, the decision to 
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watch the president’s speech is removed from the equation. By randomly assigning subjects to 
experimental conditions, in which subjects were exposed to presidential rhetoric, and a pure 
control group, in which subjects were not exposed to such rhetoric, the problem of selection bias 
was avoided. As a result, the dynamics of political sophistication are expected to play out 
somewhat differently in Study 3. Generally speaking, more politically sophisticated subjects are 
expected to place greater weight on President Bush’s rhetoric than less politically sophisticated 
subjects. 
 The concept of political sophistication has taken on a wide variety of manifestations in 
the behavior literature. Some have regarded the level of ideological constraint on the opinions 
expressed by the public as an indicator of political sophistication (Converse 1964, Nie, Verba, 
and Petrocik 1976, Pierce 1970; Pierce and Hagner 1982; Campbell et al. 1960). Others have 
considered the structure and consistency of public attitudes as a measure of political 
sophistication (Conover and Feldman 1984; Converse 1970; Fiske and Kinder 1981; Jackson and 
Marcus 1975). The definition of political sophistication employed in this study reflects more 
recent research which relies on political knowledge (Althaus 1998; Barker and Lawrence, 
forthcoming; Bartels 1996; Cassel and Lo 1997; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Duch, Palmer 
and Anderson 2000; Lupia 1994; Luskin 1987; Mondak 2000; Neumann 1986; Smith 1989), and 
political awareness, or attentiveness (Fiske, Kinder, and Larter 1983; Krosnick 1990; Neumann 
1986; Zaller 1990), to measure an individual’s level of political sophistication.  
 The definition of political sophistication employed in this study was informed by a dual-
process perspective on attitude change. In general, dual-process theories of persuasion posit two 
alternative routes to attitude change (Chaiken 1980, 1982, 1987; Chaiken and Eagly 1983; 
Chaiken et al. 1989). The systematic route is followed by individuals who engage in thoughtful, 
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deliberative, and comprehensive consideration of persuasive messages (Chaiken et al.1989). In 
contrast, the heuristic route is conceptualized as a more limited mode of information processing 
in which individuals eschew effortful consideration of messages and are likely to rely instead on 
simple decision rules, or cognitive heuristics, to formulate their judgments or decisions (Chaiken 
1980, 1987; Chaiken et al. 1989; Tversky and Khaneman 1974). One dual-process theory in 
particular, the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), stipulates the conditions under which 
individuals are most likely to engage in systematic processing (Petty and Cacioppo 1981, 1984a, 
1984b, 1986a, 1986b). According to Petty and Cacioppo, whether individuals follow the 
systematic route to persuasion depends on the extent to which they possess the ability and 
motivation to engage in thoughtful, deliberate, and comprehensive processing of persuasive 
messages.  
In the context of the present study, the Elaboration Likelihood Model suggests that 
subjects with the greatest ability and motivation to engage in the systematic processing of 
President Bush’s rhetoric are the subjects most likely to be influenced by that rhetoric. To 
explore the moderating effect of ability on the relationship between presidential rhetoric and 
perceived economic importance, this study relies on a scale of political knowledge that measures 
subjects’ knowledge of basic political information. Subjects with higher levels of political 
knowledge are expected to be better equipped than their less knowledgeable counterparts to 
understand presidential rhetoric, commit it to memory, and apply it to later decision making 
tasks. Formally stated, 
H7: The influence of presidential rhetoric on the perceived importance of the economy is 
expected to be greater among subjects with higher levels of political knowledge than 
among subjects with lower levels of political knowledge, ceteris paribus. 
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Subjects with the motivation to engage in the systematic processing of persuasive 
messages are also expected to be more influenced by President Bush’s rhetoric than subjects who 
are not so motivated. To operationalize the concept of motivation, this study relies on an additive 
scale of political attentiveness composed of items measuring subjects’ interest in politics, the 
extent to which they discuss politics with their friends and family, and the frequency with which 
they seek out media coverage of politics in the newspaper, on the radio, in national network news, 
and on the 24-hour news channels (CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC). Subjects who are motivated 
to engage in systematic processing, that is, subjects who are interested in politics, who discuss 
politics with their friends and family, and who frequent media coverage of politics, are expected 
to pay closer attention and, as a result, be more heavily influenced by President Bush’s rhetoric 
than subjects who do not shared these characteristics. In formal terms, 
H8: The influence of presidential rhetoric on the perceived importance of the economy is 
expected to be greater among subjects with higher levels of political attentiveness than 
among subjects with low levels of political attentiveness, ceteris paribus. 
 
 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 Study 3 considers the extent to which President Bush was able to use issue justifications, 
congressional appeals, and credit claiming with evidence to influence subjects’ perceptions of 
the importance of the economy. Overall, 340 undergraduates participated in the experiments in 
Study 3 during period from October 7 through October 21; 67 subjects were assigned to the issue 
justification condition, 68 subjects were assigned to the congressional appeal condition, 67 
subjects were assigned to the credit claiming condition, 69 subjects were assigned to the control 
group, and 69 subjects were assigned to the pure control group. Subjects’ perceptions of the 
importance of the economy were modeled as a function of exposure to presidential rhetoric and 
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several control variables. The items used to construct all measures used in this study are provided 
in Appendix G, their descriptive statistics appear in Table H1 in Appendix H. 
1. Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable in all analyses performed in Study 3 is the perceived importance 
of the economy. This variable was measured using a single question posed to all subjects who 
participated in the experiment: “How important do you think it is for the federal government to 
take action to address the economy?” This item was coded on a scale from zero, which means 
“not at all important,” to six, which means “extremely important.” To disguise the purpose of the 
question, and its relationship to the video to which subjects were previously exposed, the 
economic importance item was interspersed among nine other items that asked subjects to rate 
how important they thought it was that the government take action to address a range of issues, 
including the environment, AIDS/HIV, and welfare reform, to name only a few. 
2. Independent Variables 
 To estimate the influence resulting from exposure to presidential rhetoric, a dummy 
variable was created for each condition, except for the control group. With the control group as 
the excluded reference category, each dummy variable measures the influence of a given form of 
presidential rhetoric on perceived economic importance, compared to the influence of the control 
group on perceived economic importance. For example, in constructing the dummy variable for 
issue justification, subjects assigned to the issue justification condition were assigned a “one,” 
and subjects assigned to the control group were assigned a “zero.” While the issue justification 
video contains the President Bush’s economic rhetoric plus his justification of the importance of 
the economy, the control video contains Bush’s economic rhetoric plus his discussion of the role 
of the federal government in managing the economy.  
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 First, the dummy variable for issue justification estimates the influence of exposure to the 
issue justification video on perceived economic importance, compared to the influence of 
exposure to the control video on perceived economic importance. Second, the dummy variable 
for congressional appeal estimates the influence of exposure to the congressional appeal video 
on perceived economic importance, compared to the influence of exposure to the control video 
on perceived economic importance. Third, the dummy variable for credit claiming with evidence 
estimates the influence of exposure to the credit claiming with evidence video on perceived 
economic importance, compared to the influence of exposure to the control video on perceived 
economic importance. Finally, the dummy variable for the pure control group estimates the 
difference between the perceived importance of the economy expressed by subjects who were 
not exposed to a video, compared to the perceived importance of the economy expressed by 
subjects who were exposed to the control video.    
3. Moderator Variables 
 As the preceding discussion of proposed hypotheses makes clear, a number of factors are 
expected to moderate the relationship between presidential rhetoric and perceptions of the 
importance of the economy. Presidential support represents the first class of moderators 
hypothesized to influence the relationship between presidential rhetoric and perceptions of the 
economy. First, personal characteristics are measured as an additive scale of five items that 
asked subjects to rate how well certain trait descriptions represent President Bush. Subjects were 
asked to rate President Bush’s integrity, compassion, intelligence, vision, and charisma.42 
Subjects who believed a particular trait description described President Bush “extremely well” 
were coded as a “six,” and subjects who believed that trait description described President Bush 
                                                 
42 Prior research has shown these particular traits to be important determinants of candidate preferences in the 2000 
presidential primaries (Barker and Lawrence 2002, Barker and Lawrence, forthcoming).  
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“not at all” were assigned a “zero.” The responses offered by subjects to the five trait 
descriptions were combined to form a single scale representing subjects’ perceptions of the 
President Bush’s personal characteristics. The result was a 31-point scale on which a zero 
represents the most unfavorable rating of President Bush’ personal characteristics, while a score 
of 30 indicates the most favorable evaluation of President Bush’s personal characteristics. 
Second, presidential approval was measured with the oft-used question, “Do you approve or 
disapprove of the president’s performance in office?” Subjects who expressed strong approval of 
the president were coded as “six,” while subjects who voiced strong disapproval of the 
president’s performance were assigned a “zero.”  
 The next two variables measure respondents’ political predispositions. The partisan 
identification of subjects was measured by coding strong Republican subjects as a “six,” and 
strong Democratic subjects as a “zero.” Similarly, in measuring the ideological orientations of 
subjects, strong conservative subjects were coded as a “six,” and strong liberal subjects were 
assigned a “zero.” 
 The final two variables operationalize subjects’ political sophistication. The ability of 
subjects to engage in the systematic processing of political information was the measured using 
the 5-item scale of political knowledge recommended by Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996). The 
items measure subjects’ knowledge of (1) which party controls the House of Representatives, (2) 
which of the two major parties is more conservative, (3) What job or political office is held by 
Dick Cheney, (4) how much of a majority in the House of Representatives is required to override 
a presidential veto, and (5) whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not: 
the president, the Congress, or the Supreme Court? Correct responses were coded as a “one,” and 
incorrect answers were assigned a “zero.” The result was a six-point scale of political knowledge 
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on which a five represents the maximum possible knowledge score, and zero the minimum 
possible knowledge score. 
 The motivation of subjects to engage in systematic processing was measured using an 
additive scale of political attentiveness composed of six items. The first measures subjects’ 
interest in politics (0=not at all interested, 3=very interested), the second measures the extent to 
which subjects discuss politics with friends and family (0=never, 3=very often), and the 
remaining four measure the number of days during a typical week the subject (1) reads about 
politics in the newspaper, (2) watches national network news, (3) watches a 24-hour news 
channel, and (4) listens to shows about politics on the radio. The result was a 41-point scale of 
political attentiveness on which 40 represents the maximum possible attentiveness score, and 
zero represents the minimum possible attentiveness score. 
4. Control Variables 
 To account for alternative influences on the perceived importance of the economy, this 
study employs several control variables. The use of the following control variables serves to 
purify the measures of presidential rhetoric as determinants of perceived economic importance. 
First among the control variables is the prior public agenda. Before subjects viewed a video, 
they were asked what they perceived to be the single most important problem or issue facing 
America today. Subjects who indicated the economy, or an issue closely related to the 
economy,43 was most important, were assigned a “one,” all other responses were coded as a 
“zero.”  
 It is also possible that a subject’s perception of the importance of the economy was a 
function of that subjects’ economic standing in society. To account for this possibility, this study 
                                                 
43 Reponses indicating unemployment, job security, poverty, and economic inequality were most important were all 
coded as 1.  
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included a measure of subjects’ income. Because it makes little sense to ask undergraduate 
students a question about their own level of income, a question that asked subjects to report their 
parents’ combined household income was used instead. Subjects with high incomes (above 
$100,000) were assigned a “five,” while those with low incomes ($20,000) were coded as a 
“zero.” While not a direct measure of the student’s socioeconomic status, this question does 
measure the economic status of the family in which the subject was raised. In general, subjects 
raised in families with high incomes are expected to be more insulated from modest fluctuations 
in economic performance than subjects from families with lower incomes, and are therefore less 
likely to believe it is necessary for the government to take action to address the economy.  
 Finally, this study controls for the influence of subjects’ policy preferences on economic 
issues. In particular, this study measures the influence of preferences on tax cuts, the extension of 
unemployment benefits, and job training assistance. Concerning tax cuts, subjects who believed 
a 15% tax cut should be given only to low-income families were coded as “one,” and subjects 
who believed a 15% tax cut should be given all income groups equally were assigned a “zero.” 
In general, those who believed the tax break should be reserved exclusively for those with low 
incomes are expected to believe it is more important for the government to address the economy 
than subjects who favored spreading the tax break equally among all income groups. Second, 
subjects who favored increases in unemployment benefits for those recently laid off from their 
jobs are expected to believe it is more important for the economy to be addressed than subjects 
who favored decreases in the benefits for those recently laid off. Subjects who said 
unemployment benefits should be greatly increased were coded as a “four,” subjects who 
indicated that unemployment benefits should be greatly decreased were assigned a “zero.” 
Finally, subjects were asked to express their opinions toward a job assistance program in which 
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unemployed workers would be given $3,000 to use for job training, child care, moving costs, and 
other costs associated with finding a new job. Subjects who voiced strong support for the job 
assistance program were assigned a “four,” and subjects who expressed strong opposition were 
assigned a “zero.” Subjects who strongly supported the job assistance program are expected to 
believe it is more important to address the economy than subjects who expressed strong 
opposition to the job assistance program. 
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
 The influence of exposure to presidential rhetoric was estimated using Ordinary Least 
Squares regression analysis (OLS). While Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) also represents an 
appropriate estimation strategy for the research design outlined here, OLS was deemed 
preferable for a number of reasons. First, unlike ANOVA, OLS regression allows the researcher 
to estimate the influence of presidential rhetoric, while also controlling for the effect of 
alternative influences on the dependent variable. Second, OLS regression yields a summary 
statistic that reports the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable explained by all the 
independent variables in the model, a useful measure of the degree to which the overall model 
fits the data. Finally, the results OLS regression analyses yield coefficients that are of 
substantially greater informational value than those produced by ANOVA. While the coefficients 
of ANOVA simply report mean differences, partial regression coefficients interpret the effect on 
the dependent variable produced by a one-unit increase in an independent variable, holding all 
other variables constant.  
 For example, in the analysis of Hypothesis 1, the coefficient for issue justification 
estimates the difference in perceived economic importance among subjects exposed to the issue 
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justification video compared to the perceived importance of the economy among subjects 
exposed to the control video, holding all other variables constant (Hardy 2003). Hypotheses 3 
through 8 test the influence of individual moderators of the relationship between exposure to 
presidential rhetoric and the perceived importance of the economy. For instance, Hypothesis 2 
investigates the effect of presidential approval on the relationship between presidential rhetoric 
and perceptions of economic importance. To estimate the moderating effect of presidential 
approval, a set of interaction terms were created, one for each form of presidential rhetoric. For 
example, the interaction term for issue justification was created by multiplying the issue 
justification variable by the approval variable. Interpreted, this variable reflects the influence of a 
one-unit increase in presidential approval on the difference between the effect of exposure to the 
issue justification video on perceived economic importance, compared to the effect of exposure 
to the control video on perceived economic importance (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003). 
 The coefficient of the uninteracted issue justification variable represents the effect of 
exposure to this form of presidential rhetoric among subjects who strongly disapproved of the 
president’s performance, that is, when the value of the presidential approval variable equals zero 
(Jaccard and Turrisi 2003). The effect of the uninteracted presidential approval variable 
represents the influence of presidential approval on perceptions of economic importance 
expressed by subjects exposed to the control video, in other words, when the value of the issue 
justification variable is equal to zero. Having outlined the methodological procedures used to 
estimate the influence of presidential rhetoric, as well as the substantive interpretations of the 
partial regression coefficients, we turn to a discussion of the empirical results. 
 Finally, an incremental F-Test was performed on each of the models in which the 
influence of a moderator was estimated. This procedure provided a basis for comparing the 
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variance in economic perceptions explained by a “Constrained Model,” which did not include the 
interaction terms, with the variance in economic perceptions explained by an “Unconstrained 
Model,” which did included the interaction terms. By calculating whether the F-statistic 
computed for the Unconstrained Model is significantly greater than the F-statistic computed for 
the Constrained Model, the incremental F-Test determined whether the interaction terms 
explained a significant proportion of variance over and above the variance explained by a model 
which did not contained the interaction terms. 
 
F. RESULTS 
1. Presidential Rhetoric 
 The results of the OLS regression analysis of Hypothesis 1 are summarized in Table 16. 
They demonstrate, first of all, that the independent variables in model collectively account for 
almost 31% of the variance in subjects’ perceptions of economic importance. The results also 
clearly establish the importance of President Bush’ rhetoric as a determinant of subjects’ 
perceptions of the economy. Subjects in the issue justification and congressional appeal 
conditions believed it was more important for the government to take action to address the 
economy than subjects in the control group. In other words, subjects exposed to President Bush’s 
economic rhetoric plus his issue justification or congressional appeal believed it was more 
important to address the economy than subjects exposed to the president’s economic rhetoric 
plus his discussion of the role of the federal government in managing the economy. In more 
precise terms, subjects in the issue justification condition are expected to rate the importance of  
the economy an average of .800 units higher on the seven-point scale of economic importance 
than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. To calculate the average perceived importance 
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of the economy expressed by subjects in the issue justification condition, the average perceived 
importance of the economy expressed by subjects in the control group, represented by the value 
of the constant, was added to the coefficient for issue justification, which indicates how much 
greater the influence of the issue justification video was compared to the influence of the control 
video. The average perceived importance of the economy among subjects in the control group is 
4.153 on the seven-point scale of economic importance. If the influence of issue justification is 
.800 units greater than that of the control group, then the average importance of the economy 
perceived by subjects in the issue justification video is 4.953 on the seven-point scale of 
economic importance. 
 
TABLE 16. The Influence of Presidential 
Rhetoric on the Perceived Importance of the 
Economy 
 
Independent Variable  b Se       t 
     
Presidential Rhetoric     
Issue justification     .800 .188     4.27***
Congressional appeal     .396 .187     2.10* 
Credit claiming w/ evidence   -.604 .188    -3.22** 
Pure control group   -.513 .187    -2.73**  
     
Control Variables     
Prior agenda  .012 .147     0.01 
Tax cuts  .044 .130     0.37 
Unemployment benefits  .167 .089     1.89 
Job assistance  .037 .056     0.65 
Income   -.041 .039   -1.07 
     
N     340   
R2    .306   
Adjusted R2    .279   
Constant  4.153 .131 21.68***
     
Note: OLS regression results with unstandardized coefficients. 
The dependent variable is the perceived importance of the 
economy (0=not at all important; 6=extremely important).  
*p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. Two-tailed. 
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 In addition, subjects in the congressional appeal condition are expected to rate the 
importance of the economy an average of .396 units higher on the seven-point scale of economic 
importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. Again, the average importance of 
the economy perceived by subjects in the control group is 4.153 on the seven-point scale of 
economic importance. Thus, the average importance of the economy perceived by subjects in the 
congressional appeal condition is 4.549. After hearing President Bush discuss evidence of 
economic decline, subjects were more convinced that the economy should be addressed if that 
discussion was followed up by an issue justification or a congressional appeal, than if President 
Bush followed by simply discussing the role of the federal government in managing the 
economy.  
 The results also suggest, in support of Hypothesis 2, that President Bush’s rhetoric was 
successful in convincing subjects that some progress had already been made in addressing 
deteriorating economic conditions. By citing evidence of progress made in dealing with the 
economy, President Bush was able to reduce subjects’ concerns about the economy. Subjects in 
the credit claiming with evidence condition are expected to rate the importance of the economy 
an average of .604 units lower on the seven-point scale of economic importance than subjects in 
the control group, ceteris paribus. Subjects who listened to Bush discuss symptoms of economic 
decline, followed by evidence of success in addressing the economy believed it was less urgent 
to address the economy than subjects who listened to Bush discuss symptoms of economic 
decline, followed by a discussion of the federal government’s role in addressing the economy. 
While the average importance of the economy perceived by subjects in the control group is 4.153 
on the seven-point scale of economic importance, the average importance of the economy 
perceived by subjects in the credit claiming with evidence condition is 3.549.  
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 Perhaps more impressively, the importance of the economy perceived by subjects in the 
credit claiming with evidence condition was actually lower than the perceived importance of the 
economy among subjects in the pure control group. That is, the importance of the economy 
perceived by subjects who watched President Bush point to signs of economic decline, and then 
follow up by citing evidence of economic progress, was lower than the importance of the 
economy perceived by subjects who were exposed to no presidential rhetoric at all. A 
comparison of the coefficients for the credit claiming with evidence variable and the pure control 
group variable illustrates the point. As indicated above, subjects in the credit claiming with 
evidence condition are expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of .604 units 
lower on the seven-point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris 
paribus. However, subjects in the pure control group are expected to rate the importance of the 
economy an average of .513 units lower on the seven-point scale of economic importance than 
subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. While the difference between these two 
coefficients proved statistically nonsignificant,44 the fact that subjects in the credit claiming 
condition believed the economy was less important than subjects in the pure control group is 
remarkable.  
 Thought not of primary interest, the difference between the importance of the economy 
perceived by subjects in the control group and the importance of the economy perceived by 
subjects in the pure control group is also subject to meaningful interpretation. It will be recalled 
that subjects in the pure control group were not shown a video, while subjects in the control 
group were shown a video in which Bush recounted evidence of economic decline and then 
                                                 
44 A Wald test was performed to determine whether the coefficient of the pure control group variable was 
significantly different from the coefficient of the credit claiming with evidence variable. The results of this test 
yielded an F-statistic of .23, where Prob > F = .628. Thus, the equality hypothesis that the coefficients of the pure 
control and credit claiming with evidence variables are equal cannot be rejected. 
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discussed the role of government in managing the economy. As such, the pure control group 
variable serves as a measure of the perceived importance of the economy among those exposed 
to Bush’s economic rhetoric, compared to the importance of the economy perceived by subjects 
where not exposed to the president’s rhetoric. As expected, the level of importance attributed to 
the economy by subjects in the pure control group was significantly less than the importance of 
the economy perceived by subjects in the control group. On average, the perceived importance of 
the economy among subjects in the pure control group is expected to be .513 units lower on the 
seven-point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. 
Subjects were more likely to believe the government should take action to address the economy 
if they heard President Bush discuss evidence of economic decline, than if they did not hear 
Bush cite such evidence. 
 The OLS results shown in Table 16 also account for several alternative influences on 
perceived economic importance. Of the five control variables, only one achieved some degree of 
influence. Subjects who believed the amount of unemployment benefits received by people 
recently laid off from their jobs should be greatly increased were more likely to believe the 
economy should be addressed than subjects who believed unemployment benefits should be 
greatly decreased, but only marginally so (p < .10). Subjects are expected to rate the importance 
of the economy an average of .167 units higher for each one-unit increase on the four-point scale 
of unemployment benefits. Stated differently, subjects who believed unemployment benefits 
should be greatly increased rated the importance of the economy an average of .501 units higher 
than subjects who believed unemployment benefits should be greatly decreased, ceteris paribus. 
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2. Presidential Support 
 According to Hypotheses 3 and 4, subjects who supported President Bush are expected to 
be more receptive to his rhetoric in their evaluations of economic importance than subjects who 
did not support President Bush. As Hypothesis 3 predicts, the influence of presidential rhetoric 
on perceived economic importance is expected to be greater among subjects who expressed 
favorable evaluations of President Bush’s personal characteristics than among subjects who 
expressed unfavorable evaluations of President Bush’s characteristics.   
The results of OLS regression analysis of Hypothesis 3 are shown in Table 17. Collectively, the 
independent variables account for about 35% of the variance in subjects’ perceptions of the 
importance of the economy. The interaction terms in this model demonstrate the effect of a one-
unit increase on the scale of personal characteristics on the influence of a given form of 
presidential rhetoric on perceived economic importance (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003). For each 1 
unit increase on the 31-point scale of personal characteristics, subjects in the issue justification 
condition are expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of .030 units higher on 
the seven-point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. 
As an alternative strategy for interpreting the effect of personal characteristics, the following 
estimates the effect of a full range shift in the personal characteristics scale on the relationship 
between issue justification and perceived importance.45 For a maximum increase of 30 on the 31-
point scale of personal characteristics, subjects in the issue justification condition are expected to 
rate the economy an average of .900 units higher on the seven-point scale of economic 
importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus.
                                                 
45 The effect of a full range shift in the moderator variable on the influence of a presidential rhetoric variable on 
perceived economic importance was calculated by multiplying the coefficient for the interaction term by the full 
range of the moderator variable. In the present case, the coefficient for the interaction term composed of issue 
justification and personal characteristics (.030) was multiplied by the full range of the personal characteristics 
variable (30), yielding a product of .900.  
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TABLE 17. The Influence of Personal Characteristics on the 
Relationship Between Presidential Rhetoric and the Perceived 
Importance of the Economy 
 
Independent Variable   
 b Se       t 
      
Presidential Rhetoric      
Issue justification   .407 .194    2.09* 
Congressional appeal   .127 .344    0.37 
Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.581 .182   -3.20** 
Pure control group  -.912 .228   -4.00*** 
      
Personal Characteristics   .026  .011    0.24 
      
Interactions      
Personal characteristics x Issue justification   .030 .008    3.35** 
Personal characteristics x Congressional appeal   .034 .017    1.97* 
Personal characteristics x Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.033 .011   -2.94** 
Personal characteristics x Pure control group   .016 .012    1.37 
      
Control Variables      
Prior agenda   .078 .142    0.55 
Tax cuts   .052 .125    0.42 
Unemployment benefits   .039 .084    0.46 
Job assistance   .046 .054    0.86 
Income  -.041 .037   -1.11 
      
N    340    
R2   .351    
Adjusted R2   .324    
Constant   5.507 .251  21.93*** 
       
Note: OLS regression results with unstandardized coefficients. The dependent variable 
is the perceived importance of the economy (0=not at all important; 6=extremely 
important). *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. Two-tailed. 
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Evaluations of personal characteristics also proved to be an important moderator of the 
influence of congressional appeals on perceived economic importance. The moderating effect of 
personal characteristics on the influence of presidential rhetoric is also illustrated in Figures 23 
through 25. For each one-unit increase on the 31-point scale of personal characteristics, subjects 
in the congressional appeal condition are expected to rate the importance of the economy an 
average of .034 units higher on the seven-point scale of economic importance than subjects in the 
control group, ceteris paribus. In terms of  a full range shift, for a maximum increase of 30 on 
the 31-point scale of personal characteristics, subjects in the congressional appeal condition are 
expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of 1.020 units higher on the seven-
point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus.  
 
 
FIGURE 23. The Moderating Effect of Personal Characteristics on the Relationship 
Between Issue Justification and the Public Agenda 
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FIGURE 24. The Moderating Effect of Personal Characteristics on the Relationship 
Between Credit Claiming with Evidence and the Public Agenda 
 
 
 
FIGURE 25. The Moderating Effect of Personal Characteristics on the Relationship 
Between Congressional Appeals and the Public Agenda 
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 Subjects who expressed favorable evaluations of Bush’s personal characteristics also 
placed greater emphasis on his credit claiming with evidence rhetoric than subjects who reported 
unfavorable evaluations of Bush’s characteristics. For each one-unit increase on the 31-point 
scale of personal characteristics, subjects in the credit claiming with evidence condition are 
expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of .033 units lower on the seven-
point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. For a 
maximum increase of 30 on the 31-point scale of personal characteristics, subjects in the credit 
claiming with evidence condition are expected to rate the importance of the economy an average 
of .990 units lower on the seven-point scale than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. 
The uninteracted presidential rhetoric variables demonstrate the effect of those forms of 
presidential rhetoric when the value of the personal characteristics scale is equal to zero (Jaccard 
and Turrisi 2003). The results indicate that issue justification and credit claiming with evidence 
figured prominently in the perceptions of economic importance expressed, even by subjects with 
the most unfavorable evaluations of President Bush’s personal characteristics. Subjects in the 
issue justification condition with the most unfavorable evaluations of Bush’s personal 
characteristics are expected to rate the economy an average of .407 units higher on the seven-
point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control group with the most unfavorable 
evaluations of Bush’s characteristics, ceteris paribus. Also, subjects in the issue justification 
condition with the most unfavorable evaluations of President Bush’s personal characteristics are 
expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of .581 units higher on the seven-
point scale than subjects in the control group with the most unfavorable evaluations of Bush’s 
characteristics, ceteris paribus. So, while the influence of presidential rhetoric increases as the 
favorability of evaluations of Bush personal characteristics increases, the results also suggest that 
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even subjects who reported unfavorable evaluations of Bush’s personal characteristics relied on 
his rhetoric in evaluating the importance of the economy. 
The uninteracted personal characteristics variable demonstrates the effect of this variable 
when all other variables in the model are equal to zero. Thus, this variable estimates the 
influence of personal characteristics on the perceptions of economic importance expressed by 
subjects in the control group. As the coefficient for this variable reveals, subjects in the control 
group who expressed favorable evaluations of President Bush’s personal characteristics were no 
more likely to believe the economy should be addressed than subjects in the control group who 
expressed unfavorable evaluations of Bush’s personal characteristics. Finally, the results of the 
incremental F-test in Table 18 reveal the significant proportion of variance explained by the 
interaction terms (represented by the Unconstrained Model) over and above the variance 
explained by the model that does not contain the interaction terms (represented by the 
Constrained Model). More specifically, The F-statistic computed for the Unconstrained Model of 
22.370 is significantly greater than the F-statistic computed for the Constrained Model of 15.430. 
Thus, variance explained by the model containing the interactions between the presidential 
rhetoric variables and the personal characteristics measure (.351) was significantly greater than 
the variance explained by the model that did not contain these interactions (.296). 
 
TABLE 18. Incremental F-Test of Constrained and 
Unconstrained Personal Characteristics Models 
 
 
Model 
 
    
R2 
  
    
F 
  
  
Sig. 
(Change in F) 
   
Constrained model (without interactions) .296  15.430  
Unconstrained model (with interactions)  .351  22.370 .000 
   
Note: Incremental F-Test determines whether the increase in variance explained by the 
Unconstrained Personal Characteristics Model over and above the variance explained 
by the Constrained Personal Characteristics Model is statistically significant.     
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Hypothesis 4 examines the moderating influence of presidential approval on the 
relationship between presidential rhetoric and perceptions of the importance of the economy. The 
results in Table 18 demonstrate that the variables in the model account for approximately 39% of 
the variance in subjects’ evaluations of economic importance. Subjects who approved of 
President Bush’s performance in office placed greater emphasis on his issue justification, 
congressional appeal, and credit claiming with evidence than subjects who disapproved of his 
performance. The moderating effects of approval on each of the forms of presidential rhetoric are 
illustrated in Figures 26 through 28. For each one-unit increase on the seven-point scale of 
presidential approval, subjects in the issue justification condition are expected to rate the 
importance of the economy an average of .208 units higher on the 7-point scale of economic 
importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. Thus, for a maximum increase of 
six on the seven-point scale of presidential approval, subjects in the issue justification condition 
are expected to rate the economy an average of 1.248 units higher on the seven-point scale of 
economic importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. Subjects who approved 
of President Bush were also more receptive to his congressional appeal than subjects who 
disapproved of President Bush. For each one-unit increase on the seven-point scale of 
presidential approval, subjects in the congressional appeal condition are expected to rate the 
importance of the economy an average of .147 units higher on the seven-point scale of economic 
importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. In other words, for a maximum  
increase of six on the seven-point scale of presidential approval, subjects in the issue justification 
condition are expected to rate the economy an average of .882 units higher on the seven-point 
scale of economic importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus.  
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TABLE 19. The Influence of Presidential Approval on the 
Relationship Between Presidential Rhetoric and the Perceived 
Importance of the Economy 
 
Independent Variable   
 b Se      t
     
Presidential Rhetoric     
Issue justification   .128 .265   0.48 
Congressional appeal   .200 .076   2.62** 
Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.719 .202  -3.56*** 
Pure control group  -.805 .402  -2.00* 
     
Presidential approval   .021 .047   0.44 
     
Interactions     
Presidential approval x Issue justification   .208 .054   3.86*** 
Presidential approval x Congressional appeal   .147 .031   4.73*** 
Presidential approval x Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.154 .051   3.04** 
Presidential approval x Pure control group   .080 .088   0.90 
     
Control Variables     
Prior agenda   .096 .140   0.68 
Tax cuts   .040 .127   0.31 
Unemployment benefits   .023 .083   0.03 
Job assistance   .020 .053   0.38 
Income  -.033 .036  -0.90 
     
N    340   
R2   .391   
Adjusted R2   .372   
Constant  4.471 .247 18.12*** 
 
Note: OLS regression results with unstandardized coefficients. The dependent 
variable is the perceived importance of the economy (0=not at all important; 
6=extremely important). *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. Two-tailed. 
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FIGURE 26. The Moderating Effect of Presidential Approval on the Relationship Between 
Issue Justification and the Public Agenda 
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FIGURE 27. The Moderating Effect of Presidential Approval on the Relationship Between 
Credit Claiming with Evidence and the Public Agenda 
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FIGURE 28. The Moderating Effect of Presidential Approval on the Relationship Between 
Congressional Appeals and the Public Agenda 
 
 
Credit claiming also proved more influential among subjects who approved of President 
Bush than among subjects who did not so approve. For each one-unit increase on the seven-point 
scale of presidential approval, subjects in the credit claiming with evidence condition are 
expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of .154 units lower on the seven-
point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. Stated 
differently, for a maximum increase of six on the seven-point scale of presidential approval, 
subjects in the credit claiming with evidence condition are expected to rate the economy an 
average of .924 units higher on the seven-point scale of economic importance than subjects in the 
control group, ceteris paribus.  
The uninteracted presidential rhetoric variables in Table 18 estimate the effect of 
presidential rhetoric when the value of the presidential approval variable is equal to zero. For 
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Approval=6
Approval=0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Control Group Congressional Appeal
Number of Words used by the President to Issue a Congressional Appeal
Pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
Im
po
rta
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
Ec
on
om
y
148 
justification among subjects who strongly disapproved of President Bush’s performance. 
Subjects in the congressional appeal condition who strongly disapproved of President Bush’s 
performance are expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of .200 units higher 
on the seven-point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control group who strongly 
disapproved of the Bush’s performance, ceteris paribus. Moreover, subjects in the credit 
claiming with evidence condition who strongly disapproved of Bush’s performance are expected 
to rate the importance of the economy an average of .719 units lower on the seven-point scale of 
economic importance than subjects in the control group who strongly disapproved of Bush’s 
performance, ceteris paribus. Thus, while presidential rhetoric is certainly more influential in the 
perceptions of economic importance expressed by subjects who approved of President Bush’s 
performance, the findings reported here illustrate the influence of presidential rhetoric, even 
among subjects who expressed the most negative evaluations of President Bush’s performance. 
The uninteracted presidential approval reveals that subjects in the control group who 
approved of the Bush’s performance were no more likely to believe that the government should 
take action to address the economy than subjects in the control group who disapproved of Bush’s 
performance. Finally, an examination of the results of the incremental F-Test in Table 20 reveals 
the added explanatory power of the interaction terms in the Approval Model. The proportion of 
variance explained by the model that included the interaction terms (.391) is significantly greater 
than that explained by the model which did not include these interactions (.280). The F-statistic 
of 29.083 computed for the Unconstrained Model is significantly greater than the F-statistic of 
14.304 computed for the Constrained Model.  
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TABLE 20. Incremental F-Test of Constrained and 
Unconstrained Presidential Approval Models 
 
 
Model 
 
    
R2 
  
    
F 
  
  
Sig. 
(Change in F) 
   
Constrained model (without interactions) .280  14.304  
Unconstrained model (with interactions)  .391  29.083 .000 
   
Note: Incremental F-Test determines whether the increase in variance explained by the 
Unconstrained Approval Model over and above the variance explained by the 
Constrained Approval Model is statistically significant.     
 
3. Political Predispositions 
 Hypotheses 5 and 6 investigate the extent to which political predisposition influence the 
relationship between presidential rhetoric and perceptions of the importance of the economy. 
Hypothesis 5, in particular, predicts that presidential rhetoric will be more influential in the 
perceptions of economic importance expressed by Strong Republican subjects than by Strong 
Democratic subjects. The results reported in Table 19 generally support this expectation. Overall 
the variables in the model account for almost 43% of the variance in perceptions of economic 
importance. The interaction terms in the model further indicate that subjects’ partisan 
identification serves as a significant moderator of the influence of all three forms of presidential 
rhetoric. The moderating effects of party identification on are shown in Figures 29 through 31.  
 For each one-unit increase on the seven-point scale of partisan identification, subjects in 
the congressional appeal condition are expected to rate the importance of the economy an 
average of .191 units higher on the seven-point scale of economic importance than subjects in the 
control group, ceteris paribus. Interpreted differently, for a maximum increase of six on the 
seven-point scale of partisan identification, subjects in the congressional appeal condition are 
expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of 1.146 units higher on the seven-
point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. 
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TABLE 21. The Influence of Partisan Identification on the 
Relationship Between Presidential Rhetoric and the Perceived 
Importance of the Economy 
 
Independent Variable   
 b Se     t 
     
Presidential Rhetoric     
Issue justification .402 .199   2.02* 
Congressional appeal .299 .078   3.83*** 
Credit claiming w/ evidence -.494 .194  -2.55* 
Pure control group -.759 .303  -2.51*      
Partisan Identification   .017 .030   0.57 
     
Interactions     
Partisan identification x Issue justification   .168 .040   4.24*** 
Partisan identification x Congressional appeal   .191 .033   5.88*** 
Partisan identification x Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.148 .054  -2.76** 
Partisan identification x Pure control group   .063 .071   0.89 
     
Control Variables     
Prior agenda   .250 .134   1.87 
Tax cuts   .012 .118   0.10 
Unemployment benefits  -.031 .079  -0.04 
Job assistance   .069 .050   1.37 
Income  -.095 .034  -2.78** 
     
N    340   
R2   .426   
Adjusted R2   .401   
Constant  5.009 .213 23.46*** 
    
Note: OLS regression results with unstandardized coefficients. The dependent 
variable is the perceived importance of the economy (0=not at all important; 
6=extremely important). *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. Two-tailed. 
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FIGURE 29. The Moderating Effect of Party Identification on the Relationship Between 
Issue Justification and the Public Agenda 
 
 
FIGURE 30. The Moderating Effect of Party Identification on the Relationship Between Credit 
Claiming with Evidence and the Public Agenda 
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FIGURE 31. The Moderating Effect of Party Identification on the Relationship Between 
Congressional Appeals and the Public Agenda 
 
 
 President Bush’s use of issue justification also proved more effective among strong 
Republican subjects than among strong Democratic subjects. For each one-unit increase on the 
seven-point scale of partisan identification, subjects in the issue justification condition are 
expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of .168 units higher on the seven-
point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. Or, in 
other words, for a maximum increase of six on the seven-point scale of partisan identification, 
subjects in the issue justification condition are expected to rate the importance of the economy an 
average of 1.008 units higher on the seven-point scale of economic importance than subjects in 
the control group, ceteris paribus. 
Finally, strong Republican subjects were more receptive to President Bush’s efforts to 
claim credit than strong Democratic subjects. For each one-unit increase on the seven-point scale 
of partisan identification, subjects in the credit claiming with evidence condition are expected to 
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rate the importance of the economy an average of .148 units lower on the seven-point scale of 
economic importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. Stated in different 
terms, for a maximum increase of six on the seven-point scale of partisan identification, subjects 
in the credit claiming with evidence condition are expected to rate the importance of the 
economy an average of .888 units lower on the seven-point scale of economic importance than 
subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. 
The uninteracted presidential rhetoric variables illustrate the influence of presidential 
rhetoric among strong Democratic subjects, that is, when the value of the partisan identification 
variable is equal to zero. First, strong Democratic subjects in the issue justification condition are 
expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of .402 units higher on the seven-
point scale of economic importance than strong Democratic subjects in the control group, ceteris 
paribus. Similarly, strong Democrats in the congressional appeal condition are expected to rate 
the importance of the economy an average of .299 units higher on the seven-point scale of 
economic importance than strong Democrats in the control group, ceteris paribus. Last, strong 
Democrats in the credit claiming with evidence condition are expected to rate the importance of 
the economy an average of .494 units lower on the seven-point scale of economic importance 
than strong Democrats in the control group, ceteris paribus. 
The uninteracted partisan identification variable shows that strong Republican subjects in 
the control group were not significantly more likely to believe the government should take action 
to address the economy than strong Democratic subjects in the control group. The results of the 
partisan identification model also reveal income to be an important factor in perceptions of the 
importance of the economy. Subjects whose parents have lower levels of income are more likely 
to think the economy should be addressed than subjects whose parents have higher levels of 
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income. The perceived importance of the economy is expected to be an average of .095 units 
lower for each one-unit increase on the six-point scale of income, ceteris paribus. Or, interpreted 
as a full range shift, the perceived importance of the economy among subjects whose parents 
make under $20,000 a year is expected to be an average of .475 units greater on the seven-point 
scale of economic importance than among subjects whose parents make over $100,000 a year, 
ceteris paribus. Finally, the results of the F-test displayed in Table 22 demonstrate that the F-
statistic computed for the Unconstrained Model is significantly greater than the F-statistic 
computed for the Constrained Model. As a result, the proportion of variance explained by the 
model contain the interaction terms (.426) is indeed significantly greater than the proportion of 
variance explained by the model that did not contain these interaction terms (.318).
 
TABLE 22. Incremental F-Test of Constrained and 
Unconstrained Party Identification Models 
 
 
Model 
 
    
R2 
  
    
F 
  
  
Sig. 
(Change in F) 
   
Constrained model (without interactions) .318  17.064  
Unconstrained model (with interactions)  .426  32.364 .000 
   
Note: Incremental F-Test determines whether the increase in variance explained by the 
Unconstrained Party Model over and above the variance explained by the Constrained 
Party Model is statistically significant.     
 
Hypothesis 6 examines the effect of subjects’ ideological orientations on the relationship 
between presidential rhetoric and perceptions of economic importance. It sets forth the 
expectation that strong conservative subjects are likely to be more receptive to President Bush’s 
rhetoric than strong liberal subjects. The results of the Ideological Orientation Model are 
displayed in Table 20. They show, first of all, that the variables in the model account for about 
41% of the variance in perceptions of economic importance. The results also confirm the 
importance of ideological orientation as a moderator of the influence of 2 of the 3 presidential 
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rhetoric variables. The moderating effects of ideological orientation are also shown graphically 
in Figures 32 and 33. 
 President Bush’s congressional appeal and credit claiming proved more influential in the 
evaluations of economic importance made by strong conservative subjects than the evaluations 
made by strong liberal subjects. For each one-unit increase on the seven-point scale of 
ideological orientation, subjects in the congressional appeal condition are expected to rate the 
importance of the economy an average of .132 units higher on the seven-point scale of economic 
importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. For a maximum increase of six on 
the seven-point scale of ideological orientation, subjects in the congressional appeal condition 
are expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of .792 units higher on the seven-
point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. In further 
evidence of the importance of ideology as a moderator, for each one-unit increase on the seven-
point scale of ideological orientation, subjects in the credit claiming with evidence condition are 
expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of .231 units lower on the seven-
point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. 
Alternatively, for a maximum score of six on the seven-point scale of ideological orientation, 
subjects in the credit claiming with evidence condition are expected to rate the importance of the 
economy an average of 1.39 units lower on the seven-point scale of economic importance than 
subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. 
The uninteracted presidential rhetoric variables show that congressional appeal and credit 
claiming with evidence also weighed heavily in the perceptions of economic importance 
expressed by strong liberals, that is, when the value of the ideological orientation variable is 
equal to zero. Strong liberal subjects in the congressional appeal condition are expected to rate
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TABLE 23. The Influence of Ideological Orientation on the 
Relationship Between Presidential Rhetoric and the Perceived 
Importance of the Economy 
 
Independent Variable   
 b Se       t
      
Presidential Rhetoric      
Issue justification .352 .211    1.67 
Congressional appeal .170 .070    2.44* 
Credit claiming w/ evidence -.682 .214   -3.19** 
Pure control group -.073 .212   -0.34       
Ideological Orientation  .070 .041    1.72 
      
Interactions      
Ideological orientation x Issue justification   .091 .045    1.91 
Ideological orientation x Congressional appeal   .132 .027    4.88*** 
Ideological orientation x Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.231 .058   -3.97*** 
Ideological orientation x Pure control group  -.237 .059   -4.02*** 
      
Control Variables      
Prior agenda   .153 .130    1.18 
Tax cuts   .141 .115    1.23 
Unemployment benefits   .012 .078   -0.15 
Job assistance   .038 .049    0.77 
Income  -.012 .034    0.36 
      
N    340    
R2   .414    
Adjusted R2   .394    
Constant   4.751 .218  21.71*** 
      
Note: OLS regression results with unstandardized coefficients. The dependent variable is 
the perceived importance of the economy (0=not at all important; 6=extremely important). 
*p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. Two-tailed. 
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FIGURE 32. The Moderating Effect of Ideological Orientation on the Relationship 
Between Credit Claiming with Evidence and the Public Agenda 
 
 
 
FIGURE 33. The Moderating Effect of Ideological Orientation on the Relationship 
Between Congressional Appeals and the Public Agenda 
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the importance of the economy an average of .132 units higher on the seven-point scale of 
economic importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. Also, strong liberal 
subjects in the credit claiming with evidence condition are expected to rate the importance of the 
economy an average of .792 units lower on the seven-point scale of economic importance than 
subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. 
Because the hypothesis for the uninteracted ideological orientation variable is directional 
in nature, its influence was interpreted using a one-tailed test of statistical significance. The 
uninteracted ideological orientation variable shows that strong conservatives in the control group 
are more likely to believe the economy should be addressed than strong liberals in the control 
group. In more specific terms, subjects in the control group are expected to rate the economy an 
average of .07 units higher on the 7-point scale of economic importance for each one-unit 
increase on the seven-point scale of ideological orientation. Finally, the results of the incremental 
F-test shown in table 24 indicate that the F-statistic of 29.780 computed for the Unconstrained 
Model is of significantly greater magnitude than the F-statistic of 14.780 computed for the 
Constrained Model. Simply stated, the proportion of variance in economic perceptions explained 
by the interaction terms (.414) is significantly greater than the proportion of variance in 
economic perceptions explained by the model that did not include these interaction terms (.292). 
 
TABLE 24. Incremental F-Test of Constrained and 
Unconstrained Ideological Orientation Models 
 
 
Model 
 
    
R2 
  
    
F 
  
  
Sig. 
(Change in F) 
   
Constrained model (without interactions) .292  14.780  
Unconstrained model (with interactions)  .414  29.832 .000 
   
Note: Incremental F-Test determines whether the increase in variance explained by the 
Unconstrained Ideology Model over and above the variance explained by the 
Constrained Ideology Model is statistically significant.     
 
159 
4. Political Sophistication 
 The final set of hypotheses explores the moderating effect of subjects’ political 
sophistication on the relationship between presidential rhetoric and perceived economic 
importance. More specifically, Hypothesis 7 predicts that those with the ability to engage in the 
systematic processing of political information are more likely to be influenced by President 
Bush’s rhetoric than subjects who do not possess such ability. To estimate the effect of ability, 
this study relies on a five-item index of political knowledge. The results of the political 
knowledge model appear in Table 21. Collectively, the variables in this model account for almost 
33% of the variance in subjects’ economic perceptions. The results also indicate that subjects 
with high levels of political knowledge were significantly more influenced by all three of 
President Bush’s rhetorical appeals than subjects with low levels of political knowledge. The 
moderating effect is demonstrated in Figures 34 through 36. First, for each one-unit increase on 
the six-point scale of political knowledge, subjects in the congressional appeal condition are 
expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of .170 units higher on the seven-
point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. In other 
words, for a maximum increase of five on the six-point scale of political knowledge, subjects in 
the congressional appeal condition are expected to rate the importance of the economy an 
average of .850 units higher on the seven-point scale of economic importance than subjects in the 
control group, ceteris paribus. 
Second, for each one-unit increase on the 6-point scale of political knowledge, subjects in 
the issue justification condition are expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of 
.130 units higher on the seven-point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control 
group, ceteris paribus. State differently, for a maximum increase of five on the six-point scale of
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TABLE 25. The Influence of Political Knowledge on the 
Relationship Between Presidential Rhetoric and the Perceived 
Importance of the Economy 
 
Independent Variable   
 b Se      t 
     
Presidential Rhetoric     
Issue justification   .354 .180   1.92 
Congressional appeal   .150 .291   0.52 
Credit Claiming w/ evidence   .212 .287   0.74 
Pure control group   .493 .398   1.24 
     
Political Knowledge   .219 .049   4.46*** 
     
Interactions     
Political knowledge x Issue justification   .130 .044   2.98** 
Political knowledge x Congressional appeal   .170 .061   2.79** 
Political knowledge x Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.339 .100  -3.39** 
Political knowledge x Pure control group  -.366 .141  -2.60* 
     
Control Variables     
Prior agenda   .103 .138   0.75 
Tax cuts   .092 .118   0.78 
Unemployment benefits   .102 .083   1.23 
Job assistance   .031 .053   0.59 
Income  -.049 .036  -1.38 
     
N    340   
R2   .325   
Adjusted R2   .296   
Constant  4.052 .253 15.99*** 
 
Note: OLS regression results with unstandardized coefficients. The dependent 
variable is the perceived importance of the economy (0=not at all important; 
6=extremely important). *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. Two-tailed. 
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FIGURE 34. The Moderating Effect of Political Knowledge on the Relationship Between 
Issue Justification and the Public Agenda 
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FIGURE 35. The Moderating Effect of Political Knowledge on the Relationship Between 
Credit Claiming with Evidence and the Public Agenda 
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FIGURE 36. The Moderating Effect of Political Knowledge on the Relationship Between 
Congressional Appeals and the Public Agenda 
 
 
political knowledge, subjects in the congressional appeal condition are expected to rate the 
importance of the economy an average of .650 units higher on the seven-point scale of economic 
importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. 
Third, for each one-unit increase on the six-point scale of political knowledge, subjects in 
the credit claiming with evidence condition are expected to rate the importance of the economy 
an average of .339 units lower on the seven-point scale of economic importance than subjects in 
the control group, ceteris paribus. In other words, for a maximum increase of five on the six-
point scale of political knowledge, subjects in the credit claiming with evidence condition are 
expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of 1.695 units lower on the seven-
point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus.  
Remarkably, none of the uninteracted presidential variables proved significant in the 
political knowledge model. Thus, subjects exposed to President Bush’s rhetorical appeals with a 
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political knowledge score of zero were no more likely to believe the economy should be 
addressed than subjects with a political knowledge score of zero in the control group. 
Interestingly, this finding suggests that President Bush’s rhetoric was of minimal persuasive 
significance among subjects who did not possess the ability to process, store, and apply the 
information contained in that rhetoric in later decision making tasks.    
Considered last is the uninteracted political knowledge variable, which represents the 
effect of political knowledge on perceptions of economic importance expressed by subjects in 
the control group. Clearly, subjects in the control group with high levels of political knowledge 
are significantly more likely to believe the government should address the economy than subjects 
in the control group with low levels of political knowledge. More precisely, subjects in the 
control group are expected to rate the economy an average of .219 units higher on the seven-
point scale of economic importance for each one-unit increase on the six-point scale of political 
knowledge, ceteris paribus. From another perspective, subjects in the control group with a 
maximum political knowledge score of five are expected to rate the economy an average of 
1.095 units higher on the seven-point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control 
group with a minimum political knowledge score of zero, ceteris paribus. Thus, subjects in the 
control group with high levels of political knowledge were better able to understand, process, 
and call upon President Bush’s rhetoric in subsequent evaluations of the importance of the 
economy. 
Finally, the results of the incremental F-Test confirm that the F-statistic of 33.122 
computed for the Unconstrained Model is significantly greater than the F-statistic of 14.840 
computed for the Constrained Model. Thus, the interaction terms in the Knowledge model 
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explain a significant amount of variance in economic perceptions (.325) over and above the 
model that does not include the interaction terms (.284). 
 
TABLE 26. Incremental F-Test of Constrained and 
Unconstrained Political Knowledge Models 
 
 
Model 
 
    
R2 
  
    
F 
  
  
Sig. 
(Change in F) 
   
Constrained model (without interactions) .284  14.840  
Unconstrained model (with interactions)  .325  33.122 .000 
   
Note: Incremental F-Test determines whether the increase in variance explained by the 
Unconstrained Knowledge Model over and above the variance explained by the 
Constrained Knowledge Model is statistically significant. 
 
Finally, Hypothesis 8 predicts that subjects with the motivation to engage in the 
systematic processing of political information are likely to be more receptive to President Bush’s 
rhetoric than subjects without such motivation. Politically attentive subjects – subjects who are 
interested in politics, discuss politics with their family and friends, and frequent media coverage 
of politics – are expected to be more receptive to presidential rhetoric than inattentive subjects. 
The results of the political attentiveness model are shown in Table 22. They show, first of all, 
that the variables collectively explain almost 36% of the variance in perceptions of the 
importance of the economy. The results also clearly establish the moderating effect of political 
attentiveness on the relationship between all three of President Bush’s rhetorical appeals and 
subjects’ perceptions of the importance of the economy. The moderating effects of political 
attentiveness are graphically depicted in Figures 37 through 39.  
First, for each one-unit increase on the 41-point scale of political attentiveness, subjects 
in the issue justification condition are expected to rate the importance of the economy an average 
of .033 units higher on the seven-point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control 
group, ceteris paribus. Interpreted as a full range shift, for a maximum increase of 40 on the
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TABLE 27. The Influence of Political Attentiveness on the 
Relationship Between Presidential Rhetoric and the Perceived 
Importance of the Economy 
 
Independent Variable   
 b Se      t 
     
Presidential Rhetoric     
Issue justification   .053 .022  2.41* 
Congressional appeal   .140 .232  0.60 
Credit Claiming w/ evidence  -.174 .264 -0.66 
Pure control group  -.515 .329  1.57 
     
Political Attentiveness   .030 .010  2.99** 
     
Interactions     
Political attentiveness x Issue justification   .045 .012  3.87*** 
Political attentiveness x Congressional appeal   .033 .010   3.21** 
Political attentiveness x Credit claiming w/ evidence  -.061 .020 -3.05** 
Political attentiveness x Pure control group  -.100 .028 -3.59*** 
     
Control Variables     
Prior agenda   .015 .139   0.11 
Tax cuts   .028 .119   0.23 
Unemployment benefits   .069 .084   0.01 
Job assistance   .018 .053   0.33 
Income   .069 .036   1.91 
     
N    340   
R2   .355   
Adjusted R2   .327   
Constant  4.111 .234 17.57*** 
      
Note: OLS regression results with unstandardized coefficients. The dependent 
variable is the perceived importance of the economy (0=not at all important; 
6=extremely important). *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. Two-tailed. 
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FIGURE 37. The Moderating Effect of Political Attentiveness on the Relationship Between 
Issue Justification and the Public Agenda 
 
 
 
FIGURE 38. The Moderating Effect of Political Attentiveness on the Relationship Between 
Credit Claiming with Evidence and the Public Agenda 
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FIGURE 39. The Moderating Effect of Political Attentiveness on the Relationship Between 
Congressional Appeals and the Public Agenda 
 
 
41-point scale of political attentiveness, subjects in the issue justification condition are expected 
to rate the importance of the economy an average of 1.320 units higher on the seven-point scale 
of economic importance than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. 
 Second, for each one-unit increase on the 41-point scale of political attentiveness, 
subjects in the congressional appeal condition are expected to rate the importance of the 
economy an average of .045 units higher on the seven-point scale of economic importance than 
subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. In terms of a full range shift, for a maximum 
increase of 40 on the 41-point scale of political attentiveness, subjects in the congressional 
appeal condition are expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of 1.800 units 
higher on the seven-point scale of economic importance than subjects in the control group, 
ceteris paribus. 
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 Third, for each one-unit increase on the 41-point scale of political attentiveness, subjects 
in the credit claiming with evidence condition are expected to rate the importance of the 
economy an average of .061 units lower on the 7-point scale of economic importance than 
subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. Interpreted as a full range shift, for a maximum 
increase of 40 on the 41-point scale of political attentiveness, subjects in the issue justification 
condition are expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of 2.440 units lower on 
the seven-point scale than subjects in the control group, ceteris paribus. 
Only one of the uninteracted presidential rhetoric variables proved to be a statistically 
significant predictor of perceptions of economic importance. The uninteracted presidential 
rhetoric variables measure the influence of a given form of rhetoric among subjects with a 
political attentiveness score of zero. Politically inattentive subjects in the issue justification 
condition are expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of .053 units higher on 
the seven-point scale of economic importance than politically inattentive subjects in the control 
group, ceteris paribus. 
 The uninteracted political attentiveness variable illustrates the influence of this variable 
on perceptions of economic importance expressed by subjects in the control group, that is, when 
the value of each presidential rhetoric variable is equal to zero. Subjects in the control group are 
expected to rate the importance of the economy an average of .030 units higher for each one-unit 
increase on the 41-point scale of political attentiveness. Viewed from a different perspective, 
subjects in the control group with a maximum political attentiveness score of 41 are expected to 
rate the importance of the economy an average of 1.200 units higher on the seven-point scale of 
economic importance than subjects in the control group with a minimum political attentiveness 
score of zero, ceteris paribus. Thus, as the results of Tables 21 and 22 demonstrate, subjects in 
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the control group with high levels of political knowledge and attentiveness were significantly 
more likely to believe the government should address the economy than subjects in the control 
group with low levels of knowledge and attentiveness.  
 Finally, the results of the incremental F-test in Table 28 demonstrate that the F-statistic 
computed for the Unconstrained Model of 19.494 is significantly greater than the F-statistic 
computed for the Constrained Model of 12.430. Thus, the proportion of variance explained by 
the interaction terms in the Attentiveness model (355) is significantly greater than the proportion 
of variance explained by the model that did not include these interactions (.251).  
 
TABLE 28. Incremental F-Test of Constrained and 
Unconstrained Political Attentiveness Models 
 
 
Model 
 
    
R2 
  
    
F 
  
  
Sig. 
(Change in F) 
   
Constrained model (without interactions) .251  12.430  
Unconstrained model (with interactions)  .355  19.494 .000 
   
Note: Incremental F-Test determines whether the increase in variance explained by the 
Unconstrained Attentiveness Model over and above the variance explained by the 
Constrained Attentiveness Model is statistically significant.     
 
G. EVALUATING PRESDIENTIAL RHETORIC 
 This experimental analysis suggests a number of intriguing patterns concerning the 
influence of presidential rhetoric on perceptions of economic importance. To guide the following 
discussion, Table 23 provides a comprehensive summary of the results showing the influence of 
presidential rhetoric on perceptions of economic importance. This table shows the influence of 
each of the presidential rhetoric variables on perceived importance of the economy in each of the 
heavily influenced by the presidential rhetoric to which they were exposed. Subjects who 
watched President Bush justify the importance of the economy and appeal to Congress for action 
on the economy were more likely to believe government should take action to address the 
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economy. Conversely, subjects who watched President Bush claim credit for tax cuts designed to 
help provide relief to middle-income families were less likely to believe government should 
address the economy. 
 Second, the results of Study 3 have also identified several important moderators of the 
influence of presidential rhetoric. Generally speaking, the influence of presidential rhetoric on 
the perceived importance of the economy was greater among subjects who expressed favorable 
evaluations of President Bush’s personal characteristics, approved of his performance, held 
similar partisan and ideological views as the president, and possessed the ability and motivation 
to engage in the systematic processing of presidential rhetoric. However, as a testament to the 
importance of presidential rhetoric, President Bush’s issue justification, congressional appeal, 
and credit claiming were influential, even among subjects who did not share these 
characteristics. Two important exceptions to this rule are the Political Knowledge and Political 
Attentiveness Models. The results of both clearly demonstrate that presidential rhetoric was, 
generally speaking, only influential among subjects with high levels of ability and motivation to 
engage in the systematic processing of political information. 
Third, Table 23 shows that most of the moderator variables were not, by themselves, 
influential determinants of economic perceptions. For example, subjects who expressed 
favorable evaluations of President Bush’s characteristics were not more likely believe the 
economy should be addressed than subjects who voiced negative evaluations of Bush’s 
characteristics. Political knowledge and political attentiveness stand, once again, as notable 
exceptions to this pattern. Subjects in the control group who were politically knowledgeable and 
attentiveness in politics were more likely to believe government should take action to address the 
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economy than subjects who did not share these characteristics. At the time the 
experiments were conducted, the unemployment rate was 6%, the highest since 1994. Not 
surprisingly, the issue of the economy loomed large on the national public agenda during the 
entire fall of 2003. According to a Harris survey conducted from October 14 to October 19, 30% 
of the public considered the economy to be the most important issue facing America. Coming in 
at a distant second, only 18% believed the ongoing war in Iraq represented the nation’s most 
pressing problem. Thus, it should not come as a surprise to learn that subjects who were 
knowledgeable about politics, discussed politics with friends and family, and sought out media 
coverage of politics were more likely to believe government should address the economy than 
subjects who did not share these characteristics. 
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TABLE 29. Summary Table for Study 3: Presidential Rhetoric and the Perceived 
Importance of the Economy 
 
  
   Presidential  
Support 
  
 
Political 
Predispositions 
  
  Political 
Sophistication 
 
Independent Variable 
  
  
Presidential 
Rhetoric 
Model 
  
   Personal 
Characteristics 
Model 
  
  
Presidential 
Approval 
Model 
  
 
Partisan 
Identification 
Model 
 
 
Ideological 
Orientation 
Model 
 
 
  
Political 
Knowledge 
Model 
  
    
Political  
Attentiveness
Model 
             
Presidential Rhetoric           
Issue justification ?  ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Congressional appeals ?  ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Credit claiming w/ evi. ?  ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Pure control group ?  ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
          
Moderator Variables          
Personal characteristics _____  ? _____ _____ _____  _____ _____ 
Presidential approval _____  _____ ? _____ _____  _____ _____ 
Partisan identification _____  _____ _____ ? _____  _____ _____ 
Ideological orientation _____  _____ _____ _____ ?  _____ _____ 
Political knowledge _____  _____ _____ _____ _____  ? _____ 
Political  attentiveness _____  _____ _____ _____ _____  _____ ? 
          
Interactions          
Issue justification _____  ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Congressional appeals _____  ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Credit claiming w/ evi. _____  ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Pure control group _____  ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
             
Note: This table summarizes the results from all models estimated in Study 3. Each presidential rhetoric variable under the 
“Interactions” heading represents the influence of a rhetoric variable when interacted with a particular moderator. Checkmarks 
denote statistically significant variables, Xs denote nonsignificant variables. Hyphens denote variables not in the model. 
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
A. CONTRIBUTIONS 
 Traditional conceptions of presidential power portray presidents as authoritative leaders 
of public opinion (e.g. Neustadt 1960). As the preceding review of the literature has illustrated, 
presidents are able to use their speeches to influence their approval levels and the public’s policy 
preferences, but little is understood about either the magnitude or the duration of these effects. 
Comparatively little effort has been invested in the study of the president’s influence on the 
public agenda. While a modest literature has revealed presidential speeches as important 
determinants of the public agenda, a number of significant gaps remain. Most research is 
confined to just a few presidential administrations across a limited umber of years, most 
examines only a limited number of salient issues, and very little is understood about what makes 
some speeches more effective than others (but see Cohen 1995). The preceding represents a 
modest attempt to bridge these gaps and offers a contribution to the ongoing debate about the 
president’s ability to set the public agenda. 
 The research strategy employed in this dissertation relies on a variety of methodological 
techniques and procedures, including structural equation modeling, the Heckman two-step 
procedure for modeling selection bias, multiple logistic regression analysis, and Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression analysis. Also, each of the three studies draws from multiple and 
varied sources of data, including a richly detailed analysis of the content of State of the Union 
Addresses from 1946 to 2003, an aggregate-level public opinion dataset used in Study 1,
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individual level data collected immediately following four State of the Union Addresses 
delivered by 4 different presidents in Study 2, and data generated from an experimental analysis 
of presidential rhetoric conducted in Study 3. In addition, Study 3 relies on actual edited video of 
a presidential speech as an experimental stimulus, a method preferable to experimental designs 
that expose subjects to artificial newspaper articles containing passages of the president’s 
rhetoric. Finally, this dissertation considers the question of presidential agenda setting across a 
span of 57 years, covering more than one thousand issues across 11 different presidential 
administrations.  
 
B. CENTRAL FINDINGS 
The results suggest a number of findings, each with important implications for the study 
of presidential rhetoric. First, in a convergence of findings, the results of all three studies point to 
a number of effective rhetorical strategies available to presidents in their efforts to craft speeches 
designed to influence the public agenda. Issue justifications, congressional appeals, and credit 
claiming were revealed as important determinants of the public agenda in all three studies. 
Interestingly, however, not all of the strategies useful in setting the public agenda proved 
effective in setting the media agenda. While credit claiming without evidence, congressional 
appeals, and agenda size influenced the former, credit claiming with evidence, fear appeals, and 
American values influenced the latter. Whether the media are influenced by the same tactics of 
political persuasion as the public, as the results collectively suggest, remains an issue for future 
research to address.  
 Second, the results of all three studies strongly suggest that the process of presidential 
agenda setting is bi-directional in nature. That is, presidents use their rhetoric, not only convince 
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the public that certain issues represent important issues requiring government attention, but also 
to convince the public that an issue has already been addressed and no longer represents a 
legitimate cause for public concern. Credit claiming, when used successfully, enables presidents 
to coax issues off of the public agenda, making room for their most important priorities. Also, as 
an additional benefit of credit claiming, the public may come to view presidents more favorably 
in the light of the progress made by their administrations in dealing with certain issues. 
 Third, as the results of Studies 1 and 2 make clear, presidents must compete with other 
sources of influence in their attempts to influence the public agenda. Contextual factors proved 
to be potent predictors of issue salience among the public, often outweighing the influence of 
presidential rhetoric. However, as the results of both studies clearly indicate, even after 
controlling for the robust influences of media coverage, the prior public agenda, and economic 
conditions, presidents were still able to use the rhetoric in their State of the Union Address to get 
their message across to the public.  
 Fourth, Study 1 provides evidence of the duration of the influence of presidential 
rhetoric. In the results of this particular study it is evident that, in several cases, presidential 
rhetoric persists as an important determinant of the public agenda a full six months after the State 
of the Union Address was given. Immediately after the address, the total effects of presidential 
rhetoric and contextual factors are relatively even. As the amount of time since the State of the 
Union was delivered increases, however, the influence of the president’s rhetoric begins to wane. 
While the influence of contextual factors also declines over time across the six month period, the 
drop off is not quite as steep. 
 Fifth, Study 1 highlights important indirect effects of president rhetoric, many of which 
have been missed in extant research on presidential agenda setting. Importantly, Study 1 
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demonstrates that much of the influence of presidential rhetoric immediately after the president’s 
speech is felt directly among those who watched the speech. However, as the amount of time 
since the speech was delivered increases, the influence of presidential rhetoric becomes ever 
more indirect in nature, by way of an influence on media coverage that takes place after the 
president’s speech. Thus, while the memory of the president’s speech fades from the public mind 
in relatively short order, the results of Study 1 demonstrate that presidents are able to sustain 
their influence on the public agenda by influencing the content of media coverage during the 6 
month period after the speech.  
 Sixth, taken together, the results provide little evidence suggesting there are significant 
differences in the ability of individual presidents to set the public agenda. The results of Study 1 
show that presidents since Ford were more effective in setting the public agenda. This finding is 
more suggestive of a “learning curve” in presidents’ ability to set the agenda, than the 
importance of the rhetorical strengths and weaknesses possessed by individual presidents. In 
Study 2, neither of the Bushes, both noted for their rhetorical weaknesses, was significantly less 
effective in setting the public agenda than their supposedly more rhetorically skilled colleagues, 
Reagan and Clinton. 
 Seventh, while the results of Study 1 show presidential rhetoric to be an important factor 
in aggregate-level assessments of issue salience, Studies 2 and 3 reveal that such influence is not 
likely to be felt uniformly across all segments of the president’s audience. Quite the contrary, 
both studies point to several important moderators of the relationship between presidential 
rhetoric and perceptions of issue importance. Together, Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate exposure to 
the president’s speech, presidential support (vote choice, approval, and personal characteristics), 
political predispositions (party and ideology), membership in partisan coalitions (Democratic and 
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Republican coalitions), and political sophistication (political knowledge and attentiveness) all 
have the capacity to affect the extent to which individuals consider presidential rhetoric in their 
evaluations of issue salience. 
 Eighth, the results also demonstrate the value of studying the influence of presidential 
rhetoric using data collected at the level of the individual. Study 2, conducted using individual-
level data, detected several mechanisms of influence missed in the aggregate-level analyses 
performed in Study1. Public appeals, fear appeals, appeals to American values, and compare and 
contrast all proved to be statistically significant predictors of the public agenda in Study 2, but 
not Study 1.  
 Finally, the results of Study 1 demonstrate that presidents are responsive, at least to some 
extent, to environmental conditions in their decisions of what issues to discuss in their State of 
the Union Addresses. First, when the media covered an issue before the speech, presidents were 
likely to mention that issue in their speech. Second, as economic conditions worsened, presidents 
were more likely to discuss economic issues in their speeches. Third, when the nation was 
embroiled in military conflict at the time of the speech, the president was more likely to mention 
foreign policy and defense-related issues. Finally, when public concern about an issue was 
already high before the speech, presidents were likely to mention that issue in their speech. This 
particular finding is echoed in previous research examining the democratic responsiveness of 
politicians to public opinion (Jacobs and Shapiro 2003). The authors found that politicians do in 
fact pay close attention to public opinion when it comes to crafting their public statements. 
Rather than use this “crafted talk” to propose policies in accordance with the public’s 
preferences, politicians instead use their public statements as an attempt to move public opinion 
closer to their own desired policies. Thus, politicians are responsive to public opinion in their 
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decisions of which issues to cover in their speeches, even as they seek to manipulate the public’s 
preferences on those very same issues.  
 These findings suggest that the ability of presidents to shape the public agenda through 
their State of the Union Addresses is constrained by the reactionary nature of the office of the 
presidency. If the country is at war, the president cannot avoid discussing foreign policy and 
matters of national defense. If the economy is in recession, the president would be foolhardy not 
to discuss the administration’s plans to address the nation’s economic troubles. If the public is 
already concerned about an issue, presidents may choose to ignore that issue in their speech, but 
only at their own peril. Thus, a significant portion of every State of the Union Address delivered 
by every president is taken up with what might be termed “non-discretionary items” over which 
the president is able to exert little or no control. While the utility of the State of the Union 
Address as a tool for setting the public agenda is considerably limited by the environmental 
context in which that speech is given, presidents may still be able to reserve a portion of their 
speech as a small window of opportunity in which to focus on their most important issue 
priorities. But does it matter what presidents say? 
 In response to this question, the results of the empirical analyses speak with a single 
voice. By strategically using the limited window of opportunity afforded by the State of the 
Union Address, presidents are able to employ their rhetoric in successful attempts to set the 
public’s issue agenda. While the effects of presidential in each of the three studies are 
moderately sized, presidents rarely rely on a single rhetorical strategy in their discussion of an 
important issue. At the same time, presidents cannot use every single rhetorical appeal in their 
discussion of every issue. Instead, presidents must craft their speeches strategically, making the 
greatest rhetorical investment in issues that represent their most important priorities. To enhance 
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their influence on the public agenda, the results collectively suggest that presidents are well 
advised to spend a great deal of time focusing on a limited number of issues, justify the 
importance of those issues, appeal to Congress for legislative action when appropriate, discuss 
their most important issues at the beginning of the speech, and spend the week following the 
State of the Union Address reinforcing the importance of issues mentioned in the address. By 
adopting such a rhetorical plan of attack, presidents can all but guarantee that it will matter what 
they say. 
 
C. PRESIDENTS AND THE PUBLIC: A FINAL APPRAISAL 
 The most compelling evidence bearing on the question of the president’s leadership of 
public opinion sees the cup of presidential influence as half-empty. First, this literature argues, 
presidents are limited in their ability to influence the public’s policy preferences with the rhetoric 
in their speeches. And they are. Moreover, the empirical record strongly indicates that objective 
conditions, or contextual factors, often outweigh the influence of presidential speeches as 
determinants of public opinion. And they do. Furthermore, the utility of the presidential speech is 
significantly constrained by the decline in the proportion of Americans who regularly watch such 
speeches. And it is. Additionally, the preponderance of the evidence further suggests that 
presidents are inherently reactive in the kinds of issues they decide to discuss in their State of the 
Union Addresses. And they are. In fact, many of the issues discussed by the president in their 
speeches are stimulated by the presence of objective conditions; including economic conditions, 
media coverage leading up to the speech, whether the country is involved in armed conflict at the 
time of the speech, and the occurrence of important events just before the speech.  
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 Despite the formidable obstacles to presidential leadership of public opinion, the 
approach taken in this dissertation has been to view the cup of presidential influence as half-full.  
First and foremost, although presidents are not able to convince the public to change its attitudes 
toward issues mentioned in their speeches, they are more successful in their attempts to convince 
the public that the issues mentioned in their speeches should at least be addressed by 
government.  
 Second, that objective conditions are often more important determinants of public 
opinion should not be confused with the false notion that presidential rhetoric is unimportant. To 
the contrary, the results presented in Studies 1, 2, and 3 show that presidents are able to heighten 
the level of concern about issues they wish to place on the public agenda, and reduce the salience 
of issues they wish to remove from the public agenda.  
 Third, the presidential literature is quick to note the decreasing frequency with which 
Americans watch presidential speeches. However, the results of Study 1 and 2 clearly indicate 
that citizens need not have watched the president’s speech in order to be influenced by its 
rhetoric. Media coverage after the State of the Union address resulted in a strong indirect effect 
on public perceptions of issue salience expressed even by those who did not watch the 
president’s speech.   
 Finally, the political environment does influence what issues presidents ultimately choose 
to discuss in their State of the Union Addresses, but not overwhelmingly so. To be certain, 
objective conditions present at the time of the State of the Union Address make it essential that 
some issues be discussed, and other issues not be discussed. In times of economic distress, for 
example, presidents are expected to use their speeches to propose new policies to address the 
country’s economic problems. However, during such periods of economic decline presidents are 
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not expected to unveil costly new social programs that would lead to new tax increases and 
further drain public coffers. While presidents are expected to addresses some issues, and a 
number of other issues are off limits, the content of the remainder of the speech is left to the 
president’s discretion. It is in this portion of the State of the Union Address that the potential for 
presidential leadership is most likely to be realized. President George W. Bush’s 2004 State of 
the Union Address is illustrative of this point. While his address gave the requisite attention to 
the ongoing military operations in Iraq, Bush also highlighted the problem of steroids in 
professional sports and the need for a constitutional amendment to prohibit gay marriage, issues 
that were not on the public agenda or being covered by the media at that particular time.   
 Even during times of war and economic difficulty presidents have been able to lead the 
public on their administration’s most important priorities. Eisenhower led achieved public and 
government support for a national interstate highway system; Kennedy ignited America’s 
interest in space exploration; Johnson focused the public’s attention on civil rights reforms; 
Carter increased public concern about human rights issues; Reagan fueled public demand for 
increased governmental reform; and Clinton convinced the public of the need for health care 
reform. 
 As the only official elected by a national constituency, presidents stand alone in their 
capacity to shape public opinion. Unlike Congress, whose power is deeply fragmented and 
dispersed, presidents can act with dispatch and instantly attract a national audience with a prime 
time television address. Thus, the office of the presidency is well suited to leading the public, 
particularly in times of national crisis, when such leadership is most immediately needed. Much 
as Franklin Roosevelt directed the nation’s war effort during World War II, presidents are able to 
use their speeches to focus the nation’s attention on the most urgent issues of the day. Thus, in 
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this specific sense, presidential speeches serve as an important linkage mechanism in the modern 
American democratic system of governance. Indeed, the health of American democracy depends 
in part on the ability of its presidents to use their speeches to direct the public’s attention to 
important problems, and to convince the public that action should be taken to address those 
problems. To be effective, leaders must lead. The presidential speech, and the rhetoric contained 
therein, provides the chief mechanism by which the modern president has sought to exercise 
such leadership.  
“My view was that every officer, and above all every executive officer in high position, was a 
steward of the people bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the people, and not 
to content himself with the negative merit of keeping his talents undamaged in a napkin. I 
declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary for the Nation could not be done 
by the president unless he could find some specific authorization to do it. My belief was that it 
was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded unless 
such action was forbidden by the Constitution or the laws.” 
 
Theodore Roosevelt, 26th President of the United States (1913)  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
CONTENT ANALYSIS: SELECTED EXAMPLES OF PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC IN 
STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESSES, 1946-2003 
  
Presidential 
rhetoric 
  
President 
and year  
of address 
  
Selected example Issue 
    
Issue 
justification 
JFK 
1961 
“Our recovery from the 1958 recession, moreover, was 
anemic and incomplete. Our gross national product 
never regained its full potential. Unemployment never 
returned to normal levels. Maximum use of our national 
industrial capacity was never restored. In short, the 
American economy is in trouble.” 
Economy 
    
Congressional
appeals 
HST 
1946 
“The Congress has a clear responsibility to meet this 
challenge with courage and determination. I have every 
confidence that it will do so. I strongly urge that the 
Congress now resolve all doubts and as soon as possible 
adopt legislation continuing rent and price controls in 
effect for a full year from June 30, 1946.” 
Inflation 
    
Public 
appeals 
WJC 
1994 
“Hunters must always be free to hunt. Law-abiding 
adults should always be free to own guns to protect their 
homes. I respect that part of our culture, I grew up in it. 
But I want to ask sportsmen and others who lawfully 
own guns to join us in the campaign to reduce gun 
violence. I say to you, I know you didn't create this 
problem, but we need your help to solve it.” 
Gun control 
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Presidential 
rhetoric 
  
President 
and year 
 of address 
  
Selected example Issue 
    
Fear appeals GRF 
1975 
“If we don't act to slow down the rate of increase in 
federal spending, the United States treasury will be 
legally obligated to spend more than $360 billion in 
fiscal year 1976, even if no new programs are enacted. 
These are not matters of conjecture or prediction, but 
again, a matter of simple arithmetic. The size of these 
numbers and their implications for our everyday life and 
the health of our economic system are shocking.” 
Government 
spending 
    
Credit 
claiming 
without 
evidence 
DDE 
1956 
“In the last year, the free world has seen major gains  
for the system of collective security: the accession to  
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and western 
European union of the sovereign Federal German 
Republic; the developing cooperation under the 
southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty; and the 
formation in the Middle East of the Baghdad Pact 
among Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and the United 
Kingdom. In our own hemisphere, the Inter-American 
system has continued to show its vitality in maintaining 
peace and a common approach to world problems.  
International 
cooperation 
    
Credit 
claiming 
w/ evidence 
  
WJC 
1995 
 “You know, for years before I became president, I 
heard others say they would cut government and how 
bad it was. But not much happened. We actually did it. 
We cut over a quarter of a trillion dollars in spending, 
more than 300 domestic programs, more than 100,000 
positions from the federal bureaucracy in the last two 
years alone. Based on decisions already made, we will 
have cut a total of more than a quarter of a million 
positions from the federal government, making it the 
smallest it has been since John Kennedy was president, 
by the time I come here again next year.” 
Government 
efficiency 
    
American 
values 
  
RWR 
1982 
 “Our nation's long journey towards civil rights for all 
our citizens - once a source of discord - now a source of 
pride, must continue with no backsliding or slowing 
down. We must and shall see that those basic laws that 
guarantee equal rights are preserved and, when 
necessary, strengthened. Our concern for equal rights 
for women is firm and unshakable.” 
 Civil rights 
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Presidential 
rhetoric 
  
President 
and year 
 of address 
  
Selected example Issue 
    
American 
values 
  
RWR 
1982 
 “Our nation's long journey towards civil rights for all 
our citizens - once a source of discord - now a source of 
pride, must continue with no backsliding or slowing 
down. We must and shall see that those basic laws that 
guarantee equal rights are preserved and, when 
necessary, strengthened. Our concern for equal rights 
for women is firm and unshakable.” 
 Civil rights 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
STUDY 1: STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS IN THE ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
 
Each equation46 takes the form: Y1i = α + β1Y2i + β2Y3i +… + βMYMi 
 + γ1X1i + γ2X2i + … + γKXKi + µ1i 
         
where, β’s = coefficients of the endogenous variables  α = intercept  
 Y1, Y2, … YM = M endogenous variables  µ = stochastic disturbances 
 γ’s = coefficients of the exogenous variables  i = number of observations 
 X1, X2, … XK = K exogenous variables        
           
1. Issue attentioni =  α + γ1(prior media coverage)i + γ2(prior public agenda)i + γ3(economic   
conditions)I + γ4(conflict)i + γ5(events)i + γ6(scandals)2i + µi 
  
2. Issue justificationi = α + γ1(prior media coverage)i + γ2(prior public agenda)i + γ3(economic   
conditions)I + γ4(conflict)i + γ5(events)i + γ6(scandals)2i + µi 
  
3. Congressional appealsi = α + γ1(prior media coverage)i + γ2(prior public agenda)i + 
γ3(economic   conditions)I + γ4(conflict)I + γ5(events)i + γ6(scandals)2i + µi  
  
4. Public appealsi = α + γ1(prior media coverage)i + γ2(prior public agenda)i + γ3(economic   
conditions)I + γ4(conflict)i + γ5(events)i + γ6(scandals)2i + µi 
  
5. Fear appealsi = α + γ1(prior media coverage)i + γ2(prior public agenda)i + γ3(economic   
conditions)i + γ4(conflict)i + γ5(events)i + γ6(scandals)2i + µi 
  
6. Compare and contrasti = α + γ1(prior media coverage)i + γ2(prior public agenda)i + 
γ3(economic conditions)i + γ4(conflict)i + γ5(events)i + γ6(scandals)2i + µi 
  
7. American valuesi = α + γ1(prior media coverage)i + γ2(prior public agenda)i + γ3(economic   
conditions)i + γ4(conflict)i + γ5(events)i + γ6(scandals)2i + µi    
8. Agenda sizei = α + γ1(prior media coverage)i + γ2(prior public agenda)i + γ3(economic   
conditions)i + γ4(conflict)i + γ5(events)i + γ6(scandals)2i + µi 
  
9. Issue orderi = α + γ1(prior media coverage)i + γ2(prior public agenda)i + γ3(economic   
conditions)i + γ4(conflict)i + γ5(events)i + γ6(scandals)2i + µi 
  
10. Foreign policyi = α + γ1(prior media coverage)i + γ2(prior public agenda)i + γ3(economic   
conditions)i + γ4(conflict)i + γ5(events)i + γ6(scandals)2i + µi 
  
                                                 
46 Notation conventions are from Gujurati (1995). 
187 
11. Credit claimingi = α + γ1(prior media coverage)i + γ2(prior public agenda)i + γ3(economic   
conditions)i + γ4(conflict)i + γ5(events)i + γ6(scandals)2i + µi 
  
12. Credit claiming with evidencei = α + γ1(prior media coverage)i + γ2(prior public agenda)i + 
γ3(economic conditions)i + γ4(conflict)I + γ5(events)i + γ6(scandals)2i + µi 
  
13. Post-address speechesi = α + γ1(prior media coverage)i + γ2(prior public agenda)i + γ3(economic   
conditions)i + γ4(conflict)I + γ5(events)i + γ6(scandals)2i + µi 
  
14. Media coveragei = α + γ1(prior media coverage)i + γ2(prior public agenda)i + γ3(economic   
conditions)i + γ4(conflict)i + γ5(events)i + γ6(scandals)2i + β1(issue attent.)i + β2(issue just.)i + 
β3(cong. appeals)i + β4(public appeals)i + β5(fear appeals)i + β6(values)i + β7(compare & contrast)i
+ β8(agenda size)i + β9(issue order)i + β10(foreign policy)i + β11(credit claiming)i + β12(credit 
claiming with evidence)i + β13(post-address speeches)i + µi 
  
15. Public agendai = α + γ1(prior media coverage)i + γ2(prior public agenda)i + γ3(economic   
conditions)i + γ4(conflict)i + γ5(events)i + γ6(scandals)2i + β1(issue attent.)i + β2(issue just.)i + 
β3(cong. appeals)i + β4(public appeals)i + β5(fear appeals)i + β6(values)i + β7(compare & contrast)i
+ β8(agenda size)i + β9(issue order)i + β10(foreign policy)i + β11(credit claiming)i + β12(credit 
claiming with evidence)i + β13(post-address speeches)i + β14(media coverage)i + µi 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
STUDY 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE C1. Descriptive Statistics for Presidential Rhetoric 
Variables and Moderators in Study 2 
 
Independent Variable  Mean Standard Deviation Minimum
 
Maximum 
       
Presidential Rhetoric      
Issue attention 215.18. 261.32   . 27.00    . 1703.00  .
Issue justification 34.72. 60.56   . 0.00    . 372.00  .
Credit claiming without evidence 13.57. 37.82   . 0.00    . 205.00  .
Credit claiming w/ evidence 10.06. 16.45   . 0.00    . 100.00  .
Public appeals 2.13. 9.22   . 0.00    . 67.00  .
Congressional appeals 8.17. 16.18   . ….0.00    . 105.00  .
Fear appeals 2.39. 7.60   . 0.00    . 38.00  .
American values 4.01. 6.15   . 0.00    . 32.00  .
Compare and contrast 14.01. 39.54   . 0.00    . 264.00  .
Foreign policy 0.25. 0.96   . 1.00    . 1.00  .
Agenda size 18.61. 4.93   . 12.00    . 24.00  .
Issue order 9.80. 6.07   . 1.00    . 24.00  .
  
Moderators  
Exposure to the president’s speech    0.48          0.50 0.00        1.00  
Partisan predispositions     0.52         0.49 0.00        1.00 
Ideological orientation     0.53         0.50 0.00        1.00 
Presidential vote choice     0.37         0.48 0.00        1.00 
Presidential approval     0.58         0.49 0.00        1.00 
Democratic coalition     1.63         0.83 0.00        4.00 
Republican coalition     1.58         0.85 0.00        4.00 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
STUDY 2: THE HECKMAN TWO-STEP PROCEDURE FOR ADDRESSING THE 
PROBLEM OF SELECTION BIAS 
 
There are two classes of the selection bias problem. In the standard case, information is available 
for only some of the respondents. The standard form of selection bias applies to the case in 
which no information is available for respondents who did not watch the president’s speech, (i.e. 
if those who did not watch the president’s speech did not participate in the survey). In the second 
form of selection bias, often referred to as heterogeneity bias, information is available for all 
respondents, but the distribution of respondents over categories of the independent variable has 
taken place in a nonrandom, selective fashion. The heterogeneity bias in Study 2 occurs because 
those who chose watched the president’s speech differ from those who did not watch the 
president’s speech.  
 
While many statistical packages feature the ability to estimate the Heckman two-step procedure, 
almost all of them are restricted to the standard form of selection bias (e.g. SAS, STATA, and 
LIMDEP). However, as Smits (2001) and Ploeg (1993) demonstrate, the Heckman two-step 
procedure can also be applied to the problem of heterogeneity bias using SPSS. Relying on the 
instructions provided by these authors, the Heckman two-step procedure was performed as 
follows:  
 
1. In the first step the residuals, or individual predicted probabilities, computed by the Selection 
Model were saved as a new variable, IKL: 
 
 Save pred(IKL) 
 
2. Using the inverse cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution, the predicted 
probabilities were translated into quasi-probit scores using the Probit function in SPSS. The 
resulting quasi-probit scores were saved as the new variable, IPS:  
 
 Compute IPS = Probit(IKL) 
 
3. The variable IPS containing the quasi-probit scores was then used to calculate the Inverse 
Mill’s Ratio, lambda. 
 
 For respondents who saw the president’s speech: 
 compute LAMBDA =  
 ( (1/sqrt (2 * 3.141592654) ) * (exp (-IPS * IPS * .05) ) ) / cdfnorm (IPS)
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 For respondents who did not see the president’s speech: 
 compute LAMBDA =  
 - ( (1/sqrt (2 * 3.141592654) ) * (exp (-IPS * IPS * .05) ) ) / (1-cdfnorm (IPS) ) 
 
4. The Inverse Mill’s Ratio was then entered along with all the other variables, including the 
explanatory variables in the Selection Model, into the Regression Model. Finally, because the 
standard estimates of the regression estimates required correction because of heteroscedasticity 
(Breen 1996), the logistic regression of the Regression Model was estimated with White’s robust 
standard errors. 
  
5. Interpretation: The coefficient for Lambda indicates whether selection bias remains a problem 
in the Regression Model. A significant positive coefficient would indicate that those who 
watched the president’s speech, compared to those who did not, have unmeasured characteristics 
which are positively related to the public agenda. The coefficient for the variable exposure to the 
president’s speech indicates how large the difference is between those who did and did not watch 
the president’s speech, even after controlling for the problem of selection bias. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
STUDY 2: BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE E1. Bivariate Correlations Between the 
Explanatory Variables and the Public Agenda in 
the Selection Model in Study 2 
  
Public 
agenda 
Partisan  
intensity 
Ideological 
intensity 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Partisan intensity  .008            
Ideological Intensity  .003    .039**            
Political involvement  .008    .149**     .012** 
Education  .002    .014**    -.027** 
Age  .006   -.005      .011** 
        
Note: Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients. *p <.01; **p <.001. 
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
 
STUDY 3: CONTENT OF PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC VIDEOS 
 
 
Control Group Video 
     Segment #1: 
 
“The unemployment rate today is 6%. That’s low for an economy coming 
out of recession; it’s higher than it should be – and the unemployment rate 
is projected to rise further in the short run. This hardship is concentrated 
in certain regions and in certain industries. Manufacturing jobs have 
declined for 28 months in a row. You know what I’m talking about in the 
Midwest. You’re showing signs of recovery, but many people here and 
across this country are looking for work.” (Length: 33 seconds)  
 
     Segment #2: 
“Government spends a lot of money, but it doesn’t build factories, it 
doesn’t invest in companies, and it doesn’t do the work that makes 
America go. The role of our government is not to manage or control the 
economy from Washington D.C., but to remove obstacles standing in the 
way of faster economic growth. That’s our role.” (Length: 26 seconds) 
 
Issue Justification Video 
     Segment #1: 
 
“The unemployment rate today is 6%. That’s low for an economy coming 
out of recession; it’s higher than it should be – and the unemployment rate 
is projected to rise further in the short run. This hardship is concentrated 
in certain regions and in certain industries. Manufacturing jobs have 
declined for 28 months in a row. You know what I’m talking about in the 
Midwest. You’re showing signs of recovery, but many people here and 
across this country are still looking for work.” (Length: 33 seconds) 
 
     Segment #2: 
“Many Americans live in constant and increasing personal debt, with 
credit card bills so heavy they often cannot pay much more than the 
monthly minimums. Millions of citizens spend their entire adult lives 
living paycheck-to-paycheck, never getting the opportunity to save for 
their children’s education or their own retirement. All this puts pressure 
on the family budget and clouds our economic future.” (Length: 27 
seconds) 
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Congressional Appeal Video 
     Segment #1: 
 
“The unemployment rate today is 6%. That’s low for an economy coming 
out of recession; it’s higher than it should be – and the unemployment rate 
is projected to rise further in the short run. This hardship is concentrated 
in certain regions and in certain industries. Manufacturing jobs have 
declined for 28 months in a row. You know what I’m talking about in the 
Midwest. You’re showing signs of recovery, but many people here and 
across this country are still looking for work.” (Length: 33 seconds) 
 
     Segment #2: 
“So I’m asking this new Congress to extend unemployment benefits that 
expired on December 28th. And the benefits should be retroactive – like 
the Fitzgerald Bill – so that people who recently lost their benefits can 
receive their benefits in full. Helping America’s unemployed workers 
should be a first order of business in this new Congress.” (Length: 26 
seconds)   
 
Credit Claiming with Evidence Video 
     Segment #1: 
 
“The unemployment rate today is 6%. That’s low for an economy coming 
out of recession; it’s higher than it should be – and the unemployment rate 
is projected to rise further in the short run. This hardship is concentrated 
in certain regions and in certain industries. Manufacturing jobs have 
declined for 28 months in a row. You know what I’m talking about in the 
Midwest. You’re showing signs of recovery, but many people here and 
across this country are still looking for work.” (Length: 33 seconds) 
 
     Segment #2: 
 
“So I worked with the United States Congress to reduce income taxes for 
everyone who pays them – more than 100 million individuals, families, 
and sole proprietorships received tax relief. This tax relief was the largest 
in a generation and will bring real and needed relief to middle-income 
families.” (Length: 25 seconds) 
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APPENDIX G 
 
 
 
STUDY 3: ITEM DESCRIPTIONS 
 
Dependent Variable Item Description  
   
Perceived Importance  
of the Economy 
  
“How important do you think it is for the government to take 
action to address the economy?” 
  
Moderator Variables  
  
Personal Characteristics 
  
     Integrity “He says what he thinks, even if it isn’t popular.” 
     Compassion “He understands the problems of people like you.” 
     Intelligence “He’s very intelligent.” 
     Vision “He has a clear idea of where he wants to lead the nation.” 
     Charisma “He’s very inspiring.” 
  
Presidential Approval 
  
“Do you approve or disapprove of the job George W. Bush is 
doing as President.” 
  
Partisan Identification 
  
Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a strong 
Democrat, moderate Democrat, leaning Democrat, Independent, 
leaning Republican, moderate Republican, or a strong 
Republican?” 
  
Ideological Orientation 
  
“On most political matters, would you say you are very liberal, 
liberal, somewhat liberal, moderate, somewhat conservative, 
conservative, or very conservative?” 
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Political Knowledge47  1. “Which party now controls the House of Representatives, the 
Democrats or Republicans?” 
2. “What party is more conservative, Democrats or Republicans?”
3. “What job or political office is now held by Dick Cheney?” 
4. “Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is 
constitutional, the President, Congress, or Supreme Court?” 
5. “How much of a majority is required for the Senate and House 
to override a presidential veto?” ___________ 
Political Attentiveness 48  1. “In general, how would you characterize your interest in 
politics: very interested, somewhat interested, not very 
interested, or not at all interested?” 
2. “How often do you discuss politics with your friends or 
family: very often, somewhat often, not very often, or never?” 
3. How many days a week do you watch national network  
news? ______ 
4. How many days a week do you watch the 24-hour news 
channels (CNN, FOX News, MSNBC)? _____ 
5. How many days a week do you read about politics in the 
newspaper? _____ 
6. How many days a week do you listen to shows about politics 
on the radio? _____ 
  
Control Variables  
 
Prior agenda 
  
“In your opinion, what is the SINGLE most important issue or 
problem facing America today?” ________________________ 
  
Income 
  
“According to your best guess, do you believe your parents’ 
combined household income is under $20,000, above $20,000 
but below $40,000, above 40,000 but below $60,000, above 
$60,000 but below $80,000, above $80,000 but below 
$100,000, or above $100,000?” 
  
Tax Cuts 
  
“If you HAD to choose, which one of the following would you 
prefer, a 15% tax cut benefiting all income groups EQUALLY, 
or a 15% tax cut benefiting ONLY low-income families?” 
  
Unemployment Benefits 
 
“Should the amount of unemployment benefits be greatly 
increased, somewhat increased, neither increased nor 
decreased, somewhat decreased, or greatly decreased?” 
                                                 
47 The individual items were combined to form the 5-item scale of political knowledge recommended by Delli 
Carpini and Keeter (1993). The percentage of correct responses was, respectively, 69%, 54%, 53%, 75%, and 65%. 
A Reliability Analysis performed on this scale yielded a Cronbach’s Alpha of .69.   
48 The individual items were combined to form a 6-item scale of political involvement. A Reliability Analysis 
performed on this scale yielded a Cronbach’s Alpha of .64. 
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Job Assistance Program 
  
“Would you strongly support, somewhat support, neither 
support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose a 
new job assistance program that would provide $3,000 to 
unemployed workers to use for job retraining, child care, 
moving costs, and other costs associated with finding a job.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
197 
APPENDIX H 
 
 
 
STUDY 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
TABLE H1. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables in Study 3  
 
  
Variable 
  
 
Mean 
 
St. Dev. 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Range 
       
Dependent Variable      
Perceived Importance of the Economy                   4.15 1.24 0 6 6 
      
Moderator Variables      
Personal Characteristics Scale 13.82 6.44 1 30 29 
     Integrity 3.38 1.41 0 6 6 
     Compassion 2.38 1.63 0 6 6 
     Intelligence 2.46 1.66 0 6 6 
     Vision 3.41 1.58 0 6 6 
     Charisma 2.20 1.79 0 6 6 
Presidential Approval 2.78 1.70 0 6 6 
Partisan Identification 3.13 1.96 0 6 6 
Ideological Orientation 2.55 1.48 0 6 6 
Political Knowledge Scale 2.58 1.11 0 5 5 
     Partisan Control of the House 0.69 0.47 0 1 1 
     Which Party is More Conservative? 0.54 0.50 0 1 1 
     What Job is Held by Dick Cheney? 0.53 0.50 0 1 1 
     Who determines if a law is const.? 0.75 0.43 0 1 1 
     Majority required to override veto 0.65 0.48 0 1 1 
Political Attentiveness Scale 8.95 5.12 0 29 29 
     Interest in politics 1.57 0.89 0 3 3 
     Discuss politics with friends/family 1.53 0.81 0 3 3 
     Days watch national network news 1.35 1.54 0 7 7 
     Days watch 24-hour news channels 1.90 1.98 0 7 7 
     Days read about politics in paper 1.94 2.01 0 7 7 
     Days listen to politics on radio 0.66 1.30 0 7 7 
      
Control Variables      
Prior agenda 0.37 0.41 0 1 1 
Income 3.28 1.51 0 5 5 
Tax Cuts 0.65 0.48 0 1 1 
Unemployment Benefits 1.58 0.71 0 4 4 
Job Assistance Program 1.46 0.67 0 4 4 
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